Subject: Re: The Limits To Growth
From: charliew@hal-pc.org (charliew)
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 96 01:55:56 GMT
In article <58ivs6$1c2@news.inforamp.net>,
sync@inforamp.net (J McGinnis) wrote:
>charliew@hal-pc.org (charliew) wrote:
>
>>In article <58e2ak$7id@dfw-ixnews6.ix.netcom.com>,
>> tamco1@ix.netcom.com(Thomas A McGraw) wrote:
>>(BIG CUT)
>>>
>>> You all are going to have to find some other work. The trend is
>>>to combust less, not more oil.
>>
>>If the oil industry lasts about 10 more years, I will not have to find
more
>>work. At that point, it will be someone else's problem.
>
>Not only do you attempt to leave the solution to someone else, but you
>hope and fight to make sure that the problem is not even faced in your
>time. At the least the problem is still there, and most likely it is
>compounded.
>
>>> If you needed a tree to stay warm, you would tend to not use it
>>>inefficiantly. You might want some around for later. Ever eat food from
>>>a tree?
>>> The "environment" isn't "their" problem. The environment isn't
>>>'over there". It's a global thing. Your job is inconsequencial.
>>
>>This is where people like you start looking totally foolish. I have
>>dependents to care for, and so does the vast majority of the rest of the
>>adults in the world.
>
>And you think you are doing them a favor by leaving them with the
>problems? Do you think you can improve life for them by simply leaving
>them a big fat trust fund? Do you enjoy teaching them that to survive
>they have to step on whoever and whatever gets in their way, and that
>the same will done to them?
You are getting pretty close to my plan, Jason. In fact, you are finally
getting to the pessimistic part of my personality, and you are not going to
like what you read. When I look into the future of manufacturing in this
country (U.S.), I do not see a very good future past 10-20 more years.
Since I work in manufacturing, this has me committed to make as much money
in as short time frame as I am capable. Once manufacturing leaves this
country, and moves overseas, everyone's standard of living will decline. I
plan to do whatever it takes to migrate into the "rich" class, while the
rest of the middle class migrates into the "poor" class. This will
necessarily require VERY stiff competition, but I think I am more mentally
prepared than most. If I have it my way, I will leave most of the enviros,
and others who are less fit to compete, in my dust. Furthermore, based on
the attitudes and capabilities that I have seen in this newsgroup, there
will be very little that the average newsgroup poster can do about this
(either the economy declining, or me getting ahead of them).
>
>>If you are looking to change my attitude, you
>>definitely cannot do that by calling my job inconsequential. In my
>>opinion, environmentalists are often inconsequential, as my daily
problems
>>of finding food, shelter, and clothing for me and my family have a much
>>higher priority than the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere.
>
>Your job and your life is not inconsequential, but is no more
>consequential than anyone else's. Problems are solved by collective
>effort, not by self-centered competition.
My problems will indeed be solved by self-centered competition. If I stay
in my present income bracket for the next 5-10 years, I can tell my present
employer to "stick it where the sun don't shine!"
Greed and poverty are each
>direct results of the other; to eliminate one you must eliminate both.
This is a big over-simplification, usually espoused by people who are
socialistic minded. Oh, the poor working class! They need to overthrow
the greedy, rich industrialists!
In 5-10 years, you can preach this sermon to my CPA!
>The greed you demonstrate and justify with your fear of poverty is
>example enough. Those who benefit from the way things are have a
>responsibility to those who don't.
This is where we strongly disagree. I make occasional charitable
contributions, but I don't have a responsibility to raise the standard of
living of someone in poverty, at my expense. Even if I wanted to, there is
not enough money to go around. Besides this, giving away money *just plain
doesn't work*! I know this for a fact, because I have done it before, and
the gift had big unintentional consequences.
>
>There are nearly 300 milllion people in the United States, most of
>whom are well educated, intelligent and hard-working. Why should
>anyone fear going hungry? Why should anyone fear _anything_? Now
>_that_ would be the greatest country in the world.
>
>Instead we have trillions of dollars of public debt around the world,
>which is blamed on the poor, (and in your case the environmentalists),
>and held by those who benefit most from the way society works.
I don't blame the enviros for any of this debt at the present time.
However, if we implement some of their grander (and more stupid) schemes, I
will blame them big time!
However, I will tell you something that is stranger than what I have
already said. If enviros do something that causes the economy to slump, I
may even be benefitted by it. Assuming that an economic depression was the
order of the day, the money I have in savings would get more valuable. I
definitely would not want to see this, but I will try to take advantage of
it nonetheless.
>
>>Until
>>environmentalists get smart enough to recognize the human nature, and
human
>>instinct, in the problems they are so concerned about, they are going to
>>have a very difficult time impacting the problem in the way that they see
>>fit.
>
>Impacting the problem involves the definite changing of that 'human
>nature', so to say that they don't understand it is pretty far off the
>mark.
Read your Old Testament accounts of the Israeli march through the desert
(see Exodus). If the almighty couldn't seem to change the attitudes of his
chosen people, how in the world do you expect some wimpy environmentalists
to do this for a much larger population?
Your ideas were favorites of the communists. Those guys' theories
implicitly assumed that people would do the right thing, even when there
was no material gain to be had from their actions. This stupid experiment
has been repeated many times in the last century, and it has invariably
produced substandard results. Why do you think your ideas will "take root"
this time around?
Subject: Re: Ozone hole=storm in a teacup
From: eggsoft@sydney.dialix.oz.au (Greig Ebeling)
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 07:49:30 GMT
bschlesinger@nssdca.gsfc.nasa.gov (Barry M. Schlesinger) wrote:
>I refer to the message posted December 5, listed at 2:04:48 GMT,
>message id 585als$qcr@lace.colorado.edu. Perhaps it has not yet
>reached Australia. It discusses the following issues:
[snip]
No worries, I have it now, and here is my response:
----
Robert Parsons wrote:
>Greig Ebeling's posts in this thread contain many mistakes and many
>fallacious assertions. I am collecting my responses into a single post.
>
>In article <57d02n$4lh$1@sydney.DIALix.oz.au>
>Greig Ebeling wrote:
>
>>My initial impression was that research into ozone depletion seemed
>>to be conducted in an unscientific manner.
[snip]
> This is completely wrong. During the first two years after the
> discovery of the ozone hole was announced, a *lot* of effort was
> devoted to hypotheses that made no reference to halogen chemistry.
I am aware of this, but that is not what I am referring to. I was
referring to my "initial impressions", long before I had any knowledge
of the real scientific work being done. From the point of view of me
(the layman) none of the "alternative" work ever happened. The media
was only interested in the idea that the "ozone hole" was actually
predicted by (which it was not) Rowland and Molina's early theories re
homogeneous ozone depletion. The general perception was that the
observation proved the theory that CFCs CAUSE ozone depletion, and
because the ozone hole is so spectacular, it made great 'billboard'.
My point re ozone depletion being natural, and merely exacerbated by
CFCs, is to counter this common public perception.
[snip]
>(Yes, in spite of Kuhn
> et al., in science people really do change their minds when confronted
> with contrary evidence. Not always, but often.)
I agree. But in this case, I am not suggesting that ozone theory is
wrong, only that it is IRRELEVANT. There is nothing more stubborn
than a scientist who has spent a large chunk of his/her life
investigating theories, proving them accurate, explaining the
conclusions to less knowledgable people, spurred on by the media
inspired, hysterical notion that they are saving the world from
cataclysm, only to find that it was a waste of time.
>>The fact that the investigation seemed from the outset to be a witch
>>hunt for CFCs, that Dupont's patent on CFCs had recently expired,
>
> Urban legend which has been refuted several times on the net.
> The original patents expired long ago. And they didn't belong
> to DuPont anyway. From a post by Bruce Hamilton:
Point taken and noted. I still think that DuPont involvement in the
abolition of CFCs, and the rather large amount of money they have made
since, is a bit fishy. Large corporations don't shoot themselves in
the foot (unless they are also shooting everyone in the foot, and they
have two or three to spare).
[snip]
> To anyone familiar with the early history of this subject, the
> idea that DuPont is behind it all is utterly ludicrous. DuPont
> was just about the most adamant _opponent_ of the Rowland-Molina
> hypothesis between 1974 and 1988. Go look up ~1975 issues of
> _Science_ or _New Scientist_ and you'll see that they took out
> full-page ads attacking the research.
And as far as I can tell, they were RIGHT!
[snip]
>It was only upon urging from their own scientific staff
> that the executives reversed their position.
I'm sorry, Robert, but what goes on in the board rooms of companies
like DuPont involves profit, and not charity. It seems to me DuPont
saw an opportunity to make money, took it, and succeeded.
>>Also the Montreal Protocol, touted as a solution to the "problem" of
>>ozone depletion, was completely ineffective in reducing CFCs. Four
>>major industrialised countries (Japan, Korea, Indonesia, China) did not
>>sign it, and continue to use CFCs
...Sorry, "continued"...
>
> Japan signed the original protocol in 1987 and ratified it in 1988.
> China ratified in 1992, South Korea and Indonesia in 1992,
> North Korea in 1995. As of 30 June 1995, 149 nations had ratified; see
> gopher://unephq.unep.org:70/00/un/unep/convent/montreal/mon-rat
Noted.
However accession to the treaty does not bind the country to any
immediate action. That depends entirely on whether they are considered
a 'developed' or a 'developing' nation. At this time there is still a
flourishing trade in CFCs, which will continue until at leat 2005.
And even then, whether CFC production will end depends on the transfer
of technology and infrastructure to the developing nations. Will this
happen? Who will pay? Why is there so much inequality in per capita
costs? Do the benefits of CFC reduction (if any!!!) match the
economic penalty (some) countries are paying?
[snip]
>>IMO the evidence of a scientist using comparatively primitive techniques
>>is not strong evidence.
>
> "Primitive techniques"? Dobson spectrophotomers are still in use today.
> The ozone hole was discovered with one.
COMPARATIVELY primitive. Compared to TOMS. Admit it Robert, before
TOMS there was considerable doubt the accuracy of spectrophotomers.
Dobson was always (and rightly so) questioning the calibration of his
equipment. Nobody doubts that they are the only economical method of
on-going measurement.
>>Also the notion that increased ozone depletion is entirely due to
>>synthetic organochlorides must be in doubt, since the "ozone hole" has
>>recently reduced in intensity, whilst chlorine levels have continued to
>>increase. Both Cicerone and Rowlands agreed that PSCs are both critical
>
> No, except for a temporary _increase_ around 1993, probably due to
> Pinatubo aerosols extending the range of the heterogeneous chemistry,
> the ozone hole has maintained a rather constant size and depth since
> since 1989. ^^^^^^
You have conveniently missed the 1988 observation which shows that
PSCs are critical (which is my point).
Otherwise, accepted. The variations in peak measurements in recent
times are small compared to previous annual increases (and decreases).
But it is a rather minor quibble, don't you think?
> As discussed in the FAQ, this is expected since in
> the region where the heterogenous chemistry operates (lower half
> of the stratosphere, nearly _all_ of the ozone is destroyed when
> the hole forms.) Further incremental increases in stratospheric Cl
> won't influence the size or depth much, although they may increase
> the duration of the hole (with more reservoir Cl, the threshold for
> massive ozone destruction can be reached earlier in August.)
Correct me if I'm wrong, Robert, but aren't you saying here that polar
stratospheric ozone depletion has basically peaked, and will not
increase appreciably no matter how much CFC is placed in the
atmosphere. If this is what you are saying, then if ozone depletion
does not cause biological harm (more on this later), then the
Montreal Protocol is pointless*, and the "ozone hole" is a storm in a
teacup.
* If evidence of bio harm is not forth-coming, it is possible that
developing countries can delay signing the MP, and thereby continue to
use CFCs indefinitely.
>>Finally, I am yet to see any evidence that ozone depletion occurs at
>>mid-latitudes, that it results in a net loss in ozone from year to year,
>
> Evidence and references are presented in part I of the FAQ. See also
> the 1991 and 1994 WMO Scientific assessments. The Executive Summary
> of the latter is on the Web at the NOAA Aeronomy Lab, http://www.al.noaa.gov/
> Mid-latitude ozone depletion is thoroughly documented.
Let's deal with each of these seperately.
1. Mid-latitude ozone depletion.
Whilst I agree that measurements of ozone LOSS are well documented,
the mechanism for loss has not been proven to be DEPLETION at
mid-latitudes (except due to volcanic activity). Your references
suggest (as I do) that ozone loss is due to "transport of chemically
perturbed polar air to mid-latitudes". Therefore mid-latitude ozone
loss is dependent on the nature of polar ozone depletion, and on
meteorology.
2. Net loss in ozone.
Your references demonstrate that there is a trend in PEAK ozone loss,
but does not indicate a NET loss. Each year, in summer, ozone levels
return to seasonal normal levels. To suggest a trend of 3%/decade,
considering the moderation in the rate of increase in polar depletion,
is disingenuous. Also, and by your own admission in your FAQ, the
current levels are very small compared to daily, seasonal and global
variations, insufficient to overcome the so-called "self-healing"
mechanism (as backed up by the lack of conclusive evidence of
increased UV-B), and therefore completely IRRELEVANT (ie a storm in a
teacup)!
>>or that the seasonal losses cause any damage to the biosphere.
>
> What about the antarctic phytoplankton? See the Smith et al. paper,
> cited in Part IV of the FAQ.
As Smith points out, the damage is several orders of magnitude too
small to be considered significant. Come on, Robert, the jury is out
on this, and it's a long shot that proven bio harm is ever going to
justify the costs of CFC abolition.
Let's be reasonable. Compare this issue to (say) the damage caused by
acid rain. Do we abolish coal-fired power generation? No! Why not?
Because of cost/benefit vs public perception. I can think of dozens
of examples like this.
My point is that there is an incorrect public perception (CFCs CAUSE
ozone depletion/ enviro harm/ skin cancer) and a lack of cost/benefit
analysis in the Montreal Protocol.
>> (Claims that skin cancer in humans may be attributed to ozone depletion is
>> nonsense.)
>
> Not at all. See DeGruijl's paper in CONSEQUENCES, on the web at
> http://www.gcrio.org/CONSEQUENCES/summer95/impacts.html
> Just because the media exagerrates the effects, does not mean that
> the effects do not exist.
"[...] Although the rate of loss has now been slowed, total ozone is
expected to continue to drop through the present decade, when the
decrease at mid latitudes in the Northern hemisphere in summer and
fall should maximize at 6 to 7%. A reduction in ozone of this amount
would correspond to a resulting 6 to 12% increase in the average
annual dose of biologically-harmful UV radiation." [DeGruijl]
Interesting assumption on which to base a THEORETICAL analysis. And
where is the data to back up this assumption? D'oh!
>>Methyl chloride (CH3Cl) comes mostly from natural (biological) sources, and
>>is estimated to pass from the troposphere to the stratosphere at the rate of
>>about 1 Mt/year.
>
> That estimate is at least an order of magnitude too large. _Total_
> organic chlorine entering the stratosphere in the 1980's was
> around 300 kt/year, of which only ~20% was MeCl. This figure is
> given and cited in the FAQ, Part II, Section 4.4.
[from your FAQ]
"During the 1980's emissions of CFC's and related
compounds contributed ~1 Mt of chlorine per year to the
atmosphere. [Prather et al.] This results in an annual flux of >0.3
Mt/yr of chlorine into the stratosphere."
Here you are talking about total chlorine flux, as opposed to total
flux of chlorine compounds, which is what I am talking about. It is a
little unfair of you to compare oranges to apples, don't you think,
Robert?
[snip[
>>argument that a drop off of HCl with altitude in the troposphere is evidence
>>of a low natural upward flux, may also be applied to the stratosphere in
>>reverse.
>
>>[From Parsons FAQ, Copyright 1995]
>> "...the mixing ratio of HCl _decreases_ with altitude in the troposphere,
>> reaching vanishingly small values at the tropopause, and then _increases_
>> with altitude in the stratosphere. This rules out all processes in
>> which HCl slowly drifts upward from the troposphere."
>>
>>This also implies that there is no downward drift either.
>
> It most emphatically does not. *There is a sink in the troposphere.*
Well, hang on, you can't have it both ways. If HCl is passing through
the tropopause to this sink, why isn't it measured at the tropopause?
[snip]
>>Assuming that the increase is entirely from CFCs (ie avoiding the volcano
>>debate), the contribution from CFCs is about 2.3kt /year or less than 3%
>>of total Cl from CFC flux (~1-2Mt/year).
>
>>Also calculating the mass of HCl in 1977 and extrapolating backwards, the
>>natural burden of HCl is about 450 kt.
>
> Ebeling does not say how he "extrapolates backwards", but he has
> clearly made a mistake. The above figures give 490 kt for 1977, so
> somehow he is assuming only 40 kt anthropogenic Cl prior to 1977 which
> is absurd since CFC emissions had already reached their first peak
> before this.
I am not talking about emissions, I am talking about stratospheric Cl
burden. My backward extrapolation is a BOTE sketch assuming roughly
exponential increase from 1977 to 1990. And even if this estimate is
out by 100kt, it doesn't invalidate my conclusion, which is...
>>Therefore inorganic Cl compound flux from CFCs is small compared to the
>>natural burden of HCl in the stratosphere.
>
>>Also from Parson - Copyright 1995:
>>
>> "The total amount of HF
>> in the stratosphere increased by a factor of 3-4 between 1978 and
>> 1989 [Zander et al., 1990] [Rinsland et al.]; the relative increase
>> is larger for HF than for HCl (a factor of 2.2 over the same period)
>> because the natural source, and hence the baseline concentration,
>> is much smaller."
>>
>>Translation: there is much more natural stratospheric HCl than HF
>>arising from anthropogenic sources.
>
> *MIS*-translation. The paragraph neither says nor implies any
> such thing. It simply says that natural HCl exceeds natural HF.
Ah yes, that is precisely what it says, and what I am trying to say.
> In fact, the comparison between HF and HCl mixing ratios, recently
> carried out on a global scale by the HALOE project, demonstrates
> clearly that stratospheric HCl is primarily anthropogenic.
> See http://haloedata.larc.nasa.gov/home.html, and read the
> published papers.
And I do not deny this, although to say "primarily" without further
quantification is little misleading. But that is not the thrust of my
argument. I am merely pointing out that there was lots of
stratospheric Cl prior to CFCs ie all the ingredients of ozone
depletion were there prior to CFCs.
[snip]
>>2. Ozone depletion causes no biological damage.
>>
>>Ozone depletion at the poles results in insignificant UV increase,
>>because the sun is so low on the horizon.
>
> The FAQ documents _measured_ springtime UV in Antarctica that
> exceeded _midsummer_ UV in San Diego, Ca. Why was that left out?
As I have already pointed out, mid-latitude UV-B measurements are not
relatively high, particularly when the measurements are made under a
photochemical haze.
>> Also the area affected is
>>almost entirely devoid of life larger than microbes.
> ^^^^^^^^
> YM "whales" - HTH. :-)
You know very well that whales migrate to tropical waters to breed,
and are therefore (of course) highly resistant to UV-B.
You also know that the hole centres over the Antarctic continent.
> The Antarctic Ocean is hardly "devoid of life larger than microbes."
Lower depletion levels do (I admit) extend over Antarctic Ocean
waters, but the depletion levels are much lower than the maximum
levels at the centre.
> And why were the Smith et al. phytoplankton experiments left out?
Because they are not significant.
>>At mid-latitudes increase in UV due to ozone depletion is very low
>>compared to daily, seasonal and global variations. This is due to an
>>absence of PSCs (at mid-latitudes) and so ozone depletion only takes
>>place there in the presence of sulphate aerosols from volcanic activity
>>(which is natural).
>
> The chlorine - which is what actually destroys the ozone - is
> predominantly anthropogenic. And, there is a background aerosol
> layer in the absence of volcanic eruptions. And, ozone depletion
> also takes place through purely gas-phase mechanisms - this was
> the original Molina-Rowland process.
Proof!? Significance to biological harm!?
[snip]
>>Rowland relies on the lack of observation by Dobson (which IMO is
>>anecdotal). I have not posed the question to Molina.
>
> "Anecdotal"?!! The 1956-58 results are in the published literature
> (reference: the Applied Optics paper cited in the FAQ, and an earlier
[...etc...]
I know. But there was, and still is, conjecture over whether what was
published, and what was observed, are the same thing. OK, I admit
that formal publication is the only thing scientists can go on, but
the seeds of doubt are there.
[snip]
>>Exactly! And my calcs indicate that there WAS enough Cl, and has
>>been for a very long time. I have not seen any calcs or models which
>>suggest otherwise.
>
> The calculations are wrong in a number of respects. For one thing,
> they were based upon a fundamentally incorrrect picture of atmospheric
> dynamics (strat/trop exchange in particular.)
1. As I have already said, I appreciate you correcting my
understanding re strat/trop exchange. However, since my calcs are
based on direct measurement of HCl, the results do not rely on this
issue.
> For another, they compare
> annual flux of CFCs into the stratosphere with annual increase of
> HCl, a meaningless exercise since they do not include either the
> HCl sink or the subsequent behavior of the CFCs after their entry
> into the stratosphere.
2. By comparing DIRECT measurement of increased HCl (which of course
includes any sink for HCl which may exist) with known CFC flux, I calc
the natural vs anthropogenic ratio in terms of flux. This leads to a
figure for the natural burden.
> For a third, some of the numbers themselves
> are way off (for example, an estimate of ~1 Mt of methyl chloride
> per year entering the stratosphere, which is at least an order of
> magnitude too large.)
3. As I have already pointed out, the calcs are a BOTE and therefore
very rough, but I do not concede that they are "way off". You appear
to have arrived at your conclusion by failing to recognise the
difference between total CH3Cl flux and total Cl flux. There is a
difference.
> For a fourth, additional Cl reservoirs such
> as ClONO2 are left out. The partitioning of Cl between HCl and ClONO2
> varies with latitude and season.
I understand the importance of ClONO2, but could find no base
measurement data in order to include it in my calcs. Perhaps you can
point out to me how it's exclusion from my calcs affects my conclusion
re natural burden of Cl.
>And so on and so forth.
And so on and so forth.
I am curtailing any further discussion on this matter, because it is
off the point a bit, and besides my wife is nagging me to death to get
off the computer. So I am willing to move on my stand, and restate:
Ozone depletion is a natural phenomenon, but it has been significantly
enhanced by CFCs.
But I am not budging on the lack of evidence for biological harm, nor
on the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol.
...Greig
Subject: Re: Major problem with climate predictions
From: ozone@primenet.com (John Moore)
Date: 10 Dec 1996 20:59:04 -0700
On 10 Dec 1996 17:17:37 GMT, "Sam McClintock"
wrote:
>Two different scenarios, a) we can prove the model is right by
>comparing results against field research (such as we do frequently in
>air dispersion modeling) or b) we can prove various facets of the model
>are correct (through experimentation). In the case of global warming
>models, a LOT of work has gone into establishing that various facets of
>the model are addressing the physics/chemistry correctly. Of course,
>the only way we can know if the holistic model is correct is to keep
>pumping greenhouse gases into our atmosphere and see what happens. If
>the earth warms up, the model wins - sort of. I find it truly strange
>that some people don't see the idiocy wanting to keep this experiment
>going. Or that cost becomes a factor (because if the theories pan out,
>you haven't even seen what the concept of cost, in all its ugly forms,
>really means).
You seem to have a very dichotomous view of things. Cut emissions, or
the devil may care.
I don't advocate that we just ignore the issue. But the models do
indicate that we can delay doing anything will little effect on the
ultimate outcome. Thus, if the models are right, we have time to do
more research and let our economy and technology build in such a way
that the ultimate reductions, if necessary, are more technologically
and politically feasable.
And furthermore, you don't know what the cost would be if the current
scenario is right. And you don't know it is right.
>
>I made no implicit statement that the algebra was simple, only that the
>basic premises are correct. I truly hope you are not trying to argue
>that we don't understand what constitutes a "greenhouse" gas or that
>mankind is not adding a considerable amount of these gases into our
>atmosphere.
Of course not, and we are significantly increasing one greenhouse gas
(CO2) which, by pure physics if there is not feedback, will result in
a temperature rise. That's quite a caveat. On the other hand, we are
also introducing things that reduce the greenhouse effect - certain
aerosols.
>
>And complex models can come up with some outstanding results. From
>basic gaussian dispersion models, we have evolved into other
>fields/theories, and artificial neural networks, that have greatly
>increased the accuracy (predictive quality) of models in general.
Complex models, with adequate calibration, can be useful in some
fields. On the other hand, we know that the best models, with lots of
research feeding them and enormous computers, are extremely poor at
forecasting weather (certainly a related phenomenon to global warming)
beyond about 7 days.
>
>Only for those without the know-how or intelligence
Getting a little ad hominem here, I see. So far we have "idiot" and
references to "intelligence." But what the heck, USENET doesn't
require reasonable arguments.
> to work within the
>base of knowledge to improve the performance of what is going on. What
>I was pointing out though was that currently almost every atmospheric
>model out there says the globe's going to warm up. While a lot of
>attention by detractors of the situation is made about how far they
>could err into the "safe" temperatures for habitation, the same errors
>could happen to the warmer side of global warming. So if we say the
>earth's surface temp could rise 4 degrees F, but some models only say 2
>F, it ignores the modeled scenarios that say 6 F or worse. And while
>most scientists consider catastrophic (constructive reinforcement)
>warming an unlikely event, it has not been ruled out.
And not only do most models predict these increases, but also most
models fail to forecast the past, which is surely an important test of
any model!
>If I said you could raise your standard of living 25% or lower it 50%
>by flipping a coin, would you do it? A little unfair to hold you to
>this analogy, but the concept is essentially correct considering what
>we have it stake in the argument. Then we have the more honest
>questions, like what about the people who have no choice whatsoever in
>this decision - our children?
And how about the people who will inevitably die as a result of the
economic consequences of significant emissions reductions? We are
already killing several thousand per year in the US due to traffic
accidents with reduced-sized cars - reduced to meet environmental
standards.
How about the billions of folks in the third world who are likely to
simply ignore the requirements? A couple of decades and we might have
a lot less poverty there, with a resulting willingness to worry about
the environment.
Finally, although it is true that runaway warming hasn't been rules
out, it is also true that the foreseen effects of the expected warming
are not as bad as most fear mongers (ie, reporters) allege. For
example, a little warming in the winter in the arctic may not be a bad
thing. Increased CO2 leads to increased crop yields.
It is a *very* complex system. As one who works with very complex
systems myself, I am very skeptical of models that cannot be
calibrated, and I also know that some systems cannot be successfully
modeled.
Subject: Re: Yuri's crude religious bigotry.
From: Philip R
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 1996 01:28:57 -0500
David Lloyd-Jones wrote:
>
> On 9 Dec 1996 18:43:06 GMT, yuku@io.org (Yuri Kuchinsky) wrote:
>
> >David Lloyd-Jones (dlj@inforamp.net) wrote:
> >: On 8 Dec 1996 13:40:55 GMT, yuku@io.org (Yuri Kuchinsky) wrote:
> >: >David Lloyd-Jones (dlj@inforamp.net) wrote:
> >
> >: >: On the other hand you would be quite correct to point out that Italy,
> >: >: Quebec, Portugal, Ireland, Roman Catholic cultures all, have extremely
> >: >: low birth rates,
> >: >
> >: >Because they have highly educated populations who can see through the
> >: >Vatican propaganda.
> >
> >: Nope. None of these places is spectacularly well-educated even today,
> >
> >Neither are you.
>
> Suppose that were true? You allow my point to stand, I take it.
>
> >: but the droops in birth rates all took place in the period 1850 to
> >: 1920, before ma media, mass education, or even mass literacy.
> >
> >Changing the subject. You were talking about today. Neat trick, but it
> >won't fly with me.
>
> They have low birth rates today because their birth rates dropped in
> the past. I would have thought you might be able to follow that,
> Yuri.
>
> >: The fact is the Roman Catholic view of family life, including sex,
> >: leaves plenty of room for birth control.
> >
> >How silly can Dave get?
>
> Very. That in no way lessens the truth of what I say here.
>
> >: What it opposes is the view
> >: of sex as an indoor sport, or even an outdoor one, for the amusement
> >: of anyone, generally male, who wants a little fun.
>
> >Sounds like you, Dave. Not the first time you've been arguing against
> >yourself...
>
> Again, assume that what you say about me is true if you like. I take
> it you are conceding the truth of what I say about Roman Catholic
> Doctrine.
>
> >: >: while Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, all Protestant or
> >: >: non-Xian, have spectacularly high ones.
> >
Hi guys
just joined the newsgroup and just had to reply. The fact is, in the
humanrace, birth rates fall as income rises. In most of Europe, North
America, Australia and the Pacific rim as the disposable income of the
population rises the birth rate. While in Africa, India, South East Asia
and Bangladesh, because of war, desease and natural desasters the food
supply becomes erratic, incomes fall and in general the standard living
falls. At that time people revert to a basic primal instinct to reproduce
to insure survival of the specie.
Religion has little effect on birth rates in the modern world as a lot of
people see religion as (christianity) as something you can mix and match
to suit themself.
--
Philip R (voice e-mail) |Mail: best viewed in Netscape Mail|
mailto: jamaican@sprynet.com |News: best Viewed in Netscape News|
Webpage: http://home.sprynet.com/sprynet/jamaican
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/Philip_Ramsey
Subject: ECO GENEVA (AGBM5) #2 Dec 11 96(30K)
From: Lelani Arris
Date: 11 Dec 1996 00:26:39
Reply-To: Moderator of conference "mlist.ecix1"
From: Lelani Arris
Subject: ECO GENEVA (AGBM5) #2 Dec 11 96(30K)
ECO NEWSLETTER
AGBM5 - GENEVA
NGO NEWSLETTER
AGBM5
December 11, 1996
ISSUE #2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
.1 Who Says We Can't Change the World?
.2 IPCC Provides Helpful Guidance
.3 Monday Afternoon
.4 Tuesday Morning
.5 Workshop on Developing Country Impacts
.6 Japan - 4 out of 10, Must Try Harder
.7 EU Caves In
.8 Letter to the Presidents and More
.9 CAN Statement
.10 Leman
.11 CAN Members Attending AGBM5
.12 Contacts
.13 Credits
Eco has been published by Non-Governmental Environmental Groups
at major international conferences since the Stockholm
Environment Conference in 1972. This issue is produced
co-operatively by CAN groups attending the climate negotiations
in Geneva, December 1996.
******************************************************************
Who says we can't change the World?
Invigorated by COP 2, the AGBM has got off to a fresh start. The
US has promised solutions tomorrow, or possibly the next day, or
possibly the day after... provided that we are all flexible about
almost everything. With the aid of JI, emissions trading,
borrowing, etc., we can confidently expect the climate problem to
be solved sometime within the next few millennia, say by the year
3,000. Eco feels confident that with the active (and so far only)
support of Canada these proposals are bound to be adopted (or
adapted, as Saudi Arabia would prefer).
The new Franco-Japanese initiative on per capita based
commitments has met with almost universal approval within the
trade ministries of the two nations although, strangely, some
states have been reluctant to accept the concept immediately.
Amongst other proposals which, co-incidentally, particularly suit
those who propose them, are the Australian fairness criteria for
differentiation.
In a recent innovative development to try and convince Japan,
Australia has tinkered with its MEGABARE model to show Japan that
rather than being the least affected, it will be nearly as badly
affected as itself. We will surely all agree that high GDP,
population and Toyota growth are essential prerequisites for
having minimal commitments, especially if one is already a very
well-off country.
Eco is seriously considering the draft fairness criterion based
on kangaroos per square kilometers. Also under consideration is
the minke whales per capita criterion proposed by Norway. The
only problem is that both countries seem as determined to reduce
these as fast as possible as they are to increase their emissions.
Alas, the EU machinery has temporarily stalled due to a Spaniard
in the works, or possibly a Swede, or possibly something Gallic.
Silence from the Atlantic Fringe has been interpreted as an
impending parliamentary interregnum compounded if not caused by
an outbreak of Mad Cow disease.
Amongst all of these innovative and imaginative ideas, it was
clear that the AOSIS suggestion to consider their "old hat"
proposal containing real figures for QUELROs was bound to fail.
Who says that the AGBM is getting nowhere?
******************************************************************
IPCC Provides Helpful Guidance to Delegates on QELROS and PAMS
IPCC representatives were active during the first day of the AGBM
session. At the Monday plenary session, IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin
gave delegates a helpful seminar on the relationship of emissions
targets to the long term objective of the Convention. On Monday
evening, the IPCC's first technical report on Technologies,
Policies and Measures for Mitigating Climate Change was presented
at an informal workshop.
After stating that the task of the AGBM is to "negotiate further
agreements on measures to be taken in order to reach" the
Convention's ultimate objective, Bolin provided very helpful
information from the IPCC SAR on the relationship of emissions
targets and timetables to the issue of atmospheric stabilization.
If the atmospheric concentration of CO2 is not to exceed 450
ppmv, Bolin stated that the average permissable emission until
2100 is about 6Gtc/yr - slightly lower than current emissions
from burning of fossil fuels - with emissions declining to lower
values thereafter. He noted that "If a temporary increase of the
emissions takes place during the first few decades of the 21st
century, a rapid changeover to decreasing emissions would be
needed thereafter... However, such a rapid changeover is costly
because the energy industry is capital-intensive."
He went on to emphasize that "The sooner an agreement on
limitations and ultimately reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
by all countries, with due recognition of their different states
of development, can be reached, the more effective and less
costly can be the development of the needed strategies."
Professor Bolin summarized the findings of the IPCC's technical
paper. He explained that there is a significant potential for
achieving a far more efficient use of energy at negative or no
cost, but to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppmv
"the development and exploitation of renewable sources for
primary energy will be essential" and "steps to remove the
barriers that presently limit the rate of introducing renewal
energy are, accordingly, essential."
The Monday evening workshop provided further details on the
technical paper. Dr. Richard Moss, Director of the IPCC Working
Group II Technical Support Unit, and co-editor of the technical
paper, highlighted several findings:
* the Second Assessment Report's conclusion that 10-30% energy
efficiency gains are achievable at little or no cost is supported
* many measures are available to realize the economic potential
of low and zero emitting technologies
* a range of policies to overcome the barriers keeping countries
from achieving this potential is recommended
* common actions on policies and measures are identified, ranging
from adopting common measures, to coordination protocols for
consistent reporting on effects of PAMs
* the removal of subsidies for fossil fuel production is
extremely important
* there are many opportunities for non-annex I countries to
implement PAMs with multiple economic and environmental benefits
* research and development on low or zero GHG emitting
technologies and measures is critical and the declining trend of
recent years in both private and public sector funding for such
R&D; should be reversed.
The technical paper is a treasure trove of useful information for
delegates as they work on strengthening commitments in the
Climate Treaty to limit greenhouse gas emissions.
******************************************************************
Monday Afternoon
Negotiations got off to a spirited start Monday afternoon as
prepared presentations were interspersed with pointed questions
during the "Roundtable on Proposals from Parties." The Roundtable
aired divergent views on what should be contained in a Protocol
(or other legal instrument) to be adopted next December at the
third Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan.
Australia, Norway, and Switzerland argued for the differentiation
of industrialized country (Annex I) commitments based on formulas
that would determine emission reduction requirements based on
factors such as emissions per capita, GDP per capita, emissions
per GDP, and the emissions intensity of exports. Japan proposed a
menu approach, which would allow each industrialized country
Party to choose not only the policies and measures it wants to
implement, but also whether to adopt a per capita emissions cap,
or a percentage reduction from 1990 levels. Unfortunately for the
supporters of differentiation, each proposal was different and
clearly designed for the benefit of the proposer. This fact
prompted the Marshall Islands representative to comment that if
the Parties advocating differentiation couldn't agree, then there
should be a uniform 20% reduction for all Annex I Parties, as
contained in the Alliance of Small Island States' (AOSIS)
Protocol proposal.
The European Union (EU) reiterated its proposed Protocol
structure without filling in any new specifics. The proposal
includes placeholders for policies and measures in a series of
Annexes ranging from mandatory to encouraged. A binding target
requiring emissions to be reduced below 1990 levels after 2000 is
to be included, but only a range of options was provided for the
specific numbers. Questions on the EU proposal centered on the
mysterious "Annex X" listing the Parties to be bound by the
specific commitments in the Protocol. Chairman Estrada asked
whether Annex X was envisioned as larger or smaller than Annex I,
to which Ireland (on behalf of the EU) responded that the
intention was to afford the opportunity for additional Parties to
adopt the commitments in the Protocol. Micronesia and China
pointed out that other provisions of the Protocol allowed Parties
to deposit a notice of their intent to be bound by these
commitments and that the Convention itself provides for the
periodic review of the membership of the Annexes. Ireland was
unable to further clarify the EU's intention until Tuesday when
it was explained that the idea was to include new OECD members in
Annex X.
The UK and the US argued for flat rate reduction requirements for
all Annex I parties, with the US stressing that flexibility
provided by emissions trading among Parties with quantified
commitments and Joint Implementation with other Parties
alleviated any need to differentiate initial reduction
obligations. The US stressed its opposition to any binding
requirements before 2010 and its support for a cumulative budget,
e.g. for the period from 2010 to 2020, with the possibility of
borrowing emissions from a later period. The US also emphasized
the importance of provisions to encourage compliance with the
target. Given this emphasis on compliance, the EU asked whether
there was anything enforceable in the US proposal before 2020, to
which the US responded (lamely) that a mid-term target does not
avoid near term action. Continuing its pattern of insightful
questions, the Marshall Islands asked how one could be sure that
a Party which borrows against future obligations wouldn't
subsequently try to reduce its obligations unilaterally, as the
US is now doing with respect to its financial commitments to the
United Nations.
The highlight of the afternoon came, however, when Saudi Arabia
frankly admitted that its GDP is totally oily. Saudi Arabia also
admitted that continued emissions would do damage to Small Island
States and insisted that it did not want to block action, but
only wanted to ensure that action to reduce emissions would not
harm its economy. The Saudis even came up with a helpful
suggestion-remove fossil fuel production subsidies in Annex I
Parties.
The Marshall Islands asked whether Saudi Arabia had ever
considered doing anything with its oil besides exporting it;
noted that it would have been nice had Saudi Arabia shown concern
for developing country impacts in 1973, and suggested that
concern for countries facing extinction might be more important
than concern for countries facing oil revenue shortfalls.
******************************************************************
AGBM Tuesday morning (on agenda item 3 - policies and measures)
Ireland, on behalf of the European Union, began the meeting by
presenting their proposals on policies and measures (PAMs). They
distinguished between three different categories of PAMs - one
with PAMs common for all Annex "X" Parties, another where PAMs
are to be given high priority for inclusion in national
programmes (and with the necessity for coordination with other
parties) and, a left-over category for everything else.
It turned out that introducing "Annex X" without further
explanation was a highly time-absorbing measure in itself; the
majority of the subsequent 21 interventions by non-Annex I
parties asserted that the EU proposal was quite outside the
Berlin Mandate. In other words, the Annex X concept was largely
construed as new commitments for developing countries. Costa Rica
(speaking for G-77 and China) judged measures like emissions
trading and AIJ in a similar manner.
The US, sounding a bit like a broken record, reiterated their
opposition to harmonized measures of any kind. They refused to
begin negotiating text and proceeded to propose additional
measures to defer substantive action such as "medium-term"
targets, borrowing, and, surprise surprise, maximum flexibility
in all matters. This despite its call that "all Parties must
react to the SAR."
Canada mentioned that the positive impacts of climate protection
measures (like efficiency gains on the local quality of life)
should also be considered. However, they proposed a vague
"evolutionary" approach. Is this survival of the fittest?
Australia also refused to accept mandatory common measures, which
is ironic given their inability to meet their own domestic target
for 2000. Japan preferred the menu approach, voluntary goals, and
suggested that indicators for sectors be developed in order to
obtain an objective evaluation of national programmes.
AOSIS pointed out that PAMs should be accepted based upon
established QELROs, not the other way around. Metaphorically
speaking, AGBM-5 seems to be putting the carriage before the
horse.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait concurred with the G-77 and China that
there should be no deviation from the Berlin Mandate, yet they
supported the US on flexibility. They called for an economic
impact assessment of PAMs on developing countries.
One of the rare concrete proposals came from Switzerland which
proposed a tax on aviation fuel and also stated that, especially
for small countries, common measures are necessary because of
their limited home market.
The Chair concluded the meeting with little enthusiasm,
commenting that the morning did little to help in advancing the
task at hand. He therefore plans to continue with individual
consultations.
******************************************************************
Workshop on developing country impacts
Chairman Estrada's forum on impacts of Annex 1 actions on
developing countries generated no clear way forward in balancing
the concerns of fossil-fuel dependent countries with those that
will be hurt by the impacts of climate change.
The discussion, however, demonstrated a serious consideration of
concerns on all sides, including those of oil-exporting
developing countries and low-lying states. However, it was
pointed out that there is a clear distinction between economic
damage and the threat of extinction. While a final resolution on
the need for compensation or insurance schemes is not expected,
the process allowed for interaction between Parties like the
European Union and Saudi Arabia that challenged some of the
status quo rhetoric on the potential impact of actions on
fossil-fuel exporting countries.
Concerns regarding the cost of inaction were brought forward by
small island states and Honduras which shared its fears regarding
the potential cost to its most important agricultural and
economic zone. It called on all countries to face their
responsibilities.
Suggestions for dealing with impacts on developing countries
included the need for a compensation mechanism, the need to
enshrine the principle of "fairness" in the protocol and using
the Consultative Mechanism outlined in the AOSIS protocol
proposal to address ongoing impacts of actions.
Perhaps the most important development of the session was Saudi
Arabia's assurance that "we are concerned about the issue; we are
not suggesting no action." This is a welcome change to their
long-standing approach to these negotiations.
******************************************************************
Japan - 4 out of 10, must try harder
At the end of COP-2 Eco set some homework for the delegates. For
Japan we suggested assertiveness and leadership training. Well,
we have examined the homework Japan has handed in at AGBM5 and we
are not impressed. A good leader is prepared to upset everybody
to do what's right for the Convention and the environment. In
contrast, Japan wants to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol by trying
to please everybody by letting them choose the Ps and Qs that
make life easiest. What true leadership means is setting an
overall goal to substantially reduce CO2 over the next 10 years
so that all these expensive meetings will actually do something
to protect the climate. No doubt some Parties will be upset, no
doubt some Parties will complain, Saudi Arabia may even have to
exile a prince or two, but deep down inside everyone will know
the leader was right and respect their leadership.
Japan says that its proposal is "neither comprehensive or final",
so at least there is something positive to be said about it.
Isn't it sad that the nation (and ministry) most known for
innovation and technology development is ready to raise the white
flag to climate change. Japan could lead the negotiations and win
the international technology race to reduce greenhouse gases. But
on current form, it must try much harder between today and Kyoto.
******************************************************************
EU Caves In
Stephan Singer, WWF and Delia Villagrasa, CNE
Despite lengthy internal preparations by EU climate negotiators
over the last few months, EU environmental ministers meeting on
Monday completely failed to reach agreement. The overwhelming
majority of countries supported significant CO2 emissions
reductions, but the EU as an entity fell hostage to a small
minority.
In particular, France blocked consensus on a moderate proposal -
put forward by five countries including the Irish presidency -
for Annex 1 countries to cut their CO2 emissions by 5-10% by
2005. Other countries supported more drastic CO2 reductions,
closer to the AOSIS protocol (see Monday's Eco).
France's paper, presented as an intervention yesterday, revealed
the hollowness of its claims to be environment-friendly. It
projects annual per capita carbon emissions, in a range from 3 to
6 tons, by the year 2000, which should allow lower-emitting
countries to cut less. This sounds reasonable, and even appears
to serve equity. But does it?
In the first place, although a global agreement on equal per
capita carbon emissions is the only fair long-term goal,
short-term targets for agreement at Kyoto and to be achieved by
2005, as proposed in the AOSIS protocol, would be killed by this
approach. France suggests a per capita target by 2010 equivalent
to a 7-10% CO2 reduction for Annex I countries - however, this is
based on 2000 levels.
Secondly, France currently emits 1.7 tons of carbon per capita,
and would therefore be neatly excluded from its own provisions.
Thirdly, the reason for France's relatively low per-capita
emissions is its reliance on another problematic fuel source -
about 80% of its electricity production originates from nuclear
energy. NGOs cannot recommend substituting dirty fossil fuels
with such a dangerous energy source
