Subject: Re: When did Nietzsche wimp out? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: moggin@bessel.nando.net (moggin)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 18:05:50 -0400
Ken MacIver wrote:
[...]
>>>What does it say to you about science when both sides to an
>>>irreconcilable difference plead their case through citations to
>>>science?
"RICHARD J. LOGAN" :
>>It tells me that even lay people recognize that science has provided
>>unambiguously positive solutions to problems in the past and that, by
>>implying scientific evidence supports their position (and not the
>>position of people on the other side of the issue), they hope to
>>convince the uncommitted masses of the correctness of their cause.
Anton Hutticher Exactly.
>This is why eg. moggin constantly uses phrases like "newton was wrong,
>as wrong as ptolemy" or "If "some of the unstated assumptions used in
>classical mechanics have turned out to be wrong," then quite clearly
>there _was_ something to cast doubt on" without mentioning that he
>uses "wrong" etc in an extremely weird way, which would not be
>expected by lay people. They hear "wrong" and think: Gee,it doesnt
>work, lets switch to say astrology.
You are, well, wrong. In the latter example, you're not
just quoting me -- you're quoting me quoting Richard Logan. Now,
I forget exactly, but isn't Richard a scientist of some kind or
other? Maybe even a physicist? In any case, you didn't raise an
objection to the expression when _he_ used it -- it only _became_
objectionable to you when you thought that it was coming from me.
So much for the criticism you've been aiming my way. It
finally becomes clear that Newton can be wrong when you say so,
but not when I do -- blaspheming is permitted, but only to some
people, and when performed with the necessary rituals. It's o.k.
for Rich to say that "some of the unstated assumptions used in
classical mechanics have turned out to be wrong," but when you
believe I'm saying it, it's suddenly improper. So the truth has
outed. (Not that I hadn't guessed, much as I had surmised the
nature of Mati's grin.)
But maybe now we can look at other, more interesting
questions. For example, it is true (as I'd think from the above)
that you're mainly concerned with defending the esteem of science
as an institution? You seem disturbed by the notion that people
might even _consider_ placing their faith somewhere else, and your
argument is political: don't say anything that might put thoughts
in their heads. _That's_ the criterion you seem to apply.
It would follow that you argue with me not because I dare
approach the mysteries with being properly initiated, but because
someone listening to me might begin to lose confidence in the high
priests. I can at least put you at ease regarding my intentions:
my interest in swaying the "uncommited masses" is quite small.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: rvien@dreamscape.com (Robert Vienneau)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 23:32:22 GMT
A traditional metaphor (from Popper?) - and it's a good one - is that
science is reconstructing a fleet of ships while in full sail at mid
sea.
Mati, can you summarize the "Whig theory of history" and tell us whether
it is well-thought of by contemporary historians?
A quote:
"For many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention
to long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political
events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible
system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes, the
constant readjustments, the underlying tendencies that gather force,
and are then suddenly reversed after centuries of continuity, the
movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent,
motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick
layer of events...These tools have enabled workers in the historical
field to distinguish various sedimentary strata; linear successions,
which for so long had been the object of research, have given way to
discoveries in depth. From the political mobility at the surface down
to the slow movements of 'material civilization,' ever more levels of
analysis have been established: each has its own peculiar
discontinuities and patterns; and as one descends to the deepest
levels, the rhythms become broader. Beneath the rapidly changing
history of governments, wars, and famines, there emerge other,
apparently unmoving histories: the history of sea routes, the history
of corn or crop rotation, the history of the balance achieved by the
human species between hunger and abundance...
At about the same time, in the disciplines that we call the history of
ideas, the history of science, the history of philosophy, the history
of thought, and the history of literature (we can ignore their
specificity for the moment), in those disciplines which, despite their
names, evade very largely the work and methods of the historian,
attention has been turned, on the contrary, away from vast unities like
'periods' or 'centuries' to the phenomena of rupture, of discontinuity...
...they direct historical analysis away from the search for silent
beginnings, and the never-ending tracing-back to the original
precursors, towards the search for a new type of rationality and its
various effects...they show that the history of a concept is not
wholly and entirely that of its progressive refinement, its continually
increasing rationality, its abstraction gradient, but that of its various
fields of constitution and validity, that of its successive rules of use,
that of the many theoretical contexts in which it developed and matured..."
-- Michel Foucault, _The Archaeology of Knowledge_, Pantheon Books,
1972, pp. 3-4.
--
Robert Vienneau Try my Mac econ simulation game,
rvien@future.dreamscape.com Bukharin, at
ftp://csf.colorado.edu/econ/authors/Vienneau.Robert/Bukharin.sea
Whether strength of body or of mind, or wisdom, or virtue, are always
found...in proportion to the power or wealth of a man [is] a question
fit perhaps to be discussed by slaves in the hearing of their
masters, but highly unbecoming to reasonable and free men in search
of the truth. -- Rousseau
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 22:31:10 GMT
Anton Hutticher (Anton.Hutticher@sbg.ac.at) wrote:
: weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
: >
: > uchicago.edu>:
: > Distribution:
: >
: > meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
: > : In article <54blb8$sqt@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail2.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
: > : >meron@cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
: > : >: In article <54at8t$ghp@netnews.upenn.edu>, weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) writes:
: > :
:
: > : >: >I know what you're saying but don't think it's relevant, since, as
: > : >: >Richard pointed out, moggin's point was that "wrong in some instances"
: > : >: >can be translated into "wrong" tout court; that was the debatable
: > : >: >assertion. I have no problem with your account of how these things work,
: > : >: >I just don't think the argument was about it.
: > : >: >
: > : >: Well, I consider it relevant since it precisely illustrates the point
: > : >: that "wrong in some instances" doesn't simply translate to "wrong".
: > : >
: > : >No, Mati, that won't do; it doesn't "illustrate the point," it
: > : >illustrates your sense of when it makes sense to call a theory "wrong."
: > : >I'm not saying it isn't a sensible position -- I think it is --, but I
: > : >can also see an argument that understands right or wrong in absolute/ist
: > : >terms.
: Shure, but it is not the normal use in natural science. Communication
: would be extremely cumbersome in science if right or wrong are understood
: in absolute terms only. And "Newton was wrong...." does talk about a
: scientific theory being wrong. Therefore most people will assume a
: certain usage of this word.
I understand that. Whenever a thread is cross-posted between science
community and non-science community, however, mutual accomodations are in
order. Witness the "generalization" terminology: for most people,
"generalizing" something means to make it _more_ applicable, to extend or
expand its applicability. I do not for a moment doubt that Mati uses the
term correctly according to sci usage, but it's counter-intuitive to the
rest of us.
: > : >
: > : I can see such argument too, but it has nothing to do with science.
: > : This is not how science works. Of course you're free to say "this is
: > : my definition of science, and my definition ofright and my definition
: > : of wrong. that's what I'm talking about and I don't care how other
: > : people understand these terms." You're welcome to do it but I'm
: > : afraid that you'll find such approach less then useful.
: >
: > We're not quite there yet, but getting closer: it is my impression that
: > moggin used his own vocabulary in talking about an aspect of science; you
: > are saying (and I take your word for it) that scientists don't talk that
: > way, and that it wouldn't be useful for them to do so -- again, no
: > problem. However, non-scientists in a non-scientific forum are surely not
: > held to your rhetorical practice.
: Moggin has been told that his use of certain words (wrong, true, etc)
: is quite different from how they are used by scientists and is misleading
: as long as he doesn´t tell that his usage differs. So far he refuses.
: And non-scientists generally do not use "wrong" etc. the way moggin
: does, but remarkably often like scientist do.
I don't think he refuses to acknowledge that sci uses the terms
differently; I think he insists on using them according to his own
vocabulary standards. That said, however, these threads have long stopped
being "about" moggin's use of the word 'wrong' -- it would have been just
fine, I think, to declare all around, "Newton was wrong according to
this-or-that usage of the word, and not wrong according to this-or-that."
The mobbing of moggin was hardly warranted -- and it's the mobbing that
made me enter these threads, not any intrinsic interest in whether Newton
was right or wrong or generalized or specialized. The extraordinary
hostility emanating from the sci posters is still baffling me -- before
someone points out that I myself have quite a few hostile postings to my
name, yes, I know that. I have not, however, told people that they have
no basic intellectual integrity, that they are habitual liars, shouldn't
teach in their professions, etc. etc. Despite Gordon's efforts of
elucidating how such things happen, I continue to wonder at that course
of events.
: >Imagine a hard-core deconstructionist
: > raise his hand every time someone in r.a.b. talked about an author,
: > demanding proof that the person had read Foucault as well as Barthes as
: > well as Derrida on the question of authorship, was cognizant of the
: > complex tradition of authorship, could clearly and accurately account for
: > his use of the word, etc. etc.
: Imagine someone at r.a.b. discussing Hamlet and starting with the line:
: Hamlet is a chauvinistic piece of shit because the heroine, Juliet, is
: killed by her lover, Romeo, against her wishes. Wouldn´t someone on
: r.a.b. ask: Please, read *Hamlet* before you say that, and, if
: possible, other Shakespearean pieces.
I still think my analogy is better, since, as we established above,
"right" and "wrong" as moggin uses them are legitimate uses of the word
outside of sci, just as the word "author" in an unreflected way is
legitimate outside of high octane lit-crit. To put Juliet into Hamlet is
another matter.
: >This is, to a certain degree, how "the
: > science camp" comes across in these threads; it seems you are used to
: > being amongst yourselves more in t.o. or sci.ph. -- perhaps it's all just
: > mutual culture shock.
: Culture shock?
: Could be, but after having had several debates along the lines:
: :"Science is wrong! Why? Because they will always have an experimental
: :error, and if something is wrong in the millionth decimal it is
: :*wrong*.
: :There is no progress in science! Why? Ptolemy was wrong, Newton was
: :wrong, Einstein (say scientists) is wrong. NO progress."
But you do realize that you are making this up, right? Whereas I am _not_
making up that Derrida's writings have been called "shallow,"
"gibberish," etc. etc.
: I very much doubt that this is unintentional.
"this" being, so far, a fantasy.
: I have corrected the use of loaded words in those debates, pointing
: out that scientists as well as the general public have a different
: usage and that laymen are sure to draw wrong inferences, but to no
: avail. I have asked that it be explained at the beginning that
: certain words are used in nonstandard ways, in ways shure to mislead
: if not explained. No response!
: These words are *calculated* to mislead.
As someone said, it's a conspiracy?
Silke
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 24 Oct 1996 00:06:33 GMT
brian artese writes:
>Michael Zeleny wrote:
>>Now that you have implicitly established my egregious lack of knowledge of
>>and training in philosophy, would you be so kind as to indicate the exact
>>provenance of Derrida's philosophical credentials? Afterwards, you might
>>consider explaining the nature of dispensation that allows you to "expose"
>>Sokal without engaging his _Social Text_ article.
>I'm not sure what in what "provenance" philosophical credentials could
>be said to live. Normally, among scholars who read, one could answer
>your question by referring to the author's books. But I understand I
>can't do that here. And as far as engaging Sokal's presumption about
>contemporary continental philosophy, what more do I need than the
>_Lingua Franca_ article I brought to the table?
You might begin by looking up the _Social Text_ article to which the
_Lingua Franca_ item was written as a postscript. As regards the
provenance of one's philosophical credentials, the name of Derrida's
dissertation adviser would do rather nicely.
>>The critical presumption, if it be one, is surely no greater than that of
>>criticizing science or deconstructing its metaphysics without doing the
>>most basic math that undergirds it. I leave it up to you to think about
>>how and why the postmodernists acquired their reputation for innumeracy.
>Descartes was a decent mathematician, no? Yet Descartes' metaphysical
>statements -- which are based on grammatical rules, not mathematical
>ones -- are easily demystified.
Then demystify them. Tell me how to choose between arguments in favor
of Cartesian dualism such as are advanced by Saul Kripke, Wilbur Hart,
George Bealer, or David Chalmers, and counterarguments that defend
materialism such as are put forth by Michael Levin, Daniel Dennett, or
Paul and Patricia Churchland. Since you purport to have an infallible
device for resolving ancient metaphysical controversies, you could make
yourself immortal by ending this particular conflict right here and now.
A straightforward way to do so would be conclusively to resolve the
debate between Bealer and Levin, which appears on pp 185-208 and 314-323
in the 1994 volume of _The Journal of Philosophy_. Go for it.
>Descartes was no numerical illiterate -- and in, fact, he claimed that
>all of his philosophical pronouncements could be traced back to the
>most rigorous science, just as you do. But -- lo and behold -- what
>did these mathematical proofs ultimately yield? What was the
>obviously inevitable conclusion of his great scientific project
>(inevitable *because* it was founded on science, on nothing but the
>most rigorous skeptical logic)? Why, it was nothing less than the
>existence of God! So much for the inevitable insight of math. I find
>it hilarious when people claim that a knowledge of math somehow
>immunizes them from the conceptual mechanics inherent in their
>grammar. A knowledge of math does *not* suddenly divorce your
>discourse from the tropes and metaphors that construct its
>metaphysics. I find that it is *quite possible* for people adept at
>numbers to not know thing one about how those tropes are operating in
>their speech and philosophical discourse.
And I find that it is quite common for people adept at rhetorical
obfuscation to be ignorant of the most basic principles of logical
reasoning. And now that we have the politeness factor taken care of,
your characterization of the Cartesian project in the Meditations is
potentially misleading. Descartes' proof has nothing to do with the
God of Biblical revelation. The entity in question is simply that
than which none greater can be conceived. But as borne out by the
work of Spinoza, no attribute of personhood such as capacity for
perception, cognition, or volition, apply to this sort of being.
Moreover, Descartes' ontological argument, like his proof of dualism,
can be readily translated into the mathematical formalism of symbolic
logic. Some translations of this kind can be found in the writings of
Charles Hartshorne and Alvin Plantinga; a related proof due to Kurt
Goedel has been widely disseminated in folklore prior to its recent
annotated publication in the third volume of his Collected Works.
Since Goedel's work in formal logic is so often misapplied in support
of the postmodern credo, you may want to come to terms with the fact
that his philosophy was antithetical to the neo-Sophistical revival
advocated by Derrida and his cronies. Once again, you are welcome to
arbitrate between the defenders and opponents of these arguments.
>>Would you care to
>>gloss the statement that, "en dernière instance, la différence entre
>>le signifié et le signifiant _n'est rien_"?
>This is one of the most basic tenents of poststructuralist thought.
>It doesn't surprise me that I'm speaking to a self-styled critic of
>that discourse who needs it explained. To gloss the statement, I have
>to assume you're familiar with de Saussure and with linguistics in
>general, 'cause I don't want to have to start from square one. A
>signifier is a sensible thing -- ink on the page or sound from a
>mouth. The signified refers to de Saussure's notion of some "meaning"
>that "hovers above" the signifier. This dichotomy allows us to have
>the signifier right in front of us, and yet still ask the question
>"What does it mean?" The traditional assumption is that the signifier
>has *a* meaning, a single meaning that grounds it. But when we answer
>the question, for instance, "What does 'furious' mean?" we can only
>answer by saying something like "it means 'angry'" or "it means
>'hopping mad'" or "it means 'livid'" In other words, we never get to a
>signified, we only get more signifiers. It turns out that the
>signifier does not work 'metaphorically' -- that is, as a pointer to
>some proper meaning that is its 'final foundation' -- it works
>*associatively*, in relation to other signifiers.
This is silly in at least two ways. First of all, you have given no
reason to suppose that the meaning of a given signifier is identical
with its explanation. Generally speaking, things are not identical
with their explanations, and there is no reason to suppose that
meanings differ in this regard. Indeed, to assume that meanings are
reducible to equivalence classes of synonymous explanatory terms is to
assume a form of nominalism. As before, such tacit assumptions stand
in need of rational support.
Secondly, if you were to reformulate your question by applying what the
philosophers call a disquotation schema, to read "What does it mean to
be furious?", it is by no means obvious that an exhaustive answer would
not be forthcoming purely in terms of physical objects and events. For
instance, being furious might be exemplified by Clinton's state of mind
at a Whitewater press conference, or Yeltsin's state of mind upon being
informed of Lebed's behavior. Arbitrarily fine distinctions between
different kinds of states could be conceivably sustained by seemingly
similar counterexamples. And it is a basic tenet of cognitive science
that such mental states are identical with electrical activities in the
C-fibers of their bearers' central nervous systems. By contrast, an
advocate of Cartesianism would say that in so far as this identity is
subject to rational doubt, it cannot realize in nature. After all, it
seems that such doubt implies that mental states possibly differ from
physical states. And it is a theorem of a wide class of modal logics
that the possibility of A and B being distinct implies their actually
being distinct.
>Think of another signifier: say, a particular speech of Hamlet's.
>Even when we have the speech right in front of us -- let's say we've
>just read it -- somebody can ask "What does it mean?" The assumption
>is, just like with a single word, that it points to something beyond
>what it says -- or that there is something "underneath" the text which
>is its meaning or foundation. But what happens when somebody tries to
>"get at" this meaning in Hamlet's speech? Well, he paraphrases the
>speech. In other words, he offers up another articulation -- another
>speech -- that claims to explain the first one. But then somebody can
>read that second articulation, that paraphrase, and ask "What does
>THAT mean?" And then a third party will paraphrase the paraphrase.
>And then somebody can ask of that third articulation "What does THAT
>mean?", etc. So it becomes clear that meaning is achieved through
>diachronic paraphrases (i.e., paraphrases that follow one another in
>time) -- which topples the notion that the meaning or the signified
>exists *at the same time* as the signifier. But that very
>contemporaneousness is the necessary basis of the signifier/signified
>dichotomy.
Once again, you are arbitrarily importing your temporal sensibilities
into your analysis of the grasp of meaning. Suppose that understanding
is like intellectual capital. Then Shakespearean capital accrues in my
mental bank account simultaneously with my understanding of Hamlet's
soliloquy. Five minutes later you come along asking for an explanation
of my understanding. Absent the faculties of mind-reading, the required
explanation can proceed only through interlocution, a diachronic process
that depends on a physical (re)production of symbols, be they graphemes
or phonemes, not unlike an economic exchange of material goods. But
there is no valid way to make the logical leap from the necessarily
diachronic nature of verbal communication to the summary denial of the
synchronic faculty of understanding, just as there is no way to conclude
that electronic banking is impossible since the Phoenicians have taught
us to rely on tangible coins of the realm.
>In other words, it is impossible for the signified to be something
>that both (1) exists at the same time as the signifier and (2) is
>distinct from it. There are people who claim this is not impossible,
>and those people are what we call religious people. They must
>manufacture out of thin air a transcendental realm where this
>signified could be said to exist contemporaneously with its sensible
>partner, the signifier. Here on earth, however, no two things can
>occupy the same space.
>
>If you really want to know what Hamlet's speech "means" -- read it
>again. In other words, the signified _is_ the signifier -- either the
>original one, or one of the subsequent paraphrases. The meaning is
>the articulation and the articulation is the meaning.
>
>The signified is just a signifier that hasn't happened yet. "Meaning"
>exists in the deferral, the temporal movement from one signifier to
>another.
This is just plain dumb. To adapt Denyer's example, if a child asks
me for a puppy, I will not be able to gratify him by paraphrasing the
term `puppy'. I will not accept Derrida's insistent claims to the
contrary until and unless he accepts from his publisher the sequence
of letters `A', `R', `G', `E', `N', and `T' in lieu of his royalties.
>>if Derrida didn't have to extend the courtesy [of reading beyond the
>>first chapter] to Husserl, I certainly don't have to extend it to him.
>What a whimsical way to excuse your lack of scholarship. It allows
>you to (A) critique Derrida without reading him and (B) make a claim
>about his familiarity with Husserl -- even though such a claim could
>only be made upon a thorough reading of Derrida! "I haven't read any
>of Derrida's 40-odd books," you say, "but I know what he doesn't
>address."
When and where did I say that? In any event, I need not have read
"any of Derrida's 40-odd books" to know that he based his critique
of Husserl on all of thirty pages he excerpted and translated from
_Die Krisis der europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phaenomenologie_. By this standard of critical concern, the first
chapter of _De la grammatologie_ should suffice to return the favor.
>>>I suspect you won't bring to
>>>the table any persiflage from "Of Grammatology," so why don't you
>>>excerpt something from Denyer's critique and well have a look at it?
>>Nonsense. I need not do more than cite Galois to rebut a presumption of
>>trisecting an angle with a compass and a ruler. Science is a collective
>>enterprise. In the interests of keeping it that way, you are welcome to
>>traipse to the library on your own.
>Your diversion is a bit clumsy. I ask you to support your critique
>of Derrida by bringing some Derrida to the table, or even something
>written *about* him -- and you start yammering about Galois and
>trisecting angles? Who do you think you're fooling? At least I
>backed up my what I was saying about Sokal with something he actually
>wrote. I have yet to see any of the people who talk about Derrida's
>"nonsense" have the balls to do the same.
Perhaps you are laboring under the tiresome presumption that I fished the
foregoing Derridean quotation out of my butt? As for the rest, I am not
about to humor you by initiating a tedious exchange of "this is not what
he meant at all." If I wanted to talk to Jacques Derrida, I would have
gone forty miles south to his Stateside court. At this time however, I
am talking to one Brian Artese, whom I accordingly expect to bring his
own interpretations to the table. If you want to supplement them with
textual references, I have most of the Minuit and Seuil publications at
hand. Let's see what you got.
>>The cogito is not a logical
>>inference. It is an immediate intellectual recognition of the locus of
>>cognitive responsibility for presently occurring thinking. Then again, I
>>would not expect the notion of being responsible for your own beliefs to
>>be intelligible to a sophistical controversialist such as yourself.
>It's uncanny how often people who claim to be the gatekeepers of
>"rigorous logic" let themselves be mystified by blantantly religious
>discourse. Pray tell, *where* is this "locus of cognitive
>responsibility"? Where is this center? In the skull? What is this
>"source" of consciousness that is somehow *more* than the aggregate of
>all particular thoughts? What forces me to accept the existence of this
>transcendent source, besides your arbitrary positing of it? You'll find
>that this "locus" you're talking about is indistinguishable from "the
>soul": it serves all the same totalizing purposes, and follows all the
>same transcendental rules.
Like I said, I would not expect the notion of being responsible for
your own beliefs to be areeable to you. Rationalism is a question
of cognitive norms, of which parrhesia is the first and foremost.
Since a rhetorician labors under an obligation to serve any cause
that retains his services, he must exempt himself from the duty of
honest truth-telling. Unfortunately for you, this medium promotes
the preservation and reproduction of your utterances in a way that
serves as a natural remedy against prevarication and dissimulation.
So on the Usenet, the responsibility for your own beliefs is forced
upon you by the nature of their expression. You post, therefore you
are.
>The cogito is not a logical inference? Then what is that "therefore"
>doing in there?
Just read the book. It's all explained there in black and white.
Cordially, - Mikhail | God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum."
Zeleny@math.ucla.edu | Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum."
itinerant philosopher -- will think for food ** www.ptyx.com ** MZ@ptyx.com
ptyx ** 6869 Pacific View Drive, LA, CA 90068 ** 213-876-8234/874-4745 (fax)
Subject: Re: Curvature of Space-Time
From: nurban@csugrad.cs.vt.edu (Nathan Urban)
Date: 23 Oct 1996 19:55:11 -0400
(Followups to sci.physics.relativity.)
In article <326C3334.647C@direct.ca>, SAggarwal wrote:
> Alan "Uncle Al" Schwartz wrote:
> > The fishnet (or rubber sheet) analogy is a projection of four-space onto
> > two dimensions, with curvature in the third. That is as far as the model
> > goes. It obviously suffers inadequacies as an analytical tool.
> So does the curvature of space-time affect the 5th dimension (if it
> exists) or is it more like looking at the world through a fisheye lens
> (just affects the dimension in question)?
I think that it is usually best to ignore the "5th dimension". To
visualize a 2D surface, one is accustomed to pretending it's embedded in
a 3D Euclidean space. This is not necessary. (And can even be
misleading. Have you seen a drawing of a Klein bottle? The bottle's
surface does not intersect itself, yet it must be drawn that way to
embed it in R^3.) So try to think of 4D spacetime by itself, without it
being embedded in a hypothetical 5D space; we don't see any "fifth
dimension", so it's probably not a good thing to pretend it's there.
> > >3. If the answer is no to the first two, then how do I know how to
> > >orient myself when looking at the curvature of space-time?
> > Do the math (icky). Any frame of reference is a valid frame of
> > reference. Both epicycles and elliptical planetary orbits work to equal
> > accuracy. The Copernican universe is easier on human intuition.
> So it is similar to the Star Trek thing, everything is oriented on the
> same plane (just depends what you define it to be)?
Well... I'm not sure what you mean by everything being oriented on the
same plane. The analogy I used earlier is the one I think is most apt:
you may make measurements of a vector in any direction you choose,
giving you the components of the vector in that direction. Make enough
linearly independent measurements, (for an n-dimensional vector, n
measurements are necessary, of course) and you can reconstruct the entire
vector, a geometric entity. Curvature is similar, except it's not a
vector, it's a tensor.
> > >4. Is space-time surrounding a star/planet/etc. perfectly spherical
> > >(assuming object is perfectly spherical)?
> > Is the mass spinning? Is it magnetic?
> This brings up another question that is touched upon here, Earth and the
> moon would affect space-time differently (neglecting mass differences)?
> Interesting.
Slightly. The rotational and magnetic effects are not large in that
case.
> > accelerating linearly or angularly?
> Does this include things like friction, orbits and the like?
Yes.
--
Nathan Urban | nurban@vt.edu | Undergrad {CS,Physics,Math} | Virginia Tech
Subject: Re: PEACE VACCINE (or more precisely, PEACE GENETIC-VACCINE)
From: "Bill Lee"
Date: 24 Oct 1996 02:22:00 GMT
Alexander Abian wrote in article
<54efbl$or@news.iastate.edu>...
>
>
>
>
> The NATURE, for the survival among the myriad of species such as
various
> bacteria, viruses, bacilli, giraffes, cats, dogs, tigers, whales,
elephants,
> human beings, etc, etc, selects the ones who are stronger than the
others.
>
> Except for (hopefully all) human beings, all other species blindly and
> speechlessly surrender to (for us) the cruel, atrocious, heinous,
nefarious,
> monstrous and wicked NATURAL SELECTION FOR SURVIVAL which is administered
by
> the ruthless (for us the human beings), truculent and brutal NATURE.
>
> Unfortunately, very unfortunately they are human beings who also
> slavishly surrender to Nature's nefarious Natural Selection. They say
> "don't tamper with Nature", "don't meddle with Nature" - Let people
> die of Bubonic Plague, let people die of Cholera , let people die of
> typhoid - it is the NATURE's way of eliminating the weak - the ones
> who are weaker than the bacteria of Bubonic plague; it is the NATURE's
> way to eliminate the weak - the ones who are weaker than the bacteria
> of Typhoid, etc., etc.
>
> Yes, irrational animals, animals without creative intelligence die
> as victims of the powerful bacteria and viruses. As a result many
> species became extinct. Letting the Nature to continue its NATURAL
> SELECTION only vicious, toxic, poisonous, deadly-powerful bacteria
> and viruses will survive and will remain on the Planet Earth continuing
> among themselves the cruel struggle for survival.
>
> Fortunately, human beings have intelligence, brain, ingenuity, technology
> and means of altering the very fabric of human species in order to
> overpower the deadly viruses!! And, not to allow Nature to make
> selections at the expense of the human beings.
>
> Contrary to the extinction of some species, because of Humans tampering
> with Nature, human species is growing and the life span of average
> humans has grown more than 30 years during the 19-th and 20-th
centuries.
>
> We have defied the NATURAL SELECTION of the Nature. We will continue
> to defy and to augment the life span of humans and will inhabit other
> planets - but will not surrender to the (for us) nefarious Natural
> Selection which gives priority of survival to the viruses of smallpox
> and measles over the survival of human beings.
>
> The danger for our survival will then chiefly depend on those human
> beings in whom NATURE has instilled the war- mongering and war-waging
> and man-slaughtering instincts and genetic trends. But we will
> solve this by Genetic Engineering, by PEACE GENETIC VACCINES or simply
> by PEACE VACCINES. The study of the (brain) genes of those humans in
which the
> man-slaughtering, genocidal, war mongering instincts and genetic trends
> are instilled by Nature (for purposes which are absolutely invalid
> today) in view of our technology and the human genius will allow us
> to eliminated those genes by PEACE VACCINE. Everyone will be inoculated
by
> PEACE VACCINE and a healthier, intellectually more brilliant and
> aggressive and technologically more advanced human species will emerge
> which will not even dream to solve socio-economic problems by waging
> wars, by nuclear weapons and by germ warfairs. Enough of these childish
> idiotic ways of solving human conflicts. PEACE VACCINE IS THE WAY
> THE ONLY WAY OF THE FUTURE.
> No education, no religious indoctrinations, no moral lecturing, no any
kind
> of education will (as centuries of past have shown) do the job. In
fact
> the preachers of PEACE very often are the most vicious war-mongerers.
> Vaccinating especially them is the only solution.
> With all the nuclear proliferation around (I do not believe that
> any power and especially the super powers have ceased nuclear testings -
> they continue to test and test and test and test clandestinely), the
> only hope of human survival is the PEACE VACCINE , just as anti-smallpox
> vaccine curtailed a phase of Nature's Natural Selection, i.e.- letting
> the child die and the virus survive, the PEACE VACCINE WILL PREVENT
THE
> NUCLEAR HOLOCAUSTS AND WORLD WARS AND ANY WARS TO OCCUR.
> --
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
> ABIAN MASS-TIME EQUIVALENCE FORMULA m = Mo(1-exp(T/(kT-Mo))) Abian
units.
> ALTER EARTH'S ORBIT AND TILT - STOP GLOBAL DISASTERS AND
EPIDEMICS
> ALTER THE SOLAR SYSTEM. REORBIT VENUS INTO A NEAR EARTH-LIKE
ORBIT
> TO CREATE A BORN AGAIN EARTH (1990)
>
>
>
Interesting...
Actually, humanity is more fragile than you seem to think. A meteor can end
our civilization rather abruptly. I know it sounds like science fiction,
but there actually exists a small but real probability of collision(there
has been a recent interest in charting asteroids near the earth).
There is no evidence that we are beyond nature's control. After all, all
evidence suggest that our understanding of the universe is limited.
Therefore, can we really claim to be aware and to be able to deal with all
natural threats to the existence of our species? Humans have only existed
for a very brief period of geological time, currently extinct species have
existed a quite a while longer before being wiped out. As things stand, I
don't think the market's ripe for !!!THE PEACE VACCINE!!!. We probably
still have other genocidal threats to worry about.
Subject: Re: Can Science Say If God Exists?
From: st86m@Rosie.UH.EDU (slobbering skeleton)
Date: 24 Oct 1996 01:30:54 GMT
In article <545s4i$kn6@muss.CIS.McMaster.CA>, pritchjm@muss.cis.McMaster.CA (J.M. Pritchard) writes:
>In article ,
>Aaron Boyden <6500adb@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> wrote:
>
>>On 12 Oct 1996, Libertarius wrote:
>
>>> >Or, as Ivan Karamazov might say, if there is no God, there is no
>>> reason you
>>> >shouldn't kill anyone you please.
>>> I feel sorry for Ivan and other madmen whose only restraint in
>>> hurting others is a belief in eternal punishment. Mutual respect, as
>>> expressed by the Golden Rule, for example, does not have to depend on
>>> any belief system.
>
>>I, on the other hand, feel sorry for Dostoyevsky. Surely Ivan's position
>>is much more complicated than this. Note, for instance, that Ivan
>>doesn't believe in God, and yet he doesn't kill anybody in the course of
>>the book. Indeed, he even goes so far as to feel guilty about a murder
>>committed by someone else, because of the nebulous possibility that he
>>might have influenced the murderer.
Well, a little beside the point, but he _did_ cooperate with the murder.
Although he hid the fact from himself he actually did understand
the bastard son's half-implied conversations (for example on one night when
the murder was likely he paced back and forth in his room and kept
looking out the window; when Smerdya (was that the name?) suggested that
he ought to be out of the way, he went -- all the way to Moscow -- and on
the trip he spontaneously mourned to himself, "I am base!" (this before
the murder). In fact all of the sons were responsible. And Dostoyevski
actually did believe that without God all is _permitted_ (but not necessarily
commited). But of course we can't draw any ethical conclusions from
a book of fiction, however much there is in it of the religious/political
pamphlet.
Similarly, who (among those who have
>>actually read any part of the book) really believes Alyosha would cease
>>to be a saint if he stopped believing in God? Or that what's his face,
>>the actual murderer, would have been a good guy had he believed in God
>>(assuming that he didn't, which I also have doubts about, though I
>>haven't read the book for a while)? And what of the Grand Inquisitor?
>>All in all, I am absolutely appalled at the simplistic message which is
>>being so illegitimately derived from an immensely complicated book.
>
>
> Nothing is more depressing than seeing people draw simplistic mores
>from great literature - but you've already said it all, Aaron.
>
> Bravo.
>
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>
>
Reverend st86m@jetson.uh.edu
Paul Ransom (Slobbering
Erickson Skeleton) http://zeus.towson.edu/~pbake/Slob.html