Subject: Re: Aberration of Starlight
From: "Paul B.Andersen"
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 21:55:23 +0200
Keith Stein wrote:
>
> "John D. Leckie" writes
>
> >Would you
> >mind explaining it anyway, for MY benefit? :) How DOES a moving
> >atmosphere cause light to bend?
>
> OK John, but it comes directly just from vector addition of velocities.
> Consider a light ray moving from still air into an air current at right
> angles to its direction of motion, as illustrated below.
>
>
> Still air Wind moving due North at v
> ---------- ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> Light moving due East at c -> 'X'
>
> West of 'X' the light has a velocity c to the East.
> East of 'X' the light has a velocity c to the East, PLUS a velocity
> of v to the North, (as it is carried along by the medium).
>
> Therefore the velocity of the light East of 'X' is:-
> (c^2 + v^2)^.5 (relative to the ground) .....(1)
If the ground was stationary relative the star.
>
> And the angle the light makes with the ground is:-
> arctan (v/c) (degrees North of East) .....(2)
Should be _south_ of east relative a _stationary_ ground.
You obviously do not realize what you just have proven.
Let me show you:
Lets first calculate the aberration the traditional way,
without careing about any effects of the atmosphere:
observer
star * Light moving due East at c -> X moving due
north at v
The observer will perceive a south component v of the light
relative to him. Therefore he will perceive the light as coming
from an angle arctg(v/c) north of west.
Let us now introduce an atmosphere, moving with the observer,
and let us assume the light moves with the air a la Keith Stein.
| light moving
star * light moving east at c | c east, v north X observer
As the light now has the same north speed component as
the observer, e.g. no north or south component relative
to him, he will perceive the light as coming from from
due west, thus no aberration of the starlight.
So Keith, if the light was moving with the air, there would be
no aberration of starlight. The fact that it is proves that
you are wrong.
> Equation (2) gives the correct value for the aberration of
> starlight as found by the astronomer Bradley in 1728.
Right. The right classical value.
>
> Of course i know that Equation (1) violates Einstein's Special Theory of
> Relativity, but that's my point:-
>
> 'SR *IS* WRONG'
If you do the calculations above with SR instead of classical
theory, the angle will be arcsin(v/c)
Compare sin(20'') with tg(20''), and you will see why it is not
possible by experiment to say whether the aberration of starlight is
arctg(v/c) or arcsin(v/c).
So aberration of starlight proves nothing regarding SR.
Paul
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: Anton Hutticher
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:31:43 GMT
weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
>
> uchicago.edu>:
> Distribution:
>
> meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
> : In article <54blb8$sqt@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
> : >meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
> : >: In article <54at8t$ghp@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
> :
> : >: >I know what you're saying but don't think it's relevant, since, as
> : >: >Richard pointed out, moggin's point was that "wrong in some instances"
> : >: >can be translated into "wrong" tout court; that was the debatable
> : >: >assertion. I have no problem with your account of how these things work,
> : >: >I just don't think the argument was about it.
> : >: >
> : >: Well, I consider it relevant since it precisely illustrates the point
> : >: that "wrong in some instances" doesn't simply translate to "wrong".
> : >
> : >No, Mati, that won't do; it doesn't "illustrate the point," it
> : >illustrates your sense of when it makes sense to call a theory "wrong."
> : >I'm not saying it isn't a sensible position -- I think it is --, but I
> : >can also see an argument that understands right or wrong in absolute/ist
> : >terms.
Shure, but it is not the normal use in natural science. Communication
would be extremely cumbersome in science if right or wrong are understood
in absolute terms only. And "Newton was wrong...." does talk about a
scientific theory being wrong. Therefore most people will assume a
certain usage of this word.
> : >
> : I can see such argument too, but it has nothing to do with science.
> : This is not how science works. Of course you're free to say "this is
> : my definition of science, and my definition ofright and my definition
> : of wrong. that's what I'm talking about and I don't care how other
> : people understand these terms." You're welcome to do it but I'm
> : afraid that you'll find such approach less then useful.
>
> We're not quite there yet, but getting closer: it is my impression that
> moggin used his own vocabulary in talking about an aspect of science; you
> are saying (and I take your word for it) that scientists don't talk that
> way, and that it wouldn't be useful for them to do so -- again, no
> problem. However, non-scientists in a non-scientific forum are surely not
> held to your rhetorical practice.
Moggin has been told that his use of certain words (wrong, true, etc)
is quite different from how they are used by scientists and is misleading
as long as he doesn´t tell that his usage differs. So far he refuses.
And non-scientists generally do not use "wrong" etc. the way moggin
does, but remarkably often like scientist do.
>Imagine a hard-core deconstructionist
> raise his hand every time someone in r.a.b. talked about an author,
> demanding proof that the person had read Foucault as well as Barthes as
> well as Derrida on the question of authorship, was cognizant of the
> complex tradition of authorship, could clearly and accurately account for
> his use of the word, etc. etc.
Imagine someone at r.a.b. discussing Hamlet and starting with the line:
Hamlet is a chauvinistic piece of shit because the heroine, Juliet, is
killed by her lover, Romeo, against her wishes. Wouldn´t someone on
r.a.b. ask: Please, read *Hamlet* before you say that, and, if
possible, other Shakespearean pieces.
>This is, to a certain degree, how "the
> science camp" comes across in these threads; it seems you are used to
> being amongst yourselves more in t.o. or sci.ph. -- perhaps it's all just
> mutual culture shock.
Culture shock?
Could be, but after having had several debates along the lines:
:"Science is wrong! Why? Because they will always have an experimental
:error, and if something is wrong in the millionth decimal it is
:*wrong*.
:There is no progress in science! Why? Ptolemy was wrong, Newton was
:wrong, Einstein (say scientists) is wrong. NO progress."
I very much doubt that this is unintentional.
I have corrected the use of loaded words in those debates, pointing
out that scientists as well as the general public have a different
usage and that laymen are sure to draw wrong inferences, but to no
avail. I have asked that it be explained at the beginning that
certain words are used in nonstandard ways, in ways shure to mislead
if not explained. No response!
These words are *calculated* to mislead.
Anton Hutticher
(Anton.Hutticher@sbg.ac.at)
1
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3
4
5
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Subject: Re: Why is the sky blue?
From: kkobayas@scunix4.harvard.edu (Ken Kobayashi)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:56:22 GMT
pcp2g@karma.astro.Virginia.EDU (Twisted STISter) writes:
>In article <5438nf$9q7@cnn.Princeton.EDU>,
>Certainly the sky is a lot brighter than any star, but you are comparing
>apples and oranges! The sky occupies, well, the whole sky, while
>a single star is essentially a point source.
[snip]
>The question is, how bright is the sky per square arcsecond? Suppose
>it has a magnitude 0/arcsecond. If you are trying to see a 0 mag star,
>than blocking all but 1 arcsec of sky will help a lot.
>The eye has a resolution limit of about 2-3 arcminutes (about 1/20 - 1/30
>of a degree). Any hole smaller than this will look like a pinhole. You
>would need a hole big enough to actually *see* the star separate from the
>background spatially. That lets in more light, which washes out the star.
[snip]
>So, if someone out there knows the brightness of the the daylit sky
>(and the twilight sky as well) PER SQUARE ARCSECOND, we might
>be able to (haha) shed some light on this.
Finally a logical answer. I agree, one should compare the brightness
per resolution element (pixel?) of your eye. 2-3 arcmin. sounds about
right. I do not know the brightness of the daytime sky either, but I
expect that it is comparable to that of the full moon. The total
brightness is magnitude -12.7.[1] The angular diameter is approx. 30
arcminutes, about 44 times larger than the eye's resolution element
(assumed 2x2 arcminutes). That's, um, 44 log base 2.5 dimmer in
magnitude, so -8.6 magnitude per 2x2 arcminutes. That is several
hundred times brighter than the brightest star, and tens of times
brighter than even Venus, if I remember correctly. Of course, if you
were to use a telescope, one can use a much higher resolution. If one
can resolve 1 arcsecond, the brightness would be - um, about
magnitude +3 per square arcsecond? Maybe the sky is a magnitude or two
brighter than the full moon (per square arcsecond that is) but even
then, we can see that many bright stars should be visible.
Please let me know if anyone has a more detailed calculation and data,
but I think the above is good enough for the government or for
astronomy. :-)
[1] from M.V.Zombeck, Handbook of Space Astronomy & Astrophysics.
- Ken Kobayashi
--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Kobayashi . "Too low they build,
kkobayas@fas.harvard.edu . who build beneath the stars."
http://stargazer.student.harvard.edu/~ken/ . - Edward Young
Subject: Re: When will the U.S. finally go metric?
From: dbrower@us.oracle.com (David C. Brower)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 20:37:33 GMT
billa@znet.com (Bill Arnett) writes:
>Because we exchange a lot of hardware which would interoperate a whole lot
>better and be cheaper to manufacture if everything were done in the same
>units. This is not an insignificant cost, probably many billions of
>dollars per year.
Can you work this out in some more detail; it's often asserted, but
I'm wondering about the evidence. How is the manufacturing going to
be cheaper?
About the only things I can think of are:
- duplicate tool sets for those with bilingual equipment;
- extra storage space for duplicate inventories in bilingual
components.
For instance, I'm currently obliged to keep both SAE and Metric tools
for working on cars, because fasteners come both ways. Similarly, I'd
probably need to stock SAE and metric fasteners if I was to be
complete.
But is this really *Billions* of dollars worth? And how great a
proportion of the GWP is that *Billions* of waste, compared to, say
for instance, time wasted in stupid committee meetings?
Arguably, most of the things that really need to interoperate at a
hardware level have already standardized to whatever works, be it
metric, english, or dalmation. And the things that don't need to work
together quite so well remain somewhat incompatible, because they
don't really need to, and are on separate evolutionary paths.
-dB
--
"Anti-scientology is to Anti-religion as Vegetarian is to Starvation"
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: The Conscious Mind -- David Chalmers]
From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 20:26:47 GMT
In article <54j21g$i8f@usenet.srv.cis.pitt.edu>,
Anders N Weinstein wrote:
>In article ,
>Andrzej Pindor wrote:
>>> The facts you cite are only relevant because they function as
>>>data points indicating intentions; they are not collected merely out
>>>of an interest in data-collection as an end in itself.
>>>
>>As David Longley keeps pointing out, you may not need to postulate any
>>'intentions', just notice that a certain conjunction of behaviors correlates
>>(better or worse) with the act of "causing death by one's own actions".
>
>This is still wrong -- it suggests we have to first establish inductive
>generalizations linking certain (physical?) events such as making
>suicide notes other other (physical?) events such "causing death by
>one's own actions" But wait -- "making a suicide note" is intentional,
>it depends on the content. I guess we should have said "making certain
>shaped marks on paper"? But which ones? And "causing death by one's own
And what is this supposed to prove? You certainly can talk about 'certain'
marks on paper, but to calculate correlations you have to be able to classify
different shapes and combinations and this is exactly what you do by
distinguishing letters (24 different shapes) and their combinations (words
and sentences) and correlating them with human actions (i.e. what they
'mean' in English). So what is your point here? isn't it how you would
learn an unknown lagnuage by being dropped into community using such language
but knowing no English? Would you not proceed by correlating various sounds
with circumstances in which they occur?
>actions" is also intentional, it would seem, at any rate not clearly
>"physical". So I think your programmatic suggestion is transparently
>absurd.
>
How so? Is it more abhsurd then correlating various measures of health with
diet or like?
>This is sort of important to me. I think training in the methods of the
What is important to you, that my suggestion is absurd?? How so?
>exact sciences opens ones eyes to one sort of order in experience, but
>it also seems to me liable to have an idiotizing side effect, such as I
>observe in Longley and yourself. It suggests that the methods of the
>exact sciences are the only valid avenues to objective knowledge, and
>that any ontology that can't be fit to its procrustean methodological
>requirements must be some kind of subjective projection. Call this
>error "objectivism".
>
Little knowledge is more dangerous that no knowledge at all, didn't you hear
this? You are only picking up on those few aspects of exact sciences from
your small repretoire of knowledge of them which fit your predjudices and
ignore anything else as "anomaly". This is exactly what science methodology
indicates as "bad methodology".
I could say something about 'idiotizing side effect' studying too much
philosophy can have on people, but I'll refrain from pointing to examples.
>I think philosophers, particularly in the existentialist tradition,
>have well exposed the errors of the objectivism which arose as a result
>of the scientific revolution around the time of Descartes. Yet
>intelligent professional scientists seem to have limited education on
>these topics, and so continue to fancy that their ontology is somehow
>the whole of the objective world, and so make absurd demands such as
>yours above.
>
Intelligent professional scientists are too busy doing useful things to study
all these vacuous philosophical treatises. That we can use this medium to
communicate is one of the indications that not much harm has resulted from
their limited education on philosophical topics. There are some bright
philosophers, no doubt, but they are only few and far between.
>As I see it, the main problem with these arguments is this: if
>observation is to have any cognitive effect, it must be
I am not sure what you mean by 'cognitive effect', can you define the term?
>conceptualized: intuitions without concepts are blind. But there are a
Again it all depends on your definitions. A dog which suddenly runs to
the door wagging its tail seems intuitively to expect its master. Is it
conceptualizing something?
You might also remind yourself of the experiment with kittens brought up in
an environment with no horizontal lines. The kittens were unable to see
the horizontal lines later on, so presumably an ability to develop concepts
depend on stimuli we are exposed to when the brain develops.
>*plurality* of concepts we can use in observation sentences, and none
>constitute any kind of privileged basis. (Some people call this the
In what sense 'priviledged'?
>"theory-ladenness" of observation, although I don't think it need
>require the concepts of specially scientific theories.) Some of these
>are the intentional ones, the ones we employ when viewing the world
>through what Dennett called the intentional stance.
Assuming that I understand what you mean by 'priviledged' the plurality of
concepts you allude to above would seem to indicate that 'intentional
stance' is no superior to, say, 'mechanical' one. The only problem is which
is more efficient.
>
>There is simply no reason these concepts have to be reduced to any
>supposedly more favorable ones. They may well constitute a kind of
>autonomous and irreducible domain of objective fact. But with the
It depends what you mean by 'reducing'. If 'reducing' makes our description
of the reality more economical and hence easier to make predictions with
then isn't it a good enough reason?
>demise of the Myth of the Given in epistemology, it should be clear
>that the appeal to "what you can observe" is rendered toothless. All
>seeing requires seeing-as, and we normally perceive other human beings
>*as* intentional systems, not physical ones. Reductive physicalism or
>behaviorism just aren't valid principles of criticism, it seems to me.
>
As I have tried to indicate to you the issue is to use terms of 'seeing-as'
which are common to all people and this is not only enough but also an
only thing which can do in our quest to 'understanding reality'.
Note also that doctors for instance see their patients as physical systems.
What you mean by "we normally preceive other human beings *as* intentional
systems" is not fully clear to me, but we are not talking here about
everyday human interactions but about attemtping to understand how human
mind works. These are two different things the same way as chemical analysis
of your food and investigating physical principles along which the sense of
taste works is different from preparing yourself a meal and eating it.
You constantly seem to mix these things up.
>>Having said that, I should also perhaps add that I have nothing against
>>a claim that certain conjunctions of behaviors are indicators of specific
>>mental states,
>
>Good!
>
>> as long as we understand mental states as states of the brain
>>as physical system, roughly in the same way as measurements done on any
>>physical system may be indicative of its internal state. For instance,
>
>I think this is fantasy, but my real question is, why bother? I think
Why is this fantasy? "Why bother" depends on your aims. Why bother to look
if there is a black hole in the center of our galaxy? 90 years ago people
might also have asked "Why bother to investigate a structure of an atom?"
On more practical side perhaps knowing how brain states influence our
behavior and what physical causes put us in various mental states might help
to cure mental diseases or at least decrease reconviction rate for criminals
released from prisons. The trouble with philosophers is that all they do
and all they think counts is talking. If an only criterion determining
the value of what you say is what other philosophers think and say about it
then no surprise that you cannot comprehend what sceintists do.
>we understand that reductive physicalism is false, even
You can build your strawman anyway you like it.
>computationalist do not pursue reductive physicalism, and non-physical
>properties would seem to be a dime a dozen, like the facts about
>tables. Facts about mental states are in the same box as facts about
>tables, I think. They are real attributes of whole organisms, but nly
Could you please explain real attributes of what are facts about tables?
>discernible through adoption of a special attitude, the intentional
Internal structure and states of Sun are also discernible from empirical
observations by adoption of a special attitude?
>stance. They probably are not precise enough for scientific use, but
>that doesn't make them projections or confabulations.
>
And how do you determine if they are or are not projections or confabulations?
Note also that we are talking about applying science to understand human
mind. Are you then saying that mental states have no use in this area?
Then what is the point in talking about them here?
>>Yoi mean you believe in human ability to attain absolute TRUTH? I hope you
>>will grow out of it :-).
>
>Of course the issues here are deep and difficult. I think it helps,
>though, to recognize that truth can be very mundane. If John sees that
>his cornflakes box is empty and makes a note to himself to buy some, I
>guess John has obtained some "absolute TRUTH". And we do use such
>descriptions all the time.
We are talking here about science. i.e. our attempts to understand reality,
not about everyday life. I do not understand why you keep mixing these
things up.
>
>>>pointed to any evident methodological *difference* between knowledge of
>>>highly theoretical facts in science and knowledge of others' mental
>>>states.
>>
>>I am not quite sure what you mean above, but if the others' (and ours')
>>mental states are treated as physical states of the brain then there is
>>probably no qualitative difference (assuming I understand you correctly).
>>There is a quantative difference though, the brain being probably by far
>>the most complex physical system we have encountered and it is likely that
>>in most circumstances the behavioral indicators at our disposal are not
>>sufficient to specify a reasonably well defined class of brain states.
>>If not, i.e. if you do not consider mental states as classes of physical
>>brain states, then you do not appear to be talking science.
>
>True enough I am not talking science. But the real problem is the
If so, are you sure that what you are saying is relevent here?
>language we use to "classify brain states". Most philosophers now hold
>that lawfulness is *relative to description*. So even if I agreed with
>you that intentional concepts classify brain states (I would say
>organism states) I could just as easily agree that concepts like "is a
What other parts of organism are relevent?
>chair" or "is a cubist painting" classify clouds of molecules. Still
Not objectively in the sense of being observer-independent.
>that does not mean there are any laws to be found nor science to be made
>*under these descriptions*.
>
Of course you are right. This is why science does not concern itself with
such properties (as being a chair or being a cubist painting).
>You might look into Donald Davidson's papers on "anomalous monism" for
>more on the importance of this point. Jerry Fodor's "Special Sciences"
>paper also makes the case that even within science, a reasonable
>physicalism does not entail reductionism in the sense of reducibility
>of laws.
>
Importance of which point? That science does not concern itself with
observer-dependent descriptions? I know it. And I certainly do not think
it worth to read what non-physicsts think about physicalism, like I would
not waste time on a treatise about sex written by an eunuch (except as for
entertainment :-)).
>Computationalists hold one sort of anti-reductionism -- they believe
>the predicates of computational psychology form an autonomous level of
>explanation -- while respecting the truths of physical science -- these
>events are realized in physical stuff. So what's wrong with
>"phenomenologists" -- believers in the irreducibility of intentionality
>-- holding another, while not contradicting the truths of physical
>science?
I do not think it is a matter of "autonomous level of explanation" as much
as a more general (higher) level in the same sense as as phenomenological
thermodynamics relates to statistical and atomic physics. I am not quite
sure what are "predicates of computational psychology" but I have nothing
against treating mental states the same way as, say, states of Turing
machines. It is just a way of describing physical arrangements of matter
in a language suitable to phenomena we are considering, like, say, talking
about attractors, orbits, basins of attraction etc of a physical system.
In a similar way if I am using a couple of diodes as an AND gate I will
use a language of logic do describe what it does without going into
details of electron flow, electric fields etc. in the system. This does not
however change the fact that the input/output mapping for such system is
ultimately reducible to physcal analysis on the basis of physical laws.
Such higher levels of description have their (great) uses but also great
limitations and to go beyond these limitations requires descending to a lower
level of description. The main problem I see with your stance is that you
seem to be allergic to any suggestion of existence and utility of such lower
levels of description of workings of the mind.
Andrzej
--
Andrzej Pindor The foolish reject what they see and
University of Toronto not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons what they think and not what they see.
andrzej.pindor@utoronto.ca Huang Po
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 21:50:45 GMT
In article <54lifs$nrh@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
>LBsys (lbsys@aol.com) wrote:
>
>: Sorry, but again it seems, that in the humanities there is not much
>: understanding of technical things, thus Silkes point wasn't well thought
>: up at all. If her (Oh Lord, won't you buy me) Mercedes Benz would contain
>: a fuel pump which goes broke after too short a time, Mercedes will
>: silently replace it with a _newly_ engineered and differently made model
>: for to fix the bug, which otherwise would just occur again. This is what
>: Mati quite obviously meant (a fault in the construction of one element)
>: and not the replacing of the same element after just a mechanical wore-out
>: of the first. Such an assumption wouldn't have helped in the analogy at
>: all, as elements of theories do not wear out, but do have to be replaced
>L by _different_ ones, if there's a bug to fix. In my opinion that wasn't
>: too hard to see even without a technical background.
>
>So you are suggesting that 20th century developments in physics are the
>equivalent to a clandestine ("silent") fixing? Seems to me you're getting
>in deepter instead of digging yourself out.
Why clandestine? I know, I know, you pick on the "silently" above.
It is important, with analogies, to concentrate on the essential, not
on irrelevant details, else not much progress can be made.
>
>: Also, as a sidenote, what appears to Silke as a completely new model of
>: one brand is mostly only the outer appearance. Over lots of generations
>: lots of parts are kept (like motors, axles and the like) and only
>: reluctantly exchanged for newer ones. So of course 'Classical mechanics'
>: vs. 'Relativistic mechanics' may look like two different models to the
>: onlooker, the brandnew one replacing the older one, when in fact the same
>: heart still is beating under the bonnet.
>
>I assume that most physicists pay more respect to Einstein, Newton, and
>co. It's of course your and Mati's prerogative to think of them as
>fuel-pumps; seems that even Mati has parted company with you in the
>meantime, though.
>
Again, lets concentrate on the essential. The issue is not whether
fuel pump or transmition are better comparisons. The issue is one of
continuity. The analogies are there to illustrate a point and if you
find one analogy more pleasing then another, I'm not about to quible.
But if we now start arguing about details in the analogies, we may be
forced to use second order analogies to illustrate the first ones, and
so on ad infinitum and ad nauseam. So, lets get back to the issues.
The issue is one of continuity. Physics is an ongoing construction
project and new layers are being added continuosly. But the
foundations remain there. Once in a while it is found necessery to go
back and change some things. Still, overall there is an enormous
continuity in the development of physics since Newton till today and
most of the groundwork created 300 years ago persists, some intact,
some in a generalized form. Now, to people unaware of the core
concepts of the theories involved it may appear as if the changes are
way bigger then they reallly are. That's where you get statements
like "how can you say that special relativity is a continuation of
classical mechanics when so many things are different, you've time
dilation, length contraction, velocities add differently, etc. etc.?"
Well, these are no multiple differences. There is only one
change, the replacement of the Galilean transformation group by the
Lorentzian one. That's it. The rest are but consequences. To use an
analogy (do I hear groans here) from Lem, when you hold your hand
underwater with just your fingers breaking the surface, to an
uninformed observer they (the fingers) appear to be separate entities.
You've to look beneath the surface to realize that they belong to a
single hand.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:37:01 GMT
Jeff Candy (candy@mildred.ph.utexas.edu) wrote:
: moggin:
: |> The reaction to the hoax also revealed that the defenders of
: |> "rationality," "critical thinking," and "intellectual standards" were
: |> willing, even determined to throw all three to the winds in pursuit of
: |> their prey.
: It wouldn't suprise me. In any case ...
: |> Sokal's hoax was used to condemn everything from the
: |> character of the _Social Text_ editors to "the critics of science" to
: |> "post-modernism" to the state of the humanities today. (Can you say,
: |> "generalizing from a single instance"? I knew that you could.)
: That "the hoax" was published at all emphasizes an inherent weakness of
: academic discourse in the humanities: it is a business which tolerates
: vagueness and imprecision. The scientist who reads Sokal's article
: receives the following reaffirmation: nonsense sufficiently dressed up
: in jargon and context-dropping *will* be accepted in some cases by the
: academic community. This is the message.
_in some cases_, precisely. So what? The humanities have no choice but do
tolerate "imprecision" at times; some of the very best work done in the
humanities is "imprecise" according to nat-sci standards. This is a
weakness only from the nat-sci viewpoint; it can also translate into
considerable intellectual and conceptual liberty -- to be used as well as
abused, no doubt. Moggin was not debating that shit gets published in
humanities journals -- he was debating whether this says anything
interesting, or "precise" for that matter, about post-structuralism,
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Lacan, etc.
: |> Often they not only failed to look at the evidence, but even
: |> flat-out refused. One argument ran, "We don't need to check and see
: |> if the conclusions we draw from the hoax are true; it's not worth the
: |> trouble, since the hoax proves them." (No, I'm not making that up.)
: |> Many of the attackers never acquainted themselves with their targets,
: |> preferring to base their arguments on prejudice and speculation (much
: |> like the folks who picket movies they've never seen).
: If there were reason to suspect that "the hoax" only made it to
: publication by a rare fluke; by a foul-up in the referee process,
: I could be more sympathetic to your defence. My intuition (and
: experience) tells me that the odds of this being a statistical
: anomaly are very low -- in which case the point should be accepted
: rather than skirted.
It is very rare that physicists submit to humanities journals; if you are
suggesting that the article should have been sent out to another
physicist, I whole-heartedly agree. As things stand, however, the hoax
proves that the grad student whom A.Ross let judge the article didn't
know much about either science or literary theory -- and what does that
prove?
Silke
Subject: Re: Is glass a solid?
From: Peter Swedock
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 17:55:25 -0400
On Wed, 23 Oct 1996, Stephen La Joie wrote:
> If someone was to ask "is metal a solid", I would be unable
> to answer until they told me what metal or metal alloy, what
> is their definition of solid, and under what conditions.
>
> I am surprised at the number of learned experts who would
> venture an opinion without having a clue as to what "glass"
> they are talking about.
>
>
Everything (theoretically) has the potential to be either gas, liquid or
solid. It matters not at all what kind of glass it is, only what are the
pressures and forces acting upon it.
Your comment above
> If someone was to ask "is metal a solid", I would be unable
> to answer until they told me what metal or metal alloy, what
> is their definition of solid, and under what conditions.
isn't quite true... what you are saying is that, were some-one to name
you a metal you'd be able to tell them what state (gas, liquid, solid) it
has AT ROOM TEMPERATURE and one atmosphere of pressure.
Peace,
Petr
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: Noel Smith
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 20:42:03 GMT
meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
[...]
> The overriding theme of all of 20th century physics is "empirical
> evidence rules". To the extent that if empirical evidence seems to
> contradict our common sense and intuition, then common sense and
> intuition are to be modified.
In other words, scientific practice presents Derrideans with the
properties of real physical systems or, more precisely, with the fact
that these properties compel us, and do not admit of any real degree
of subjective interpretation. A lucid person can't deny the weight of
a 5-pound brick without appearing before the world as less than
lucid.
This compulsory property of empiricism is what offends the liberatory
sensibility of many academic left thinkers. The quarrel with science
reflects "a desperate unhappiness that science is such a powerful
force, materially and intellectually, in contemporary life." (Gross
and Levitt, _Higher Superstition_)
When freedom appears to be constrained by fact (the objective,
intractable nature of the real physical world studied and manipulated
by scientists), anti-foundational intellectuals levy a charge of
simplistic thinking. It is claimed that unsupportable metaphysical
assumptions are involved.
Just how this matters is never made clear. Science works. Moreover,
it works by accepting the limitations on subjective freedom posed by
the afore-mentioned compelling, objective, properties of real
physical systems; and using these constraints on freedom to
advantage.
Stephen Best wrote:
Postmodern social theory vigorously rejects every key
axiom of modern philosophy and sociology: it renounces
foundationalism and representational epistemologies.
Postmodernism stresses the relativity, instability and
indeterminacy of meaning; it abandons all attempts to
grasp totalities or construct Grand Theory. [...] Like
postmodern social theory, postmodern science sees
modernity and modern reason as inherently repressive.
(as quoted in Gross and Levitt)
"With Einstein," writes Derrida, "for example, we see the end of a
kind of privilege of empiric evidence." Unfortunately this is simply
not true, and in fact reflects a position, as Meron says, which is
not possible for 20th century physics. Such statements are driven by
the underlying moral imperative of postmodernism, which is to
liberate us from repression.
But liberation from objective necessity, as represented by the
intractable characteristics of material objects, is a quixotic goal,
and leads to intellectual incoherency. The arguments produced are
driven by resentment, not by logic. Like the Church, which once
believed its values endangered by Galilean cosmology, Derrideans
mistakenly believe that "real" conflicts with "free."
> Mati Meron - meron@cars.uchicago.edu
- Noel
Subject: Re: When social critics wimp out ... (was: Nietzsche)
From: jti@isleta.santafe.edu (Jeff Inman)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:45:18 GMT
moleary@dmu.ac.uk (Mark O'Leary) writes:
>Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
>>So far, you've been berating me and berating me and berating me for not
>>commenting on science
>
>... actually for not using (or knowing?) the appropriate scientific
>definitions/meanings of a word when you were using it in a scientific
>context...
>Silke, there seem to be two options here:
Two options? That's all you can think of? What about (c) that Silke
is doing a fine job, and folks sympathetic to her arguments don't fall
all over themselves to repeat her words in different order, as seems
to be quite popular among her opponents, or (d) what about Moggin, who
was plenty good at getting your attention until you all decided that
since you couldn't understand him, and you all were saying the same
thing, that he must be crazy? No wonder y'all are famous for your
lack of imagination.
>Oh, I did forget the usual third
>option: conspiracy theory. We're out to get you because
>(suggestions might be race, sex, fear of being exposed as foolish,
>nit-picking, etc etc).
don't forget: lacking enough sense to understand what she is talking
about.
>Bottom line: if a professional in a field tells an amateur they are
>mistaken, they would do well to listen. If ten do so, listen really hard,
>because you are very likely to be mistaken.
Doctor A: As a matter of fact, the leeches will bring the fever right
down. What? a second opinion? Certainly. Doctor B?
Doctor B: Well, actually, its all fairly complicated, but in simple
layman's terms, you have got an excess of fire. Now, as you probably
know, the blood carries fire. That's why it's red. So we're just
going to take a little of the excess heat that way.
Repeatable, Reproducable, Falsifiable. Withstands all the tests.
--
"Okay. So, we got a trooper pulled someone over. We got a shooting.
These folks drive by. There's a high-speed pursuit. Ends here. Then
this execution-type deal."
Subject: Re: Question on Force, Work, and Torque was: Emory's Professors
From: brindle@lf.hp.com (Mark Brindle)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:59:46 GMT
LP: = Lloyd R. Parker (lparker@curly.cc.emory.edu) wrote:
MB: = Mark Brindle (brindle@lf.hp.com) wrote:
MB: Only in this case, there is *NO EXCUSE* for *anyone* with even an
MB: associate degree in the physical sciences for getting it wrong.
MB: Just *LOOK AT THE FRIGGIN' UNITS* in the Planck equation -- or ask
MB: a bright 10th grader to explain the difference between "extensive"
MB: and "intensive" properties. Duh!
LP: I looked at the units in the equation as Wall derives it -- ergs/cm^3.
So, if Wall's version gives erg/cm^3 and Stroble's version Watts/m^2,
could you please tell us WHICH version *you* used to get Joules/m^2 ?
In case you "forgot", the following idiocies are direct Lloyd-quotes:
On 8/21/96 Lloyd single-handedly discovers The Joules Of Power:
But if you did find a blackbody radiator at that temperature
the power it would emit works out to 4X10(-22) J.
On the following day, Lloyd recants. Planck's equation NOW yields
an "energy" of 10^-22 Joules/m^2 -- *per photon*! (per m^2 ?????)
OTOH, you might well be on the verge of snagging your own
Nobel Prize -- as soon as you convince them foreigners
that a JOULE is a unit of POWER!
True; I should have said energy and the value is J/m^2. ...
I'm also waiting for you to tell me how you plan to detect
We were talking about Planck's black-body radiation equation
-- which doesn't say anything about the energies of individual
photons.
Since Planck's (Wien's) equation gives up the wavelength, we
most certainly can say something about the energy of individual
photons.
On 9/4 and 9/5, Lloyd again insists that Planck's equation yields
*energy* AND that this represents the energy of a single photon.
Mark, look in Strobel.... The plot there is for Planck's
black-body radiation. What is the unit on the y-axis?
Why, it's ENERGY!
Common sense dictates that "Energy" *MUST* mean "Energy Flux".
Or the energy of individual photons (of course, since you deny
their existence, you can't accept this).
Finally, Lloyd admits that Planck's does *not* yield energy/photon;
but again insists that the stuff "coming off" a black body radiator
has units of energy; no power involved, mind you -- just *energy*.
So, again, light bulbs should be rated in Joules (or foot-pounds!)
The energy of the photons themselves isn't in J/m^2; the
energy coming off the black body emitter has that unit...
There's *lots* more stuff on DejaNews just as unbelievable as the
above -- but that gets the point across. Clueless to the max!
MB: The *SIMPLE FACT* is that light bulbs are rated in *WATTS* and
MB: NOT in Joules.
LP: OTOH, we talk about a 10 V *power* supply.
So, are you telling us that a volt is a unit of power? Or, are you
*still* claiming that light bulbs should be rated in energy units?
Which is it, Lloyd? Volts Of Power or Foot-Pounds Of Brightness?
Hmm... how 'bout Lloyds Of Dimness?
MB: Guess what, Lloyd? Ergs/cm^3 is *NOT* a unit of energy; the *erg*
MB: is a unit of energy -- you CAN'T just ignore the "/cm^3" part. Duh!
LP: Of course not. It's energy density -- energy per unit volume.
LP: Still no "time" unit.
DEAD WRONG, Lloyd. Wall's energy density formulation is predicated on
the assumption that ALL of the energy (i.e., photons) is moving in a
particular direction and *AT A PARTICULAR SPEED*; the "units of time"
are implicit in his equation -- it's just Planck's equation divided
by the *SPEED* of light. (As I've explained to you about ten times.)
MB: As I've already explained in great detail, *IN THIS CASE*, erg/cm^3
MB: is a direct measure of radiated *power*.
LP: No, you explained that you could multiply energy density by the speed of
LP: light to GET power units. Gee, I can multiply mass by the speed of light
LP: squared to get energy. Does this mean mass really doesn't exist?
Are you *totally* innumerate, Lloyd? Einstein's equation simply says
that energy and matter are *interchangable* -- you can convert one to
the other. In *exactly* the same way, (and *IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE*),
power/area and energy/volume are interchangable -- either is a *direct*
measure of the other. OTOH, what *YOU* are trying to tell us is that
energy/area is *equivalent* to power/area -- and *you* are DEAD WRONG!
Can't you understand that Joules and Watts are *different*, Lloyd?
MB: Shoulda left that one alone, Lloyd. The subject came up when *YOU*
MB: made the idiotic claim (in a context of *purely* Newtonian physics)
MB: that gravity "must supply energy" to maintain the *force* of a log
MB: leaning on a wall. That's right, Lloyd, YOU personally discovered
MB: the "missing link of Newtonian physics" -- The Joules Of Gravity!
MB:
MB: Hey, but no surprise -- you discovered *LOTS* of equally amazing
MB: stuff such as The Joules Of Power and The Joules Of Torque.
LP: Gravitational energy no more violates Newtonian physics than
LP: electromagnetic energy does.
LP:
LP: As Silk explained, when a star goes supernova, gravity waves are
LP: emitted. I don't think this requires anything beyond Newtonian physics
LP: to explain. But if it does, so what? You DO know that there is more
LP: than Newtonian physics, right, Mark?
LP:
LP: Yet you maintained for weeks that there was no such thing as
LP: gravitational energy and that there was no such thing as joules of
LP: gravity, period. I proved you wrong, yet you haven't admitted that either.
Lloyd, *YOU* are a gross violation of Newtonian physics. Apparently,
you've "conveniently" forgotten the context of the Joules Of Gravity
discussion -- so, I'll refresh your memory with a *few* of your most
"interesting" discoveries and assorted "facts a la Lloyd":
...gravity is a form of energy and can be measured in joules.
No, the energy is due to gravity. Gravitational energy is free
to us all, Mark. [Re: the "energy" of a log leaning on a wall.]
No, but the force is different. Your leaning on a wall -- gravity
supplies the force. Your pushing on it -- your body must supply
the force. There is energy involved in both cases.....
^^^^^^
Just as EMF is a force, there's also electrical energy. Something
has to supply the energy for the force. Ditto for gravity. What
do you suppose supplies the energy for the gravitational force?
Drop a brick from a roof. The brick gains energy since it now has
kinetic energy. Where did that energy come from? Gravititional
energy.
MB: It was only when a net.cast-of-thousands mocked the utter stupidity
MB: of your "gravity must supply the energy" claim that you attempted
MB: to throw up a smokescreen by babbling about "gravitons" and such.
LP: Actually, people agreed that gravitational potential energy is
LP: what is supplied.
So, you're *still* claiming that energy must be "supplied" in order
to maintain a static force? What do you suppose "supplies the energy"
to "maintain the force" that my (parked) car exerts on the driveway?
a) How much "gravitational potential energy" do you suppose my car
has when it's sitting *ON* the driveway?
b) What "energy source" does my driveway tap to "supply" the opposing
upward force? Would that be ANTI-gravitational potential energy?
c) Did you *really* pass high school physics?
Please don't bother to answer this post -- unless you want *more* of
your innane "facts a la Lloyd" re-posted to sci.physics. I'm sure
rec.autos.* is (at least!) as weary of this idiocy as I am; and
now that you've given the folks on sci.physics a good belly-laugh,
you've covered the net.audiences for your hilarious sci-comedy act.
...BTW, what's the value of 'g' -- in Joules? BWAHAHAHAHA!
Mark
"To knock a thing down, especially if it is cocked at an arrogant
angle, is a deep delight to the blood."
- George Santayana
Subject: Re: Science and Aesthetics [Re: When did Nietzsche wimp out?]
From: jti@isleta.santafe.edu (Jeff Inman)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 21:28:02 GMT
Vance Maverick writes:
>[Yet once more, o ye newsgroups, trim your crosspostings]
Pardon me for untrimming. It seems this concerns most of the receiving
groups.
>gonser@eawag.ch (-Tom-) writes:
>> I am of the persuasion that on some level (the highest?) science is
>> an art form in its own right.
[...]
> Of course, different horse trainers may judge a horse
> differently. That is what makes horse racing. But the
> horse trainer's aesthetic sense is a means to an objective
> end -- the end of selecting horses that win races. The
> physicist's sense of beauty is also supposed to serve a
> purpose -- it is supposed to help the physicist select ideas
> that help us to explain nature. Physicists, just as horse
> trainers, may be right or wrong in their judgments, but they
> are not merely enjoying themselves. They often *are*
> enjoying themselves, but that is not the whole purpose of
> their aesthetic judgments.
>
> -- Steven Weinberg, _Dreams of a Final Theory_, p. 133
[This reminds me of your recent statement that you found very few
classes that had anything to say about beauty. If it could be taught,
there would be teachers of it? What constitutes an "explanation"?]
>
>But then he betrays his geek aesthetics by using pretentious epigraphs
>for his chapters (Donne, Vaughan, Paul Bowles).
Geek aesthetics is right, and Weinberg's statement sounds just like
what we have been hearing from the science-has-no-mythos camp, in this
thread and every other one that vaguely resembles it. The whole
notion of an "objective end" seems so devoid of the personal
(Nietzsche covers this so well in BG&E; #207, that I keep referring to
it) that one presumes that where the personal is despised there must
be the impersonal. But claiming that you are interested in the
"objective" does nothing to support the claim that your results really
are impersonal in some grand way. Before you ask me to walk out of a
window, or build an airplane, read on.
Sure, the scientists claim to be deriving principles that can be
repeated, and falsified, but so do the others. It's just the methods
and tools that vary. Or, more subtly, its the underlying metaphysics
that differ, as Silke was pointing out a while ago. The scientist
will tell you that his theories are only refuted by natural laws, but
it seems to me that more mythological types of system say the same
thing. The only difference is in the understanding of what Nature
might be.
Both types of systems are founded on utility, as well. Moral and
ethical exhortations are founded on a type of utility. "Crime doesn't
pay" for example, is a secularized version of a "religious"
utilitarian principle. (i.e. that immoral acts are ultimately
ineffective.) It's falsifiable, within its domain, but like
"objective" science, it embraces a metaphysics which adherents are not
interested in testing. Occam is just a hueristic, without support,
and not an "objectifying" principle of reason.
Jeff
--
"Okay. So, we got a trooper pulled someone over. We got a shooting.
These folks drive by. There's a high-speed pursuit. Ends here. Then
this execution-type deal."
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: The Conscious Mind -- David Chalmers]
From: andersw+@pitt.edu (Anders N Weinstein)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 23:41:51 GMT
In article ,
Andrzej Pindor wrote:
>>This is still wrong -- it suggests we have to first establish inductive
>>generalizations linking certain (physical?) events such as making
>>suicide notes other other (physical?) events such "causing death by
>>one's own actions" But wait -- "making a suicide note" is intentional,
>>it depends on the content. I guess we should have said "making certain
>>shaped marks on paper"? But which ones? And "causing death by one's own
>
>And what is this supposed to prove? You certainly can talk about 'certain'
That it is deceptive for you to think that intentional descriptions are
based on correlations described in non-intentional terms. You tacitly
helped yourself to intentional descriptions, such as making a suicide note.
>marks on paper, but to calculate correlations you have to be able to classify
>different shapes and combinations and this is exactly what you do by
>distinguishing letters (24 different shapes) and their combinations (words
>and sentences) and correlating them with human actions (i.e. what they
>'mean' in English). So what is your point here? isn't it how you would
Well I have never correlated shapes and letters with human actions. In
fact, like most of us, I don't have much of a vocabulary for talking
about letter shapes and such at all -- so I couldn't do any such
correlations, becuase I don't ususally attend to the shapes and
couldn't think in those terms if I did.
Compare: I know how to see a facial expression directly *as* expressive
of emotion, say pain. But I didn't learn to do so by starting with
concepts of "meaningless" physical descriptions of facial expressions --
descriptions which don't reveal them as expressive -- and trying to
establish correlations between these and other independently
identifiable patterns of meaningless behavior. If anything, it takes
much more advanced learning to master the physical descriptions, as David
Longley will assure you. You have to purge your naive experience or rely
on instruments in order to see it that way.
What really happened was rather this: I learned to recognize both
expressions and pain-behavior in the course of mastering pain language.
This is a process that builds upon a certain innate background, I
think, but also extends it. The end result is that new facts are
available to me that were not available when I started, not simply new
correlations between antecedently available facts.
>learn an unknown lagnuage by being dropped into community using such language
>but knowing no English? Would you not proceed by correlating various sounds
>with circumstances in which they occur?
Only in a very broad sense. Note first, that even if you are dropped into
an alien community you antecedently recognize the people *as* presenting
the aspect of humanity, as acting for reasons, say, even if you do not
initially understand them. So even here you don't start with behavior
characterized under impoverished descriptions. But again, the end
state of learning an initially alien language can be that new facts
are available to you, not merely correlations among antecedent facts.
A bit like coming to appreciate an unfamiliar style in music or painting.
>>actions" is also intentional, it would seem, at any rate not clearly
>>"physical". So I think your programmatic suggestion is transparently
>>absurd.
>>
>How so? Is it more abhsurd then correlating various measures of health with
>diet or like?
I think so. Certainly there are no science books reporting such
correlations in the case of human behavior.
The problem, to repeat, is that the descriptive vocabulary we use
for characterizing behavior is already intention-laden. There is no
getting into this circle of concepts from outside, I think.
>>This is sort of important to me. I think training in the methods of the
>
>What is important to you, that my suggestion is absurd?? How so?
It is important to me that physicalism or behaviorism are not valid
principles of criticism from which to attack the very use of intentional
vocabulary in the description of human behavior.
>>As I see it, the main problem with these arguments is this: if
>>observation is to have any cognitive effect, it must be
>
>I am not sure what you mean by 'cognitive effect', can you define the term?
Role in reasoning or in the justification of belief. In particular,
if it is to serve as a premise in an inference.
>Again it all depends on your definitions. A dog which suddenly runs to
>the door wagging its tail seems intuitively to expect its master. Is it
>conceptualizing something?
Like many philosophers, I would say this shows a protoconceptual capacity,
but that full-blown concept use only comes with language and the ability
to articulate reasons and perform inferences.
Even in the dog case, however, I should note that we do not say it
expects its master because we have established inductive correlations
between this behavior and something else.
>You might also remind yourself of the experiment with kittens brought up in
>an environment with no horizontal lines. The kittens were unable to see
>the horizontal lines later on, so presumably an ability to develop concepts
>depend on stimuli we are exposed to when the brain develops.
But I agree almost entirely with this. One has to learn to see. And
someone studying an alien language has to learn in a similar way. But
this learning is not inductive generalization from antecedently available
evidence.
>Assuming that I understand what you mean by 'priviledged' the plurality of
>concepts you allude to above would seem to indicate that 'intentional
>stance' is no superior to, say, 'mechanical' one. The only problem is which
Right.
>is more efficient.
But efficient for what? Evaluation depends on the aims. But I think the
purpose of intentional vocabulary is not prediction; rather a kind of
evaluation.
A simple example: if I say that you believe both p and p -> q, I might
not be able to predict that you will believe q with any degree of
accuracy. But I might still be able to say that you *ought* to.
>>There is simply no reason these concepts have to be reduced to any
>>supposedly more favorable ones. They may well constitute a kind of
>>autonomous and irreducible domain of objective fact. But with the
>
>It depends what you mean by 'reducing'. If 'reducing' makes our description
>of the reality more economical and hence easier to make predictions with
>then isn't it a good enough reason?
But I think then you are simply not describing the same phenomena.
Compare: if I am interested in whether there is a desk in my office,
I need an answer in the language of desks, offices, and ownership.
An answer in the language of atoms and molecules is of no use at all,
however valuable that language is for prediction. In a way, I don't think basic
physical science *can* predict whether or not there will be a desk
in my office tomorrow. I don't think the terms of the
question can be translated into that language. Physical science just
doesn't deal with this question, even though desks and offices are
subject to the laws of physics. I also don't care whether the terms are
useful for the purposes of scientific prediction -- I care whether there's
a *desk* in *my office*.
I think the situation is similar for intentional states and actions.
It is a bit as if someone were to say that we should reduce terms of
art criticism to computable functions of digitized images so as to
obtain an efficient description of reality. That would not do the work
that the terms of aesthetic criticsm do.
>As I have tried to indicate to you the issue is to use terms of 'seeing-as'
>which are common to all people and this is not only enough but also an
>only thing which can do in our quest to 'understanding reality'.
Why? As long as others can *learn* to see different things, that is
enough for objectivity. I can learn to hear the meanings in Chinese,
I bet, although I don't know do so.
>Note also that doctors for instance see their patients as physical systems.
But I didn't deny that the physical stance is valuable.
>What you mean by "we normally preceive other human beings *as* intentional
>systems" is not fully clear to me, but we are not talking here about
>everyday human interactions but about attemtping to understand how human
>mind works. These are two different things the same way as chemical analysis
>of your food and investigating physical principles along which the sense of
>taste works is different from preparing yourself a meal and eating it.
>You constantly seem to mix these things up.
But I think that our concept of the mental is rooted in everyday human
interactions, like the concept of a chair. In my view, there is no
hidden structure to "the mind", because "the mind" is not a causal
part of you, like an organ -- not even like the brain. If "the mind"
denotes anything it should be much more like a personality, a style,
a way of being, not a functional component.
>On more practical side perhaps knowing how brain states influence our
>behavior and what physical causes put us in various mental states might help
But I have no objection to this. I objected only to the idea that intentional
vocabulary must be reduced to something else.
>Could you please explain real attributes of what are facts about tables?
Not sure what you mean. It is a real attribute of this thing before me
that it is a table. All I mean by this is that it really is a table,
and that this is an objective question in my sense -- one's judgemnts
could be right or wrong on the matter.
>>discernible through adoption of a special attitude, the intentional
>
>Internal structure and states of Sun are also discernible from empirical
>observations by adoption of a special attitude?
Possibly. But in any case a different attitude than we adopt towards
people.
>And how do you determine if they are or are not projections or confabulations?
>Note also that we are talking about applying science to understand human
>mind. Are you then saying that mental states have no use in this area?
>Then what is the point in talking about them here?
What is the point about talking about tables? That concept is of
no use in applying science to the motions of matter. And yet there are
tables.
>We are talking here about science. i.e. our attempts to understand reality,
>not about everyday life. I do not understand why you keep mixing these
>things up.
But that is exactly the mistake. Psychological concepts are only
applicable in the world of everyday life. Science doesn't use
norm-laden concepts like these, that is why science is not in the main
very successful in application to "the mind".
>If so, are you sure that what you are saying is relevent here?
I don't know. If you will agree with me that mental states, like
chairs, are 100% real, but not in the subset of facts (world) that the
exact sciences deal with, I suppose I will drop the point.
>>language we use to "classify brain states". Most philosophers now hold
>>that lawfulness is *relative to description*. So even if I agreed with
>>you that intentional concepts classify brain states (I would say
>>organism states) I could just as easily agree that concepts like "is a
>
>What other parts of organism are relevent?
The body and its history.
>>chair" or "is a cubist painting" classify clouds of molecules. Still
>
>Not objectively in the sense of being observer-independent.
No, but objectively in the sense that there is a right answer that
is not up to us. Look, my main idea is that some objective facts are
observer-dependent -- including the facts about the observers (us)!.
>>that does not mean there are any laws to be found nor science to be made
>>*under these descriptions*.
>>
>Of course you are right. This is why science does not concern itself with
>such properties (as being a chair or being a cubist painting).
And it should take the same attitude towards the intentional or "the Mind".
It cannot explain things in these terms, and it is not incomplete if
it doesn't.
>>You might look into Donald Davidson's papers on "anomalous monism" for
>>more on the importance of this point. Jerry Fodor's "Special Sciences"
>>paper also makes the case that even within science, a reasonable
>>physicalism does not entail reductionism in the sense of reducibility
>>of laws.
>>
>Importance of which point? That science does not concern itself with
>observer-dependent descriptions? I know it. And I certainly do not think
No, the point that lawfulness is relative to a description, and that
ontological physicalism therefore does not entail reductionism, the
reducibility of laws. Fodor's example was Gresham's law -- it applies
at the level of economic activity. Now every economic transaction is
a physical event and so fall under physical laws. But some
involve movements of paper, others of coins, others of fishhooks, etc.
As physical events, they have nothing in common, no physical law
subsumes all economic transactions under that description. So, in
Fodor's terms, economics "cross-classifies" the same old physical
events, applying a different taxonomy to them in service of a higher-level
order.
In this way, intentional predicates may cross-classify physical (and
computational, and neurological, and Skinnerian behavioral) events,
in service of revealing a different sort of order, that of at least
minimal rationality.
>it worth to read what non-physicsts think about physicalism, like I would
>not waste time on a treatise about sex written by an eunuch (except as for
>entertainment :-)).
Your pronouncements on physicalism are going to continue to be worthless
and uninformed if you don't know what philosophers have said about it.
>machines. It is just a way of describing physical arrangements of matter
>in a language suitable to phenomena we are considering, like, say, talking
>about attractors, orbits, basins of attraction etc of a physical system.
But talking about an impressionist painting in terms of its style
is also "a way of describing physical arrangements of matter in a
language suitable to phenomena we are considering". I.e. there are many
other interests than those of science that determine useful ways of
talking.
> The main problem I see with your stance is that you
>seem to be allergic to any suggestion of existence and utility of such lower
>levels of description of workings of the mind.
I do not deny the lower-level vocabulary is useful. But I think that
certain phenomena only exist at the higher level, they disappear when
you move to the lower level. Intentional states are like that -- they have
no substructure or composition.
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 23:43:14 GMT
moggin@bessel.nando.net (moggin) writes:
>zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>Thus spake Jacques Derrida:
>>>>
>>>> When I take, for example, the structure of certain algebraic
>>>> constructions [ensembles], where is the center? Is the center the
>>>> knowledge of general rules which, after a fashion, allow us to
>>>> understand the interplay of the elements? Or is the center certain
>>>> elements which enjoy a particular privilege within the ensemble?
>>>> ...With Einstein, for example, we see the end of a kind of
>>>> privilege of empiric evidence. And in that connection we see a
>>>> constant appear, a constant which is a combination of space-time,
>>>> which does not belong to any of the experimenters who live the
>>>> experience, but which, in a way, dominates the whole construct;
>>>> and this notion of the constant -- is this the center?
moggin@bessel.nando.net (moggin):
>>> I'm afraid you're badly mistaken: Derrida didn't say any of the above.
Zeleny:
>>I am afraid that you are correct. I have omitted the attribution of
>>the above question to a Derridean sycophant. Not that apportioning
>>boundless ignorance to two parties makes any difference in the outcome.
moggin:
> Your error is of commission, not ommission: you wrote, "Thus
>spake Jacques Derrida" and proceeded to quote another person entirely
>(namely Jean Hyppolite). This type of thing is frowned on, for the
>reasons you demonstrate above.
On the contrary, my point was to focus on the nonsensical claim that
the Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a center. Hence its
force would not have been blunted, had I not neglected to expand my
attribution to read "Thus spake Jacques Derrida in response to vigorous
brown-nosing by Jean Hips-or-Lips", or whoever.
Zeleny:
>>>>As Sokal rightly says, "Derrida's perceptive reply went to the heart of
>>>>classical general relativity:"
>>>>
>>>> The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, is not a center.
>>>>
>>>> It is the very concept of variability -- it is, finally, the
>>>> concept of the game. In other words, it is not the concept of
>>>> something -- of a center starting from which an observer could
>>>> master the field -- but the very concept of the game ...
>>>>
>>>>(Derrida, Jacques. 1970. Structure, sign and play in the discourse of
>>>>the human sciences. In The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of
>>>>Man: The Structuralist Controversy, pp. 247-272, edited by Richard
>>>>Macksey and Eugenio Donato. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.)
moggin:
>>> Here your attribution is half-right and wholly misleading. The
>>>passage you quote comes not from the well-known essay, "Structure,
>>>Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," as one would
>>>expect from your reference, but rather from the discussion following
>>>Derrida's presentation of that essay at the Hopkins symposium, "The
>>>Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man," in the fall of 1966.
Zeleny:
>>EXCUSE ME? Are you implying that having railed against the evils of
>>phallogocentrism entitles Derrida to a special dispensation to issue
>>inconsequential howlers, provided that someone else transcribes them?
>>Hippolyte offers an egregious question. Derrida obliges him with an
>>egregious answer. Sokal shows that both are blathering. Case closed.
moggin:
> I thought I was being quite explicit, but let me make it even
>plainer for you, since that appears to be necessary. The howlers are
>yours. You assigned Hippolyte's words to Derrida. You made it seem
>as if remarks Derrida offered following a lecture came from his essay,
>"Structure, Sign, and Play." You then added a sarcastic comment about
>"Derrida's" learning and posted the stew to five different newsgroups,
>with the expectation that the population of sci.physics would find it
>especially delectable.
Have you by any chance flunked remedial reading? Does writing "Thus
spake Jacques Derrida:" look like making it seem "as if remarks Derrida
offered following a lecture came from his essay"?
moggin:
> What does this show? First of all, that your claims to rigor
>are unfounded. Secondly, that your criticism of Derrida begins with a
>basic mistake: you're unable to correctly identify his work. If I'm
>right to say you got your information from Sokal's hoax, as seems to
>be the case, then it also shows that while you're eager to attack
>Derrida, you've been reluctant to read him. And given your response,
>it shows that you find none of these failings to be of any concern.
Actually, I got my information from recalling Weinberg's article about
Sokal's hoax in the New York Review and pulling the quotations from
Sokal's home page. Lacking the Hopkins symposium publication, I have
the Seuil edition of _L'écriture et la différence_, which I have
been using in my discussion with Silke Weineck. And in my ongoing
conversation with Brian Artese, I have quoted the Minuit edition of
_De la grammatologie_. So if you were able to count, you might have
concluded that I overcame my alleged reluctance to read Derrida in at
least two cases.
> There's also the irony that I mentioned before: Sokal's hoax,
>designed to unmask post-modernism, has served to expose the thinking
>and scholarship of its opponents. You're merely the latest victim.
What does it tell me about your own "thinking and scholarship" that
you would rather cavil about the format of attributions than address
the textual substance that I presented on three separate occasions?
Cordially, - Mikhail | God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum."
Zeleny@math.ucla.edu | Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum."
itinerant philosopher -- will think for food ** www.ptyx.com ** MZ@ptyx.com
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