Subject: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 22:42:07 GMT
In article <54jg3b$jf9@peaches.cs.utexas.edu>, turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin) writes:
>-*------
>In article <54hvlm$p4i@news.ox.ac.uk>, patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola) writes:
>>> It's pretty fundamental to the philosophy of linguistics, that
>>> anything that can be said in one language can be said in any
>>> language. Translatability falls out in your lap from that one.
>
>In article , wrote:
>> In that case, maybe something is faulty with the philosophy of
>> linguistics.
>
>Or with Patrick Joula's description.
I had such suspicion.
>
>Linguists believe, from much observation, that natural languages
>(i.e., those that people actually speak) are extensible, so that
>anything that can be said in one natural language, any other
>natural language can be extended to also say. Someone's native
>tongue may not have a ready phrase for "conformal mapping,"
>but that does not prevent them from learning complex analysis
>and developing the appropriate terms in their language to deal
>with it. Of course, in many cases, it is easiest just to import
>the terms from a language that already has terms to deal with
>the subject matter: witness how many Japanese technical terms
>have been imported from English.
>
>Note that it was not necessary to shift Japanese grammar, changes
>its basic rules, or even revise words unrelated to the technical
>topics concerned for this purpose. Other languages are similarly
>adaptable. Thus, linguists arrive at the principle that Joula
>describes, not as a matter of philosophy, but of observation.
>
As a matter of observation, this is usually true. As for principles,
I view the matter as more complex. It is one thing to have a word in
language B which corresponds to a word in language A thus allowing
for translation. It is another matter alltogether for this word to
convey some meaning.
Let's take, for example the Innuit language. It does have an enormous
amount of terms describing various types of ice and snow. Now,
suppose we translate a passage from this language to one of the
languages used in equatorial Africa. Well, first you won't have the
adequate terminology to perform the translation. Now, suppose you
extend the African language by adding to it words corresponding to the
Innuit terms (either creating new words or just importing them from
Innuit. The translation still won't make much sense to reader from,
say Zaire, since he cannot put any meaning behind the words. It would
take some actual experience with ice, snow, freezing weather etc. to
know what all of this means.
Now all of this doesn't contradict the statement that in principle any
language can be extended to be able to express anything that's being
said in another language. But, there may be a long way from principle
to application.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (Was: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 23:00:33 GMT
In article <326D4886.702@bloxwich.demon.co.uk>, rafael cardenas writes:
>
>A more serious problem than the mathematization of physics, which has
>been going on for centuries and, while it may confuse laypeople, doesn't
>confuse people who are already working in the discipline, is the growing
>mathematization of many other fields (biology; geography since the
>1950s;
>now history; even textual criticism) which, many suspect, is an
>obfuscation
>that hides feeble conceptualization, dubious assumptions,
> technical or disciplinary mistakes, or even fraud. (A person who,
> to use an analogy with physics, is an
>experimental incompetent, may get away with murder by using mathematical
>techniques which the majority of workers in the discipline can't cope
>with).
Very true and, indeed, very serious. If anything it is getting more
serious nowadays since the existance of prepackaged "data analysis"
software enables people to use techniques which they don't understand,
in cases where they're not applicable, yielding results ranging from
useless to downright fraudelent. Then the magical words "statistical
analysis using (substitute the name of you favorite procedure here)
clearly shows that ..." are usually sufficient to stiffle any
criticism. Just the Emperor's new Clothes syndrom, not much different
from the utilization of an extremely profound sounding terminology in
other disciplines. Thus, the workers in any field should remember
that they have not only the right but the duty to stop and ask "what
does it mean..." whenever somebody introduces terminology that the
majority doesn't recognize.
>
>An extreme case of dubious overmathematization is economics, many
>of whose basic assumptions are notoriously unrealistic (and, in contrast
>with physics, are not constantly refined by the effects of predictive
>failures).
I perfectly agree.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: When did Nietzsche wimp out? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: Andrew_Perry@Brown.edu (Andy Perry)
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 19:00:04 -0500
In article <326D3D48.133A@OVPR.UGA.EDU>, "RICHARD J. LOGAN"
wrote:
>Ken MacIver wrote:
>>
>> Possibly because you contrasted science with religion in your original
>> post, positing science as dynamic, religion as static. Martin Luther
>> would certainly smile at your view of religion, as would the countless
>> offshoots of protestantism, and most all religions, down to the
>> present day liberation theology.
>>
>
>Thanks for the feedback. However, I would say none of these offshoots of
>christianity question the founding assumptions of catholocism, namely the
>deity of christ and the existance of an afterlife. Is this a corredct
>statement?
>
>I would then contrast this to the situation in physics where such
>fundamental concepts as space and time have been questioned and revised.
> In this respect science is a dynamic process while religion remains
>firmly rooted (wouldn't the faithful say that the unshakable foundation
>of their faith is what gives them the greatest comfort?).
>I would say a person who characterizes science as a form of religion is
>fundamentally mistaken.
>
>Your thoughts?
I think you misunderstand both science and religion. Neither christianity
nor physics is (centrally) a description of the world. What they are,
rather, are methodologies for constructing such descriptions. Physics
tells you how to go about understanding the world in one register, while
christianity tells you how to understand the world (and yourself) in a
very different register.
Thus, for both, the "fundamental assumptions" are their primary
valuations, NOT mundane facts. Your task is to come up with statements of
the form "It is good to behave in such a fashion..." for both physics and
christianity, and to compare the ways those kinds of statements get
treated by each.
--
Andy Perry We search before and after,
Brown University We pine for what is not.
English Department Our sincerest laughter
Andrew_Perry@brown.edu OR With some pain is fraught.
st001914@brownvm.bitnet -- Shelley, d'apres Horace Rumpole
Subject: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?
From: subg@atheist tamu.edu (SubGenius)
Date: 22 Oct 1996 22:59:49 GMT
Patrick Juola (patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk) wrote:
: It's pretty fundamental to the philosophy of linguistics, that anything
: that can be said in one language can be said in any language.
: Translatability falls out in your lap from that one.
+---------------------------------SubG------------------------------------+
Only if one wishes to take a rather whimiscal view of what the word
`translatability' might mean (not, of course, a bad course in all
events). How is, for example, `chutzpah' `translatable' into
English? Or, if we declare that `breemcurdle' is the English word
meaning what `chutzpah' means in Yiddish, have we thereby `translated'
it?
In any case here, as in the discussion of mathematics-as-language
that spawned this thread, the question remains, then, how one is
to categorise those things which are sometimes called semasiographic
systems---writings systems in which specific ideas are conveyed
but which are not simply visual representations of utterances of
any spoken language. Mathematics is a commonly used example
in which there is no fact-of-the-matter as to what utterances
are associated with the symbols
2 + 2 = 4
Is that `two plus two equals four', or `dos y dos es cuatro'?
Or if we consider, say, the mathematical symbols `10', is
this `ten', `Zehn', `one zero' or something else? Clearly
when we `translate' `10' as `ten' this has little to do with
converting the symbols of the written language into the sounds
of our spoken language (`one zero' would be more appropriate
for that), but rather we are attempting to `translate' the
underlying idea which the symbols represent, which is an idea
neither in English nor German nor Spanish.
Another example the Gentle Reader might find edifying to consider
is the `language' of diagnostic indicators/idiot lights/u.s.w. on
certain sorts of devices---cars, VCRs, u.s.w. In many cases there
is no simple one-for-one correspondence of symbols to diagnosed
conditions, but there is clearly a primitive sort of context...that
is, a syntax. For example, the characters `12:00' on a VCR console might
mean one thing when presented one way, and might mean something quite
else when blinking, or in the presence of lit indicator elsewhere
in the display, or when displayed after a particular set of
button-pushes. Your Humble Narrator would suggest that such a system
can reasonably be considered a language in that it has a vocabulary
and a syntax and is used to convey specific messages, but that the
things which can be said in this system can only in a fairly loose
sense be `translated' into utterances.
Intrepid Gentle Readers might also wish to investigate the writing
system of the Yukaghirs of Siberia, which is another fairly
standard example of a nonglottographic writing system.
Yours etc.,
SubGenius
Subject: Re: When did Nietzsche wimp out? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Date: 22 Oct 1996 18:12:33 -0500
-*-------
In article ,
Andy Perry wrote:
> ... Neither christianity nor physics is (centrally) a description
> of the world. What they are, rather, are methodologies for
> constructing such descriptions. ...
Really? What a strange notion of Christianity ...
> Thus, for both, the "fundamental assumptions" are their primary
> valuations, NOT mundane facts. Your task is to come up with
> statements of the form "It is good to behave in such a
> fashion..." for both physics and christianity, and to compare
> the ways those kinds of statements get treated by each.
I think it would be more fun, and perhaps as relevant, to treat
physics and Christianity as sets of books, and compare how these
books are treated. Let's see ... one set is full of math, are
typically quite expensive, and are used primarily as objects of
study and then souvenirs from one's student days. They are
rarely stored on the same shelf as dictionaries. The other
almost never has math, and some of its books are given away by
preachers and in hotels, and they are used primarily to hold up
dictionaries. ('Fess up: isn't your Bible on the same shelf as
your dictionary?) This just a start, and it could get quite fun
...
Russell
--
Newton plain doesn't work, even as an approximation,
except within certain limits. -- Moggin
Subject: Re: When will the U.S. finally go metric?
From: DarrenG@cris.com (Darren Garrison)
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 22:17:19 GMT
Anthony Potts wrote:
>On Tue, 22 Oct 1996, Darren Garrison wrote:
>
>>
>> I see..... and since when are there innately "correct" and "incorrect"
>> ways of spelling things. If it works better, why question a change?
>
>
>No, but seeing the word metre, or litre, or so on would lead me to the
>correct pronunciation. There is no need to change it if it works fine in
>the first place.
>
That is entirely because you were raised in a society that uses that
spelling. The spelling is not a visual cue to its pronunciation, it
is one of those exceptions that you must memorize. Like in metre,
litre, theatre, you learn to pronunce them NOT as they are spelled,
but as meter, liter, and theater.
>> I can answer that, actually, the original statement came from someone
>> who likes to think themselves an eletist
>
>No, I think that the word you are searching for is elitist. Even in the
>USA.
Yes, typo.
>
>> for keeping the "proper"
>> English while we primitive decidant
>
>Do you mean dissident?
>
No, I do not. I meant decadent.
>> Americans have profaned their
>> perfect language. Eletist snobbery.
>>
>Again, just being from the US does not free you of all constraints in
>literary methods. You still have correct and incorrect spellings.
No, you cannot have fundamentaly correct and incorrect spellings of
words. Yes, you can have spelling errors, such as my "eletist" and
"decidant" above, but if the convention here is that meter is spelled
meter, then the correct spelling for meter is meter. The same is true
in the UK. If the convention is that metre is spelled, then the
correct spelling for metre is metre. Thinking that one is
fundamentaly, innately superior to the other is being ethnocentric.
(read closer to the end to see why I then justify "meter" and such
over "metre" and such.) Languages are high level abstractions, purely
symbolic. If you understand the symbols that you use, and your
intended audence understands your meaning from those symbols, then
those symbols have served their propose. But there is the question of
consistancy and ease of use of those symbols, which will effect the
base population that can actuall follow what you say. (Saying,
"tree", for instance, is more efficient than saying
"bigthingwithbrowntrunkandlimbsandgreenleavesthatchangecolorsandfalloffinthewinter.)
>
>For example, whichever way you choose to slice it, that red fruit is still
>spelled tomato, without the Quaylesque additional e.
>
>If you want to have a language freed from constraints, that's fine. Just
>don't expect tobeable to hold your own in a conversation of any depth
>though. As a language becomes less well formed, it loses out in precision.
>
>For example, I would read the word meter as very different to the word
>metre.
>
>One is a measure of distance, the other is a measure of your poetry, as in
>iambic pentameter.
Hah! Caught you on that one. Meter in poetry, as in iambic
pentameter, is exactly the same word as in a "metre." Both are a unit
of measurement, and both I'm sure share a common origin. I suppose,
then, it should be iambic pentametre. That particular inconsistancy
in UK English does not exist in US English.
>
>Of course, I could be wrong. Trying to have correct grammar and spelling,
>and achieving it are a fair distance apart. It is a very different matter,
>though, to insist on thelowes common denominator in language.
>
>Two nations separated by a common language? It would certainly appear so.
The thing you have to realize is (and, like your original post, this
wasn't intended as a flame.) Is that ALL current languages are
derivitive. There are no pristine languages left in the world, and
there probably have not been for untold thousands of years. All are
bult upon mixtures of other languages. Languages mix and gain words,
among other ways, from colonizations, invasions, and trade. One
example that comes to mind is an African term describing a particular
species of primate; they called it the Orang-Utan. Later, that was
de-hyphenalized (<-----see, new word) into orangutan. And most of the
time, I hear it pronounced as "o-rang-a-tang." And one could come up
with any number of terms that have been borrowed from other languages
and folded into English. English is one of the most dirivative
languages in the world; it absorbs and produces words constantly.
That makes among the most flexable languages in the world, but that
also makes it one of the most difficult to learn. British children
have to learn that "re" is pronounced "re" unless it is in metre,
litre, theatre, or the such, in which case it is pronounced "er."
Same in both countries for words like knife, or phone, which should
logically be spelled nife and fone. And, as another post implied, I
do think that English would be better off without such contradictions
and redundancies. There should also be something done about words
that sound the same, like two, too, and to. And lie and lye. And
hear and here. And bear and bare. Make tenses and numbers more
logical, no more "I am, I was, I will be, you are" such of thing.
Change the alphabet, so that Cindy and Candy will not start with the
same letter for different sounds. It won't (screwy word, there, too.
Won't means will not? Why? Why not wil'nt? Just off the top of my
head, there is probably some German in the explanation) happen, but it
would be nice.
But some changes will happen. Words do evolve, change so that they
come closer to fitting the general pattern of the language by which
these words have been adopted. Thus, the many Roman and German and
Latin and Greek and Hebrew and French and Japaneese and Korean and
Vietnamese and African and so on words that enter English slowly but
surely become more and more like the general base of English or
whatever the adoptive language. And what is wrong with that? Why
should a language be frozen at a particular point, artificialy forced
to cease evolving? Should we be forced to all speak the English of
Chaucer? That of King James? That of King Author? That of Queen
Elizabeth II? That of Benny Hill? And which dialect of UK English?
One from London? One from Liverpool? At what point would be the
correct English, upon which no new words could be added, and from
which no new spellings could be adapted?
I prefer the words "meter", "liter", and "theater" because there are
closer to the conventional English spelling rules, and not exceptions
to those rules that you have to memorize in grade school. "Metre",
"litre", and "theatre" are not Anglicized, but retain close to the
original French spellings. And that, not ethnocentrism, is why I
prefer the former (or should that be "formre") spellings to the
latter. (latre.) When the new words more closely match the
conventions of the new language, and less closely match the language
from which those words were derived, then those words have a more
logical and rational place in that language, making it easier
(easire) to learn, and will, in this case, be more truly English than
the Frenchier (another new word) spellings.
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck)
Date: 22 Oct 1996 23:32:52 GMT
meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
: In article <54jbu6$5ag@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
: >meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
: >: In article <54iu77$4mq@uni.library.ucla.edu>, zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
: >: >
: >: >Thus spake Jacques Derrida:
: >: >
: >: > When I take, for example, the structure of certain algebraic
: >: > constructions [ensembles], where is the center? Is the center the
: >: > knowledge of general rules which, after a fashion, allow us to
: >: > understand the interplay of the elements? Or is the center certain
: >: > elements which enjoy a particular privilege within the ensemble?
: >: > ...With Einstein, for example, we see the end of a kind of
: >: > privilege of empiric evidence. And in that connection we see a
: >: > constant appear, a constant which is a combination of space-time,
: >: > which does not belong to any of the experimenters who live the
: >: > experience, but which, in a way, dominates the whole construct;
: >: > and this notion of the constant -- is this the center?
: >: >
: >: >As Sokal rightly says, "Derrida's perceptive reply went to the heart of
: >: >classical general relativity:"
: >: >
: >: > The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a center.
: >: >
: >: > It is the very concept of variability -- it is, finally, the
: >: > concept of the game. In other words, it is not the concept of
: >: > something -- of a center starting from which an observer could
: >: > master the field -- but the very concept of the game ...
: >: >
: >: >(Derrida, Jacques. 1970. Structure, sign and play in the discourse of
: >: >the human sciences. In The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of
: >: >Man: The Structuralist Controversy, pp. 247-272, edited by Richard
: >: >Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.)
: >: >
: >: >A veritable polymath, your frêre Jacques. I expect the sci.physics
: >: >crowd to take special pleasure in this quotation.
: >: >
: >: You bet. Best laugh I've had in a long, long time.
: >
: >I take it you know what Derrida's concept of center is, then? It's a
: >matter of some debate. Please share.
: >
: I was chuckling at the statement " ...With Einstein, for example, we
: see the end of a kind of privilege of empiric evidence". It is quite
: the opposite, in fact.
"It is quite the opposite, in fact," meaning what:
- we see the beginning of a kind of privilege of empiric evidence?
- all kinds of privileges are now accorded to empiric evidence, as
opposed to only certain kinds before?
In other words, what specific "kind" of evidence does Derrida in mind?
Silke
: Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
: meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Question on Force, Work, and Torque was: Emory's Professors
From: brindle@lf.hp.com (Mark Brindle)
Date: 22 Oct 1996 23:31:27 GMT
LP: = Lloyd R. Parker (lparker@larry.cc.emory.edu) wrote:
MB: = Mark Brindle (Brindle@lf.hp.com) wrote:
Cute trick, Lloyd! I notice that you "accidentally" edited the
newsgroups line to *AVOID* posting your reply on sci.physics.
Strangely enough, the replies you posted immediately before and
immediately after this one didn't suffer the same "accident".
Let me guess... you're just "saving bandwidth" -- and all this
black body radiation stuff really belongs on rec.autos.driving
instead of sci.physics. Obviously, those motor heads are MUCH
more interested in Max Planck's equation than the physicists.
Yeah, Lloyd, that's the ticket!
MB: To begin with, you repeatedly *denied* that EMR sources even
MB: have *power* -- and insisted that Planck's equation predicts
MB: the *energy* of a black-body radiator! (That's right folks;
MB: Lloyd *really* said that -- no, I'm not making it up -- he
MB: actually believes that light bulbs should be rated in ft-lb
MB: instead of watts. Right there in black & white on DejaNews.)
LP: Wrong. What I said was that you can derive and use Planck's
LP: equation in terms of energy.
Yes, Lloyd, that *IS* what you said; and furthermore, you said
that Planck's equation could be used to predict the *energy* of
of a radiator (i.e., in Joules) WITHOUT RESPECT TO TIME.
Only one problem, Lloyd -- that's ABSOLUTELY 100% DEAD WRONG!
Planck's equation tells you *nothing* about the "energy of a
black body radiator" -- because, there is *NO SUCH THING*.
LP: I never said EMR source output can't be measured in power.
LP: But I cited the derived equation in Wall as well as the
LP: discussion on Strobel as substantiation that you CAN use
LP: Planck's equation in terms of energy.
Oh, I see, Lloyd. What you're saying is: Given the temperature
and size of a black body, you can use Planck's equation to find
*either* its "energy without respect to time" *or* its "power".
Is *that* what you're saying, Lloyd? Doesn't that imply that a
black body must have two *entirely independent* characteristics
(i.e., "energy" and "power")? But, Lloyd, it they're entirely
independent, *HOW* can you get *BOTH* from the *SAME* equation?
I'll give you a hint, Lloyd. Radiators CANNOT be characterized
in terms of "Joules" -- the very idea is absolute nonsense. Of
course, that doesn't prevent you from *again* making the claim.
MB: Now, you've finally come around to admitting that radiators
MB: do indeed have *power*; and, even though you probably don't
MB: realize it, you're arguing that *every* black body radiator
MB: *is* detectable because it's possible to detect one photon.
LP: Again, I never said this. You said flat-out you MUST always
LP: consider the power of the source in detecting photons.
Wrong again, Lloyd. We were discussing *radiators*, and I said
one must always consider the power of the *SOURCE* when talking
about the detectibility of a *SOURCE* of EMR. *YOU* changed the
subject and started blabbering about detecting single photons --
which has *absolutely nothing* to do with the original subject.
MB: You're so tangled up in your own weasel-words and lies, that
MB: you're arguing with yourself again, Lloyd...
LP: Well, I guess if you can change everything I say, it's easy
LP: to make yourself look right. Gee, Mark, how about if I claim:
LP:
LP: "Mark said the earth is flat. Bwahahaha. He's wrong."
Only one *small* problem with that argument, Lloyd -- I can PROVE
that I haven't changed *anything* you said. Tell ya what -- why
don't you find a DejaNews citition for my "flat earth" statement,
and I'll supply the references to your idiotic claims. OK, Lloyd?
...DejaNews RULES!
Mark
"The discipline of the written word punishes both stupidity and
dishonesty."
- John Steinbeck
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 23:52:01 GMT
In article <54jlj4$d50@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
>meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>: In article <54jbu6$5ag@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
>: >meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
>: >: In article <54iu77$4mq@uni.library.ucla.edu>, zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>: >: >
>: >: >Thus spake Jacques Derrida:
>: >: >
>: >: > When I take, for example, the structure of certain algebraic
>: >: > constructions [ensembles], where is the center? Is the center the
>: >: > knowledge of general rules which, after a fashion, allow us to
>: >: > understand the interplay of the elements? Or is the center certain
>: >: > elements which enjoy a particular privilege within the ensemble?
>: >: > ...With Einstein, for example, we see the end of a kind of
>: >: > privilege of empiric evidence. And in that connection we see a
>: >: > constant appear, a constant which is a combination of space-time,
>: >: > which does not belong to any of the experimenters who live the
>: >: > experience, but which, in a way, dominates the whole construct;
>: >: > and this notion of the constant -- is this the center?
>: >: >
>: >: >As Sokal rightly says, "Derrida's perceptive reply went to the heart of
>: >: >classical general relativity:"
>: >: >
>: >: > The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a center.
>: >: >
>: >: > It is the very concept of variability -- it is, finally, the
>: >: > concept of the game. In other words, it is not the concept of
>: >: > something -- of a center starting from which an observer could
>: >: > master the field -- but the very concept of the game ...
>: >: >
>: >: >(Derrida, Jacques. 1970. Structure, sign and play in the discourse of
>: >: >the human sciences. In The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of
>: >: >Man: The Structuralist Controversy, pp. 247-272, edited by Richard
>: >: >Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.)
>: >: >
>: >: >A veritable polymath, your frêre Jacques. I expect the sci.physics
>: >: >crowd to take special pleasure in this quotation.
>: >: >
>: >: You bet. Best laugh I've had in a long, long time.
>: >
>: >I take it you know what Derrida's concept of center is, then? It's a
>: >matter of some debate. Please share.
>: >
>: I was chuckling at the statement " ...With Einstein, for example, we
>: see the end of a kind of privilege of empiric evidence". It is quite
>: the opposite, in fact.
>
>"It is quite the opposite, in fact," meaning what:
>- we see the beginning of a kind of privilege of empiric evidence?
>- all kinds of privileges are now accorded to empiric evidence, as
>opposed to only certain kinds before?
>
The overriding theme of all of 20th century physics is "empirical
evidence rules". To the extent that if empirical evidence seems to
contradict our common sense and intuition, then common sense and
intuition are to be modified.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: brian artese
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 18:47:40 -0500
Michael Zeleny wrote:
> Now that you have implicitly established my egregious lack of knowledge o=
f
> and training in philosophy, would you be so kind as to indicate the exact=
> provenance of Derrida's philosophical credentials? Afterwards, you might=
> consider explaining the nature of dispensation that allows you to "expose=
"
> Sokal without engaging his _Social Text_ article.
I'm not sure what in what "provenance" philosophical credentials could be =
said to live. Normally, among scholars who read, one could answer your =
question by referring to the author's books. But I understand I can't do =
that here. And as far as engaging Sokal's presumption about contemporary =
continental philosophy, what more do I need than the _Lingua Franca_ articl=
e =
I brought to the table?
=
> The critical presumption, if it be one, is surely no greater than that of=
> criticizing science or deconstructing its metaphysics without doing the
> most basic math that undergirds it. I leave it up to you to think about
> how and why the postmodernists acquired their reputation for innumeracy.
Descartes was a decent mathematician, no? Yet Descartes' metaphysical =
statements -- which are based on grammatical rules, not mathematical ones -=
- =
are easily demystified.
Descartes was no numerical illiterate -- and in, fact, he claimed that all =
of =
his philosophical pronouncements could be traced back to the most rigorous =
science, just as you do. But -- lo and behold -- what did these mathematic=
al =
proofs ultimately yield? What was the obviously inevitable conclusion of h=
is =
great scientific project (inevitable *because* it was founded on science, o=
n =
nothing but the most rigorous skeptical logic)? =
Why, it was nothing less than the existence of God!
So much for the inevitable insight of math. I find it hilarious when peopl=
e =
claim that a knowledge of math somehow immunizes them from the conceptual =
mechanics inherent in their grammar. A knowledge of math does *not* sudden=
ly =
divorce your discourse from the tropes and metaphors that construct its =
metaphysics. I find that it is *quite possible* for people adept at number=
s =
to not know thing one about how those tropes are operating in their speech =
and philosophical discourse.
=
> Would you care to
> gloss the statement that, "en derni=E8re instance, la diff=E9rence entre
> le signifi=E9 et le signifiant _n'est rien_" =
This is one of the most basic tenents of poststructuralist thought. It =
doesn't surprise me that I'm speaking to a self-styled critic of that =
discourse who needs it explained. To gloss the statement, I have to assume=
=
you're familiar with de Saussure and with linguistics in general, 'cause I =
don't want to have to start from square one. A signifier is a sensible thi=
ng =
-- ink on the page or sound from a mouth. The signified refers to de =
Saussure's notion of some "meaning" that "hovers above" the signifier. Thi=
s =
dichotomy allows us to have the signifier right in front of us, and yet sti=
ll =
ask the question "What does it mean?" The traditional assumption is that t=
he =
signifier has *a* meaning, a single meaning that grounds it. But when we =
answer the question, for instance, "What does 'furious' mean?" we can only=
=
answer by saying something like "it means 'angry'" or "it means 'hopping =
mad'" or "it means 'livid'" In other words, we never get to a signified, w=
e =
only get more signifiers. It turns out that the signifier does not work =
'metaphorically' -- that is, as a pointer to some proper meaning that is it=
s =
'final foundation' -- it works *associatively*, in relation to other =
signifiers.
Think of another signifier: say, a particular speech of Hamlet's. Even whe=
n =
we have the speech right in front of us -- let's say we've just read it -- =
somebody can ask "What does it mean?" The assumption is, just like with a =
single word, that it points to something beyond what it says -- or that the=
re =
is something "underneath" the text which is its meaning or foundation. But=
=
what happens when somebody tries to "get at" this meaning in Hamlet's speec=
h? =
Well, he paraphrases the speech. In other words, he offers up another =
articulation -- another speech -- that claims to explain the first one. Bu=
t =
then somebody can read that second articulation, that paraphrase, and ask =
"What does THAT mean?" And then a third party will paraphrase the =
paraphrase. And then somebody can ask of that third articulation "What doe=
s =
THAT mean?", etc. So it becomes clear that meaning is achieved through =
diachronic paraphrases (i.e., paraphrases that follow one another in time) =
-- =
which topples the notion that the meaning or the signified exists *at the =
same time* as the signifier. But that very contemporaneousness is the =
necessary basis of the signifier/signified dichotomy.
In other words, it is impossible for the signified to be something that bot=
h =
(1) exists at the same time as the signifier and (2) is distinct from it. =
There are people who claim this is not impossible, and those people are wha=
t =
we call religious people. They must manufacture out of thin air a =
transcendental realm where this signified could be said to exist =
contemporaneously with its sensible partner, the signifier. Here on earth,=
=
however, no two things can occupy the same space.
If you really want to know what Hamlet's speech "means" -- read it again. =
In =
other words, the signified _is_ the signifier -- either the original one, o=
r =
one of the subsequent paraphrases. The meaning is the articulation and the=
=
articulation is the meaning.
The signified is just a signifier that hasn't happened yet. "Meaning" exis=
ts =
in the deferral, the temporal movement from one signifier to another. =
> if Derrida didn't have to extend the courtesy [of reading beyond the firs=
t =
> chapter] to Husserl, I certainly don't have to extend it to him.
What a whimsical way to excuse your lack of scholarship. It allows you to =
(A) critique Derrida without reading him and (B) make a claim about his =
familiarity with Husserl -- even though such a claim could only be made upo=
n =
a thorough reading of Derrida! "I haven't read any of Derrida's 40-odd =
books," you say, "but I know what he doesn't address."
> >I suspect you won't bring to
> >the table any persiflage from "Of Grammatology," so why don't you excerp=
t
> >something from Denyer's critique and well have a look at it? =
> Nonsense. I need not do more than cite Galois to rebut a presumption of
> trisecting an angle with a compass and a ruler. Science is a collective
> enterprise. In the interests of keeping it that way, you are welcome to
> traipse to the library on your own.
Your diversion is a bit clumsy. I ask you to support your critique of =
Derrida by bringing some Derrida to the table, or even something written =
*about* him -- and you start yammering about Galois and trisecting angles? =
=
Who do you think you're fooling? At least I backed up my what I was saying=
=
about Sokal with something he actually wrote. I have yet to see any of the=
=
people who talk about Derrida's "nonsense" have the balls to do the same.
> The cogito is not a logical
> inference. It is an immediate intellectual recognition of the locus of
> cognitive responsibility for presently occurring thinking. Then again, I=
> would not expect the notion of being responsible for your own beliefs to
> be intelligible to a sophistical controversialist such as yourself.
It's uncanny how often people who claim to be the gatekeepers of "rigorous =
logic" let themselves be mystified by blantantly religious discourse. Pray=
=
tell, *where* is this "locus of cognitive responsibility"? Where is this =
center? In the skull? What is this "source" of consciousness that is =
somehow *more* than the aggregate of all particular thoughts? What forces =
me =
to accept the existence of this transcendent source, besides your arbitrary=
=
positing of it? You'll find that this "locus" you're talking about is =
indistinguishable from "the soul": it serves all the same totalizing =
purposes, and follows all the same transcendental rules.
The cogito is not a logical inference? Then what is that "therefore" doing=
=
in there?
-- brian
Subject: Re: Why is momentum preserved?
From: bob@1776.COM (Robert Coe)
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 00:03:55 GMT
On 21 Oct 1996 16:20:22 -0400, nurban@csugrad.cs.vt.edu (Nathan Urban)
wrote:
: In article <326C2415.4B62@algonet.se>, pri@algonet.se wrote:
: > ***** Why is momentum preserved? *****
:
: I don't know if you'll be more satisfied with this answer, but momentum
: is conserved because space is symmetric under spatial translations.
: That is, because you can do an experiment and get the same result as if
: you had done the experiment slightly to the side, momentum is
: conserved.
:
: This assertion can be proved rigorously from the Lagrangian formulation
: of mechanics, but an intuitive way to see this is: Suppose momentum
: were not conserved. Then that means that an object at rest could just
: spontaneously accelerate in some direction. But _which_ direction? If
: space is the same everywhere ("homogeneous"), there can be no preferred
: direction, so if the laws of physics are deterministic it follows that
: the object _can't_ just spontaneously accelerate somewhere.
Does it follow that momentum is conserved within any given reference
frame? In particular, suppose an object is at rest in space. (I.e.,
its velocity vector in 4-D spacetime points in the direction of
increasing time.) Now suppose the object is accelerated into motion (so
that its velocity vector has a spatial component). Is its momentum
conserved in the original reference frame? I ask because if that is the
case, the fact can apparently be used to derive the Lorentz equations
that describe the relativistic changes in mass, length, and time
consumption undergone by a moving object. In effect, it seems to show
that special relativity is a direct consequence of classical mechanics
(generalized to 4-D spacetime) - something that came as a bit of a
surprise to me when I first noticed it.
--
___ _ - Bob
/__) _ / / ) _ _
(_/__) (_)_(_) (___(_)_(/_____________________________________ bob@1776.COM
Robert K. Coe ** 14 Churchill St, Sudbury, MA 01776-2120 USA ** 508-443-3265
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (Was: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: Matt Austern
Date: 22 Oct 1996 17:04:33 -0700
cri@tiac.net (Richard Harter) writes:
> >Which text are we reading? One certainly doesn't need
> >Calculus to understand Newton's theories of celestial
> >mechanics.
>
> Yes and no. You need the notion of a derivative, i.e. velocity is the
> derivation of position with respect to time, and acceleration is the
> second derivative of position with respect to time. You can fake
> it and "physics for poets" courses do but it's a lot easier if you
> have the rudiments of calculus. Similarly angular momentum is hard to
> deal with if you don't have some very elementary vector calculus.
> Without calculus one's understanding of celestial mechanics is going
> to pretty nominal.
Actually, I think that Gordon's statement probably is literally
true---especially if you think about the implications of his question.
He asked "Which text are we reading?," and I imagine that the text he
had in mind was Principia Mathematica. His questions probably sounds
a bit unnatural to some of the people in this discussion, of course,
since most physicists don't use that sort of vocabulary and don't
think that identifying a specific "text" usually matters very much.
I've never read any of Newton's works. (I wonder what fraction of
today's physicists actually have read any? Probably quite tiny:
there's really no good reason to read them.) I'm told, though, that
Newton deliberately wrote Principia so that it didn't use any
calculus. He managed to rewrite all of his proofs, even the proof
that spherical bodies could be treated as point masses, so that they
used old-fashioned geometrical reasoning.
It probably is true, then, that you don't need to understand any
calculus in order to read Newton's formulation of Newtonian physics.
On the other hand, you would need to be familiar with rather subtle
methods of geometrical proof that aren't widely taught or understood
nowadays. You'd also need to be fluent in 17th century scientific
Latin, of course. On the whole, I think learning a bit of calculus
would be a bit easier... Especially since that way you'd be able to
understand 20th century books on Newtonian physics, like Goldstein, or
Landau and Lifschitz. All modern formulations of Newtonian physics do
use calculus.
I tend to think it's a very healthy fact, actually, that modern
physicists don't bother to read books by Newton or Einstein: the
structures of these theories are well understood, and don't depend on
the personality or writing style of any one person. (Some physicists
do read Dirac's book on quantum mechanics, but that's not because of
any particular desire for authenticity: it's just because Dirac wrote
so clearly that his book is still one of the best treatments of the
subject.)
Subject: Re: Quantum Physics:Illusion and Reality
From: Peter Diehr
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 1996 20:26:35 -0400
Gillian Megaughin wrote:
>
> I am a fourth year student at Edinburgh Uni doing a lab on the subject of
> QP:illusion adn Reality. We have a basic idea of what needs to be done, it's
> seems that it is based on the EPR paper and a paper published by Bell in 1969.
> We are having trouble tracking these down.
>
> We would be most grateful if anyone could enlighten us as the the content or
> where to obtain these on-line.
>
> If anyone can help, would it be possible to mail me directly?
>
> Thanx
"Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?"
by Albert Eienstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, Physical Review, 47, 777-80 (1935).
"On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics", John S. Bell, Reviews of
Modern Physics, 38, 447-52 (1966).
These are also reprinted in many collections, such as "Quantum Theory and Measurement",
J.A. Wheeler and W.H. Zureck, editors, (1983), (Princeton University Press).
See your reference librarian for how to find these in your university library.
For popular renditions, check out Nick Herbert's "Quantum Reality", or David Mermin's
"Boojums all the way through".
Best Regards, Peter