Subject: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 09:10:27 -0600
-*-------
Jeff Inman (jti@coronado.santafe.edu) wrote:
> The step between CM and GR may be "well defined, explicit, and clear"
> without implying that the metaphysical underpinings of CM are clearly
> continuous with those of GR. It only works in retrospect, as a sort
> of "fixing" of what was understood in the past. But, in fact, the
> nature of what an "object" was in CM and what it is in GR is vastly
> different. Before you can understand what Newton means when he speaks
> of an "object", you must enter a different world. ...
Nonsense.
GR can extend CM only *because* they share common, operational
notions of time, space, and many other common concepts. For both
Einstein and Newton, time is measured by regular physical
processes, i.e., clocks. If Newton were to pop forward to the
20th century, he would NOT say of GR: What a strange concept of
time! It uses the same operational concept he used, indeed, the
same operational concept used by every chef in boiling an egg.
Rather, he would say: so a clock accelerated away and back
*really* runs at a different rate from the one that stayed in
place? The amazing thing is NOT the "metaphysical underpinning,"
which hasn't changed one bit, but a surprising fact about how
time works across great distances and changes in speed.
The reason CM and GR are important is because the notions of
time, space, object, etc. that they use are operationally the
same as those used in everyday life. For example:
In article <55p6nr$ecp@lynx.dac.neu.edu>,
Michael Kagalenko wrote:
> All this is usual pomo nonsense. GR is currently used in engineering.
> Cars in Europe use GPS already, and GPS would not work without GR.
If GPS deals with different notions of time, space, and object
from the everyday notions, those differences are transparent to
every sailor. (Well, there is the selective availability, but
that is the US military, not metaphysics.)
Russell
--
The difference between life and a movie script is that the script has
to make sense. -- Humphrey Bogart
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (Was: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 1996 15:59:43 GMT
In talk.origins +@+.+ (G*rd*n) wrote:
[snip]
>
>You see, it's getting worse. My dog and I have demonstrated
>our respective intuitive grasps of instantaneous
>acceleration and velocity, I can trace the courses of the
>planets and give the formulas for the forces acting between
>them (in the Newtonian model).... If pressed, I could
>probably come up with a derivative of something.
>It's never enough.
I did not and do not see how you and your dog's "intuitive grasp" of
physics has anything to do with anything. Both of you have an amazing
intuitive grasp of biology and evolution, everything you do follows
the "laws", but that does not mean you understand either.
And I am confused by you statements on your knowledge of calculus. Are
you saying that you don't think you know enough or that others claim
you don't know enough? And if it is others, did they know, at the
time, of your math knowledge?
But, without trying to give you a test, lets look at a recent example,
the discussion of curved vs. flat space. Are you familiar with the
discussion here (involving Moggin) on the topic? And are you familiar
with the issues involved? If so, do you think your knowledge of math
helps, or even is essential, to understanding the transformation from
a euclidean to a reinmannian view of space?
>
>g*rd*n:
>| >(Although in a previous iteration of this thread someone
>| >tried to give me a Calculus test.) So the argument had to
>| >be moved; and while the moving was going on, I decided I
>| >wanted to know what _understand_ meant, because it seemed a
>| >little bit too rhetorically fluid for my interlocutors.
>| >That brings us up to the present.
>
>matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein):
>| BTW, I posted what was probably an arrogant view of "understanding"
>| elsewhere in this thread. I would appreciate some comments. It seems
>| reasonable to me, but I don't really know. And I think the subject is
>| worth exploring. What does it mean to understand something? Does it
>| mean something different to understand Kant, Newton, and Shakespear?
>| ...
>
>_Understanding_ seems to be fairly ill-defined. So my
>suggestion would be to stop trying to disqualify would-be
>participants in discussions of these matters by claiming
>they "lack understanding." After all, this is an ill-
>defined proposition, as well as an ad-hominem argument,
>_understood_ even in antiquity to be invalid.
>
If you objection is with "understand" then that seems a very different
discussion. I don't see how "understanding" is different for science
as opposed to arts, humanities, sports, etc. It might me, but I would
like to see the arguments.
Matt Silberstein
===========================
Let others praise ancient times, I am glad to live in these.
Ovid
Subject: Re: Do gravitational waves carry momentum? was: Does gravitational waves carry momentum
From: kunk@perseus.phys.unm.edu ()
Date: 6 Nov 1996 15:21:17 GMT
Sorry it took so long to address this, been busy.
In article , Ken Fischer wrote:
>kunk@perseus.phys.unm.edu wrote:
>: Ken, I cannot comprehend the following as long as you believe the electric
>: field between charges is a "magnetic attraction", and are unaware of the
>: identical nature of the formula of the gravity and electric field.
>
>In the last message I wrote:
>
>: > I see nothing about gravity that resembles magnetic
>: >attraction of opposite charges.
>: > I am not aware of any direct experiment using a
>: >single proton and electrons, although I assume it has
>: >been done if it is possible.
>
> If the particle isn't charged, is there any acceleration
>in an electromagnetic field?
>
> How about "electromagnetic attraction"? The text
>"Gravitation" [MTW] has a box on page 35 comparing the acceleration
>of a test particle in an electromagnetic field with the same
>particle in a gravitational field.
>
> A charged particle has to be compared to an uncharged
>particle in an electromagnetic field.
>
> All particles, charged or not, accelerate the same
>in a gravitational "field".
>
> A charged particle in an electromagnetic field
>accelerates proportional to e/m, in a given field, I would
>think that the electron will accelerate 1836 times the rate
>of a neutron.
>
> I don't want to quote the entire box on the comparison.
>
OK, what is a field? The way I learned it, classically it is the
gradient of a field which yields force. Thus, looking for force
only, there is no force due to charge of a particle in a gravity
field and no force due to mass of a particle in an electric field.
In both fields, the force is proportional to the mass or charge
(pick the appropriate property) and to the strength of the field
at the point. MTW is giving examples which involve particles
with both properties and involving inertia (acceleration) in add-
ition to pure force, which is the defining property of the field.
Oh yeah--a neutron does not accelerate at all in an electric field;
it has no charge. An electron will accelerate at 1836 time the rate
of a proton, and in the opposite direction. (I am an obsessive
grader.)
>Then, in the last message, I said:
>
>: > Gravity can not be "created", can not be shielded,
>: >can not be deflected, can not be reflected, can not be
>: >amplified, can not be weakened, never fails, and the
>: >mechanism by which it operates is not known.
>: > The only thing that is known is the effect, and
>: >it works on all known elements and compositions equally.
>
> This is nothing like the electromagnetic field.
>And:
>
>: > The mathematical representation of fields may seem
>: >to be somewhat alike, but the gravitational "field" is not
>: >really a "field" in the same sense as a magnetic field.
>: > If it were a "field" then there should be some way
>: >to alter the gravitational field, and there is no way known
>: >to alter it.
>: > I wouldn't read too much into statements about the
>: >gravitational field generating more field, the reason that
>: >gravitation does not fall off as precisely the inverse
>: >square is apparently not well understood else there would
>: >not be dozens of theories with only minor differences.
>: > I think the gravitational field is purely geometrical
>: >and can not be acted on, the effects are observed from a
>: >biased reference frame, with the observers seeing accelerations
>: >where no accelerations exist.
>: > Gravity is a riddle of major proportions.
>
Yes it it, but particle physicists claim to see a regime in
which the strong and weak nuclear forces unite with the EM. I
think their work is based more on group theory than on their
gut feelings.
> Forgive me for pushing this, but I have developed
>first approximations for a unified field reference model
>where the gravitational field is purely geometrical, and
>I am anxious to discuss it.
> I have little to gain from standing my ground on
>this, and I can understand how many people might have a
>lot to lose if they agree with me, so I just have to keep
>trying.
> Electromagnetism is the cause of gravitation, but
>I don't think it is anything like the long range attractive
>"field" that supposedly requires gravitons as the operating
>particle.
> I support General Relativity 100 percent, as every
>single thing I have ever figured out in my reference model
>has already been extensively covered in General Relativity.
>
>Sincerely,
> Ken Fischer
Forgiven. I like the idea of geometric explanations. It has
more than once occured to me while working problems in Jackson
that EM theory is 99.9% geometry. I suggest you read QED
(have I already said this) to get a feeling for the geometric
nature of EM quantum field theory. And add my vote for GR.
Jim
Subject: Re: Momentum and Vis Viva
From: qnd@dgsys.com (Randy Poe)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 16:34:00 GMT
In article <54qfpi$c15@newsbf02.news.aol.com>, nosewheeli@aol.com says...
>
>I would appreciate help on the following problem:
>
>Two balls, A and B, are moving on a frictionless surface. A, which has a
>mass of 8 kg, is moving right at a V of 15 m/s, and B, which has a mass of
>2 kg, is moving left at a V of 24 m/s. I know the two will colide in an
>elastic colision, so both momentum and vis viva must be conserved,
I learned the term "kinetic energy", but your statement is correct.
> but I
>can't use V`a=(2Ma/Ma+Mb)Va or V`b=(Ma-Mb/Ma+Mb)Va because both object are
>moving.
Also correct. Both of these are derived formulas, neither one is
a statement about conservation of energy or momentum. Go back
to the derivations of these formulas and look at the starting
points. You will see something like
ma*Va + mb*Vb = ma*V'a + mb*V'b (conservation of momentum)
.5ma*Va^2 + .5mb*Vb^2 = .5ma*V'a^2 + .5mb*V'b^2 (conservation of KE)
If Vb is zero in the above, you get the formulas you mention above.
As a general rule, it's a better idea to learn the derivations in
physics classes and understand the assumptions that go into them,
than to try to memorize every possible derived formula. I was
continuously surprised when I taught physics for engineering
students, that their pencils would be still during every step
of a derivation, until I got to some godawful specialized result,
whereupon they would all start scribbling madly.
In physics we are often taught to go back to "first principles"
when uncertain, which means writing down the things that you
are certain apply to the given situation. For the above example,
first principles means making your statement about conservation,
then writing down the mathematical expressions for conservation.
Can you understand why your formulas for V'a and V'b can't
be interpreted as a mathematical statement of conservation?
----------------------------------------------------------
Randy Poe
Q & D Software Solutions Johns Hopkins University
POB 10058, Silver Spring, MD 20914 Dept. of Math. Sciences
qnd@dgsys.com poe@jhu.edu
We sell solutions, not just advice.
------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Science and consistency (was: When did Nietzsche ...)
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 10:56:31 -0600
-*------
In article ,
wrote:
>>> ... I would add to it that science also assumes that
>>> said reality is consistent. ...
In article <54qkon$at9@peaches.cs.utexas.edu>, turpin@cs.utexas.edu says...
>> Really?
>>
>> I would say that science deals with considerable inconsistency in
>> the world. Matter behaves one way when very cold, and another
>> when very hot. Even in time, the earth's atmosphere was
>> seemingly was very different a couple of billion years ago.
>>
>> Or did you have another notion in which reality might be
>> inconsistent?
In article <55qe30$uah@news.dgsys.com>, Randy Poe wrote:
> You might find that the freezing point changes if measured
> precisely enough, but then you would find that further
> investigation leads to the conclusion that the changes are
> related very PREDICTABLY and CONSISTENTLY to the ambient
> pressure.
And if we didn't find such consistency, we would label the
results chaotic, or develop a probabilistic theory of how things
behave. Physicists cannot predict when a molecule of Americium
will decay (these molecules being strangely inconsistent in when
they do so, even though all relevant variables are identical), so
instead, this is statistically characterized. Poe might complain
that at least all samples of Americium molecules are consistent
in this statistical characterization. My point is that if they
weren't, science would NOT ground to a halt, but instead, we
would work with that fact, also.
I am really pressing two points here. First, that there is no
clear meaning for the word consistent when applied to physical
systems. People often say things like "reality is consistent,"
with no clear notion in which this is the sense. If you try to
pin them down, the notion they scramble to formulate is always
just loose enough to include current scientific theory, but
curiously, it didn't stop science when reality became
inconsistent in yesterday's sense, and it will not stop science
if reality becomes inconsistent in today's sense.
Second, and largely largely following from the first, science
does NOT assume that reality is consistent. And a good thing
too! If science made this assumption, the whole enterprise would
break down the moment we found that the current notion of global
consistency was too strict in some regard.
If Poe wants to play the game, I invite him to rigorously define
what consistency means in this context. In particular, he should
explain what would make a world INconsistent. (If he cannot do
the latter, then his definition is trivial in the logical sense
that it applies to everything, and the word is meaningless.)
Russell
--
The difference between life and a movie script is that the script has
to make sense. -- Humphrey Bogart
Subject: Re: Do gravitational waves carry momentum? was: Does gravitational waves carry momentum
From: lrmead@ocean.st.usm.edu (Lawrence R. Mead)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 17:50:35 GMT
Ken Fischer (kfischer@iglou.com) wrote:
: Peter Diehr (pdiehr@mail.ic.net) wrote:
: : Ken Fischer wrote:
:
: Somebody else wrote this, and the discussion was about my stating
: that gravitation is not part of, and is not like the propagated
: electromagnetic spectrum:
: : > : Let's compare the field of a proton acting on other electrons to
: : > : that of gravity. Now both are atractive force fields.
: : >
: : > I see nothing about gravity that resembles magnetic
: : > attraction of opposite charges.
: : > I am not aware of any direct experiment using a
: : > single proton and electrons, although I assume it has
: : > been done if it is possible.
:
: : Thousands of experiments have been done, of a very detailed nature,
: : with electrons and positrons.
:
: And none of them show any resemblence to gravitation.
:
: : > If gravity is not anything like opposite charge
: : > attractions, then it must be different.
:
: : Of course it is different! The field structure has a tensor, and
: : not a vector nature.
:
: How can you ignore the physics to the point of making
: the math take a dominant role? And by doing so, the physics
: of whether or not gravitation is a long range force field
: is side-stepped.
: The point that I am trying to make is that gravitation
: is purely geometric in nature, and does not involve a "field".
Um, what would you call g_mu_nu(x,y,z,t) ?
: I can accept "ripples in spacetime", but attributing
: the mechanism of gravitation to gravitational radiation is
: far fetched at best.
Well exchange forces are a quantum mechanical effect/result and do not
exist in classical physics at all. If one quantizes the *linearized*
version of gravity, you get spin 2 gravitons moving at speed C and
carrying momentum as well as energy ( E = p c).
: : > Gravity can not be "created", can not be shielded,
: : > can not be deflected, can not be reflected, can not be
: : > amplified, can not be weakened, never fails, and the
: : > mechanism by which it operates is not known.
:
: : I've previously mentioned the evidence for gravitational waves.
: : Like any waves, these should be able to be reflected and refracted.
:
: The binary star study is well known to me, but I
: consider it to be an interpretation suggesting the cause
: is gravitational radiation.
Until there is direct verification of gravity waves you are correct. If
you can find another energy loss mechanism we would be happy to listen.
I for one cannot think of another possibility that fits all observations.
: But what bothers me is that gravitational waves
: may be too weak to detect, yet the binary study seems to
: say gravitational radiation is powerful enough to affect
: the orbits of the binary pair, and this doesn't seem
: consistent.
Why? Huge stellar masses with great accelerations are what produces
the waves. Little tiny masses with not very powerful electronics
*a very huge distance away* is what is trying to detect them.
: : Why do you worry about the mechanism? If gravitation is fundamental,
: : then it just _is_ ... there will be no mechanism, only laws.
:
: Some of the literature on gravitation makes
: about as much sense as the current threads on absolute
: velocity and the existence of an aether.
Huh? Perhaps you need to study some more then.
: : > The only thing that is known is the effect, and
: : > it works on all known elements and compositions equally.
:
: : This seems to be true.
:
: : >
: : > The mathematical representation of fields may seem
: : > to be somewhat alike, but the gravitational "field" is not
: : > really a "field" in the same sense as a magnetic field.
:
: : They are both mathematical fields ... they have values every
: : where. But the field structures are different. For example,
: : the gravitational field for a spherical body has no dipole
: : component.
:
: They perhaps can be expressed mathematically,
: but the "fields" are more than mathematics.
: Gravitation is far more complex than the description
: of the field structure. I think a great deal can be learned
: by a rational discussion of other properties of gravitation
: besides the field and it's mathematical description.
: For instance, I feel my Steady State-Big Bang-
: Grand Unified Theory reference model predicts a greater
: gravitational red shift of the light from the Sun's edge
: than from the center of the Sun's disk.
: Is that a subject that anyone is interested in?
So does SR, etc. since the center of the sun has nearly zero velocity.
: : > If it were a "field" then there should be some way
: : > to alter the gravitational field, and there is no way known
: : > to alter it.
:
: : Of course there is! Just move the mass around ... split it up,
: : rearrange it, add or remove some!
:
: You know what I mean, in an electron-positron
: interaction an electromagnetic field will affect them,
: but there is nothing that can affect a gravitational "field".
? What about the presence of a nearby mass?
[snip]
: If there were no other way for gravity to work than
: by long range "field", then I would certainly agree, but
: since I think there is a more basic way that gravitation can
: work, I will have to wait and see what LIGO turns up.
:
: Ken Fischer
Excuse me for butting in.
--
Lawrence R. Mead (lrmead@whale.st.usm.edu)
ESCHEW OBFUSCATION ! ESPOUSE ELUCIDATION !
http://www-dept.usm.edu/~scitech/phy/mead.html
Subject: Re: When social critics wimp out ... (was: Nietzsche)
From: vpiercy@ezinfo.ucs.indiana.edu (Van Piercy)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 17:04:01 GMT
In article <55gv9u$aeu@panix2.panix.com>, G*rd*n <+@+.+> wrote:
>G*rd*n <+@+.+> wrote:
>| >What Dr. Sokal did that was dishonest was to reveal the
>| >game as soon as _Social_Text_ had published the article.
>| >So unlike the case of scientific hoaxes, whatever community
>| >or establishment _Social_Text_ belongs to wasn't allowed to
>| >deal with it in its own way. ...
>
>vpiercy@ezinfo.ucs.indiana.edu (Van Piercy):
>| One could argue that the humanities/cultural studies community is quite
>| operative, "self-corrective" and innoculated at this stage: anyone who
>| would seriously use Sokal's article as supplying any supporting theses for
>| his or her own work would be laughed out of court.
>| ...
>
>One wouldn't use a contemporary overview as support for
>anything.
I dunno. If the piece is pursuing an "overview" or synthesis along some
never before traveled margins between certain disciplines, I think someone
might cite it as support for pursuing certian kinds of connections. After
all, the work wouldn't just be a kind of introduction or overview to a
well known and well worked field: it would instead be original research
between the fields.
>However, if Sokal had let the hoax lie [heh], it
>might have been referred to here and there, then (forgotten
>by the respectable) descending into our vast intellectual
>underworld, to appear later in badly jumbled cabalistic
>texts, diagrams scrawled on the walls of tenements, and
>dreams. I'm hoping this will happen anyway; as Russell
>points out, recantation by an author is not necessarily a
>bar to success of one kind or another. The text is all
>the freer, is it not, abandoned in the road?
One should always let a sleeping hoax lie. But yes, I could see the
possibility where someone finds something strangely suggestive from the
Sokal pastiche, or analyze the piece symptomatically as an instance of the
"culture wars" or "science wars"--that's certainly already taken place.
Van
--
"The scientist has no unique right to ignore the likely consequences of
what he does." --Noam Chomsky. _The Chomsky Reader_. Ed. James Peck. New
York: Pantheon, 1987. 201.
Subject: ANNOUNCE: new journal Regular&Chaotic; Dynamics
From: maciejka@ncac.torun.pl (Andrzej Maciejewski)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 17:44:51 GMT
Dear Colleagues,
on behalf of the editor-in-chief Professor V.V. Kozlov and the
editorial board I would like to inform you that the first iussue
of new internation journal "Regular and Chaotic Dynamics" has appeared.
"Chaotic and Regular Dynamics" will publish papers dealing with a wide range
studies of non-linear dynamic system behaviour, beginning with classical problems of integrability, bifurcations and ending with up-to-date
concepts, i.e., deterministic chaos, non-integrability, stochastization, self-organization (synergetics).
More information about the journal you will find at:
http://www.astri.uni.torun.pl/~maciejka/ChRD.html
If you have questions concernig the journal, please send an e-mail
to Alex Borisov: BORISOV@matsim.udmurtia.su
or to me:
maciejka@astri.uni.torun.pl.
We invite all specialist in the field to submit their papers.
Below, you will find a letter of the editior-in-chief that opens the first
iussue of the journal.
With best regards
A.J.Maciejewski
-----------
Dear Reader,
You are holding the first issue of the journal "Regular and
Chaotic Dynamics" containing works on several rapidly going
ahead fields of up-to-date science. This and further issues
will study both classical problems of integrability as well as
nonintegrability in dynamic systems, problems of quantitative
analysis of differential equations, and a range of new ideas of
the theory of deterministic chaos, principles of self-organization,
and fractal dynamics.
We plan to publish papers containing applying methods of general
mathematic m to various fields of up-to-date science, papers
of methodic character and reviews. The journal will also present
information on new books and actions connected with the subjects of the
journal.
Our aim is to promote unification of investigations carried
out in various Russian schools and in important international centres.
The journal is supposed to appear quarterly.
The editorial board pay great attention to the quality of works
to be published.
We hope to find sponsors willing to help us to issue our journal
regularly and of high quality.
V.V. Kozlov
Subject: Re: Using C for number-crunching (was: Numerical solution to
From: shenkin@still3.chem.columbia.edu (Peter Shenkin)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 18:27:11 GMT
In article ,
David Kastrup wrote:
>shenkin@still3.chem.columbia.edu (Peter Shenkin) writes:
>
>: First, I recently posted a disclaimer to two of my earlier postings,
>@> but now I want to disclaim the disclaimer. :-) Someone had posted
>@> saying that const qualification (in C) does not convey non-alias
>@> information, because the const qualifier guarantees only that no
>@> attempt will be made to write to the underlying addresses *through the
>@> const-qualified pointer*.
>
>This was me, and I stand by my statement. See below why.
Ugh. I have to eat my words again. I'm getting tired of the same
meal. :-)
>@> But now (sparked by Nick's posting, which implicitly seemed to
>@> concur
>@> with my original) I've looked this up in the C standard, section
>@> 6.5.3. It states, in part, "If an attempt is made to modify an object
>@> defined with a const-qualified type through use of an lvalue with
>@> non-const-qualified type, the behavior is undefined."
Yes. The operative word here is "defined"; I read it as if it
had said "declared".
>@> Thus, the standard is quite clearly saying that the compiler can
>@> assume from the const-qualified declaration of b[] that the contents
>@> of b[] will not be altered even by means of dereference through a.
>@> I.e., my original posting was correct.
>
>And that's where you are being wrong in your interpretation. A
>pointer, be it const or not, does *not* define an object. It just
>references it. ....
And Christian Bau (christian.bau@isltd.insignia.com) pointed out
that if I were correct, memmove() couldn't work. Its prototype
is as follows:
void *memmove (void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n);
The whole point of memmove() is to copy the storage pointed to
by s2 to the destinations pointed to by s1 when these blocks
overlap. If the const qualification of s2 forbade the overwriting
of storage pointed to by s2, then this function prototype for
memmove() would be incorrect.
I understand that the draft copy of the next C language standard
has a "restrict" keyword which guarantees the behavior we'd
like. I guess this is modeled after Cray's "restrict".
I have two questions about this:
1. How does "restrict" differ from the illfated "noalias"
proposal from the previous standardization process?
2. How can one obtain a copy of the current draft standard?
Living and (hopefully) learning,
-P.
--
****************** In Memoriam, Bill Monroe, 1911 - 1996 ******************
* Peter S. Shenkin; Chemistry, Columbia U.; 3000 Broadway, Mail Code 3153 *
** NY, NY 10027; shenkin@columbia.edu; (212)854-5143; FAX: 678-9039 ***
MacroModel WWW page: http://www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/chemistry/mmod/mmod.html
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (Was: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: +@+.+ (G*rd*n)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 13:25:12 -0500
matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein):
| ...
| But, without trying to give you a test, lets look at a recent example,
| the discussion of curved vs. flat space. Are you familiar with the
| discussion here (involving Moggin) on the topic? And are you familiar
| with the issues involved? If so, do you think your knowledge of math
| helps, or even is essential, to understanding the transformation from
| a euclidean to a reinmannian view of space?
I skipped over most of that discussion, which seemed to me
to be an attempt to disqualify moggin from speaking about
physics -- another math test. Did I miss something? Anyway:
the transformation of Euclidean to Riemannian space strikes
me as at least partly a rhetorical procedure, so I would
assume one would have to understand the rhetoric. But isn't
this true even of Euclid's 2-d geometry? One does not
readily intuit, say, the Pythagorean theorem.
Generally I'd say it's pretty hard to understand mathematics
without understanding mathematics, whatever "understand" may
mean.
g*rd*n:
| >_Understanding_ seems to be fairly ill-defined. So my
| >suggestion would be to stop trying to disqualify would-be
| >participants in discussions of these matters by claiming
| >they "lack understanding." After all, this is an ill-
| >defined proposition, as well as an ad-hominem argument,
| >_understood_ even in antiquity to be invalid.
matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein):
| If you objection is with "understand" then that seems a very different
| discussion. I don't see how "understanding" is different for science
| as opposed to arts, humanities, sports, etc. It might me, but I would
| like to see the arguments.
It's no doubt as ill-defined for those as it is for the
sciences. And the practice of constructing arcana in
these fields to keep out the unsanctified is an practice
of great antiquity. It's unfortunate to see it spreading
into the sciences.
--
}"{ G*rd*n }"{ gcf @ panix.com }"{
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (not enough)
From: candy@mildred.ph.utexas.edu (Jeff Candy)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 16:42:25 GMT
Russell Turpin:
|> The other result (an increasing function cannot have an
|> uncountable number of discontinuities) requires not calculus, but
|> an understanding of how set cardinality works, in particular,
|> that the countable union of countable sets is, itself, countable.
Agreed.
|> Candy may give this problem to his incoming calculus students,
|> but my experience is that few students at that level, in the
|> usual sequence of things, are prepared for this kind of problem.
I didn't pose the question! Neither do I teach calculus.
However, this Q. does appear as a problem in Ch. 2 of Buck's book
"Advanced Calculus" -- the 1st year calculus text where I went to
school. Of course, at that level it requires (as far as I can tell)
an intuitive solution.
|> The "usual sequence" is an oddity, of course (double entendre
|> intended). Calculus is taught to freshmen because engineering,
|> physics, and chemistry students need it for their non-math
|> courses. The actual mathematical content of calculus is beyond
|> what most freshmen can handle, and so the course focuses on
|> *applying* substantial theorems, rather than on the mathematical
|> issues behind them. (Indeed, the typical real analysis course
|> taught in the junior year can be viewed as "calculus, done
|> right.")
Also true. The rigorous definition of monotone functions, as well
as this discontinuity theorem in particular, appears in 3rd year
real analysis (at least for physicists -- I don't know if the math
stream did it in their second).
|> One can easily study "more advanced" subjects such as
|> point-set topology and linear algebra without calculus, and if it
|> were not for the practical needs that calculus fills, it would
|> make more sense to study topology first, and calculus second.
One (as you note, practical) utility of the non-rigorous presentation
of calculus is to give students of the physical sciences the tools
to understand chemistry, astronomy, physics, etc. You can't wait
forever before introducing Maxwell's equations, the Schroedinger
equation, etc.
|> Maybe we can get topology made a high-school course? (Oh ...,
|> what *am* I thinking?!)
Actually, there is a non-negligible fraction of students who
would both enjoy and benefit from this.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Jeff Candy The University of Texas at Austin
Institute for Fusion Studies Austin, Texas
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: Hardy Hulley
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 1996 18:34:00 +0200
Richard Harter:
> Since Silke and I discussed this very passage you might look to the
> last exchange between her and I for a bit of clarification. We
> disagreed on a point and, in the course of the disagreement, I
> remarked that Derrida's reply was clear in context. She said, in
> effect, "show me, mr. smarty pants". I replied with a very simple
> minded analysis which established that, right or wrong, it made sense
> to me and explained why it made sense.
Since I have no access to the discussion to which you refer, I am unable
to heed your advice. However, I do not dispute that you may have
satisfied yourself of having understood Derrida's statements. My claim
was that, insofar as Derrida's comments are not simply false, they are
nonsense to a *reasonable* reader. Whether or not you fall into this
category must still be determined.
Richard Harter:
> The point is that "center" and "constant" are jargon, technical terms
> established in a larger context. There is a general notion of a field
> of discourse as a game and some notion of what it means to say that a
> field of discourse is a game. Think of it as an elaborate analogy. I
> am quite confidant that this does very rough justice to whatever
> Derrida's theories might be.
"Center" and "constant" can't be anything other than technical jargon,
since Derrida's statements make no sense otherwise. What I want to know
is whether this jargon is adequately mapped into meaning anywhere.
Furthermore, is this jargon useful? All I can see is empty vessels.
As far as your definition of "game" goes, it is plausible, I'll admit -
but then, so are many other theories regarding its meaning. It isn't
good enough to say "there is a general notion that...", and "I am quite
confidant that...", you need to root these assertions within some
supporting text. The problem with Derrida is that, since he leaves so
much open to the reader's imagination, it is possible to generate many
plausible interpretations of his words. The obvious interpretations tend
to be either false or trivial.
I must say, at this point, that many great philosophers are difficult to
read (Kant being the most obvious example). But, in all of these cases,
careful scrutiny and reflection yields interpretations of their works
which are both logically coherent, and unambiguous. When reading them,
we (for the most part) can agree on what is actually being said. The
natures
of their projects unveil themselves, and we can begin to evaluate their
contributions. The problem with Derrida (and it isn't just my problem)
is the level of noise and ambiguity in his writing. I am left with the
feeling that the words on the page could have been generated by a random
process. Moreover, in his own comments on his work, he is actively
hostile to any attempts to demystify it. This is part of the reason why
he is regarded as such a controversial figure by working philosophers.
Richard Harter:
> Muttering about unintelligibility simply says that you aren't trying,
> aren't willing try to get anything from the text.
I am also not willing to try to find the Lord.
Clearly my scepticism regarding the possibility of Derrida's remarks
(insofar as they are not provably false) being meaningful can be
remedied with the aid of an existence solution. Similarly, my religious
scepticism is subject to a concrete miracle, inconsistent with my
current beliefs. Assitance in either regard will be gratefully accepted.
Richard Harter:
> [Remarks concerning Boot Camp experience deleted]
I'm sure you managed to march very smartly. Fortunately for you, the DI
never instructed you to explain Derrida.
Richard Harter:
> I will omit the obvious cheap shot. It should be clear that Derrida's
> theories are complex and that it is no simple matter to explain them
> clearly, simply, and shortly to someone is completely ignorant of the
> structure. Think of it as explaining a specific feature of the
> internals of Windows 95 to someone who has never used a computer.
It is not clear that Derrida's theories are complex, only that they are
(at best) difficult to penetrate. It is your mistake to conflate this
property with complexity. Comparing Derrida with the internals of
Windows 95 may be closer to the mark than you anticipate, however.
Richard Harter:
> Your reading and your quotes are wrong. Read it as the "Einsteinian
> constant" is not a "constant". H. introduces the notion of
> "Einsteinian constant" in his question. (His conception is deeply
> superficial, but that is quite another matter.) D. is saying that
> H.'s "Einsteinian constant", i.e., the concept that H. has just
> presented and labelled as "Einsteinian constant, is not a "constant"
> in the sense that D. is using the word, i.e., within the theory that
> he is presenting.
In what sense, then, is the Eisteinian constant not a constant? All
you've told me is that Derrida is resorting to non-standard
interpretations for the words he uses. You still have to demonstrate
that these iterpretations are sensible.
Richard Harter:
> What is the game? In general, the philosophic analysis of a field of
> discourse; in the context of H.'s question, the philosophic analysis
> of physics with respect to relativity.
If by relativity, you mean Einstein's theory, then Derrida's claim that
the Einsteinian constant "is the very concept of variability" is surely
false. If you are referring to some other theory of relativity, then his
claim is meaningless.
Richard Harter:
> Are they intelligible? Not to you.
I happily concur. My question is whether they are intelligible to
anybody, except the terminally pretentious.
Richard Harter:
> A "ground" in philosophy is something that everything can be reduced
> to or expressed in terms of, a fundamental starting point. If one is
> concerned with the philosophy of physics or anything else asking what
> it is grounded in is an important question. What D. is saying (or
> Silke is saying D. is saying) is that the "Einsteinian constant" does
> not provide a ground for the philosophy of physics. Whether it was
> intended to or not is beside the point; the question at hand was "does
> it?". The question was answered. Whether the answer is correct and
> whether it makes sense is another matter.
So, according to Derrida (via his medium, Silke), everything within the
philosophy of physics cannot be reduced to Einstein's constant. You'd
have to be a moron to make a statement like that (not that I am
disputing that this is what Derrida meant).
Furthermore, whether or not Derrida's answer makes sense is precisely
the topic of this debate.
Richard Harter:
> Give me a break. Creating special meanings in a specialized field for
> common words (usually based on a refined analogy) is done all the
> time. To take an example from higher Algebra: "What is the center
> of a simple group?" It only takes about 20 pages of dense text to
> explain what the question means if you are starting from ground zero.
You neglect three important points about mathematics (and other
technical) writing here. Firstly, when an existing word is appropriated
for use as a specialised technical term, the meaning ascribed to it is
(almost always) both consistent with its existing meaning, and related
to same. In other words, the meaning of the word is *extended* within
the given context. The aim of employing existing words in this way is to
appeal to the reader's intuitive understanding of the word outside of
its specialised domain in order to help him understand the *concept*
denoted by the word within that domain. Examples of this are countless:
"complete", "valid", "consistent" (within logic), "compact",
"continuous" (within analysis, topology and elsewhere), "computer
virus", etc. When technical writing uses existing words without
compliance to this principle, it very quickly becomes bad writing. By
doing this gratuitously, it risks becoming incomprehensible - Derrida's
predicament, I believe.
Secondly, in good technical writing, the tendency is to make
terminological usage explicit. Within mathematics this takes the form of
"DEFINITION *.*: A topological space is said to be *compact* if...".
Derrida is, unfortunately, not partial to explicit definitions of
terminology.
Thirdly, if any writing, which doesn't employ explicit explanations of
the specialised jargon used, is to be intelligible, meaning has to be
accessible through scrutiny of context. In my opinion, Derrida fails
here as well. Too much is left to the imagination of the reader, leading
to a level of ambiguity which leaves one wondering whether Derrida is
making any point at all.
Richard Harter:
> Of course he is not intelligible to you. He is not writing in baby
> talk for babies. He is writing as someone who is initimately familiar
> with the major works of Western philosophy for people who are equally
> familiar with said works.
Perhaps you'd care to direct your "baby talk" and "major works of
Western philosophy" comments at W.V.O. Quine (among others), as well. As
one of the academics who signed the letter to Cambridge during the
infamous Derrida-Cambridge affair, he held that (and I paraphrase) where
Derrida's writing does not make trivial points, it is essentially
impenetrable. Furthermore, the letter alleged that Derrida's work did
not meet the standards of serious work in philosophy at the time.
In fact, I seem to enjoy the company of a reasonable number of
luminaries within philosophy, if my dismissive stance towards Derrida is
your criterion for measuring these things. Consequently, accusations of
intellectual ineptitude, based upon an inability to ascribe coherent
meanings to comments attributable Derrida, may have a larger target
market than you have anticipated. Not that all of these people can't be
wrong, of course - you may well be on the brink of making a major name
for yourself within the passages and halls of philosophy departments
world-wide.
As an amusing diversion, perhaps you could provide your spell-bound
audience with a few examples of Derrida's famed mastery of Western
Philosophy.
Richard Harter:
> And I find it bizarre that you think that this is what is going on.
> Your "bizarre concept" is little more than a strawman constructed not
> from your ignorance but rather from your unwillingness to make even a
> small effort in following what is being said.
I see you are referring me back to the parable of the Boot Camp for
further instruction. More effort required, eh? Actually, I subscribe to
the practice of critical reflection before zealous application of
elbow-grease. I mean, who knows, maybe Derrida's day-job is selling
snake-oil (just a thought...).
Cheers,
Hardy
Subject: Re: c as 'speed' of gravity
From: carlip@dirac.ucdavis.edu (Steve Carlip)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 18:48:50 GMT
Stefano Bianchi (mc9350@mclink.it) wrote:
: I've read in several articles that the speed a gravitational field
: propagates itself with is, indeed, equal to c. I don't have problems
: in thinking about gravitational interactions as a sort of waves ( is
: it right? I think so, since the concept of field itself makes me think
: about a 'modification' of space brought by 'something' that actually
: takes time to reach each portion of it ), but I can't realize why its
: speed should be c. If it's so, I'm sure this is one of the most
: important clue a physicist has about a Unified Theory.
If I may offer a slightly provocative answer:
The problem is that you're thinking about "the speed of light"
as something having to do with light. It's not, really---at
least within the framework of the theory of relativity, it's
more something to do with the structure of space and time.
Specifically, the speed of light is what determines the difference
between the future (the set of events that you can send a message
to using objects traveling at or slower than c), the past (the
set of events that can send a message to you), and the present
(everything else). Technically, the structure of light cones
determines the causal structure of spacetime. From this point
of view, it's natural---although not inevitable---that gravity
propagates at c; after all, general relativity describes gravity
as a property of the structure of spacetime as well, so there
is at least some conceptual connection.
The real question is not why gravity propagates at a speed c,
but why light does. I don't know of any simple answer to this.
In modern particle physics, the photon is just one of four
similar particles described by a unified electroweak theory.
(The other three are the W+, W-, and Z bosons.) The photon
happens to move at speed c, but the other three don't. The
technical reason for this is well-understood: it has to do with
the pattern of spontaneous symmetry-breaking and the existence of
an unbroken U(1) symmetry. But the *reason* for this particular
pattern is not known.
Steve Carlip
carlip@dirac.ucdavis.edu
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 18:46:56 GMT
Derrida:
>>>>>>>"I believe, however, that I was quite explcit about the fact that nothing
>>>>>>>of what I said had a destructive meaning. Here or there I have used to
>>>>>>>word _de'construction_, which has nothing to do with destruction. THat is
>>>>>>>to say, it is simply a question of (and this is a necessity of criticism
>>>>>>>in the classical sense of the word) being alert to the impliations, to
>>>>>>>the historical sedimentation of the language which we use-- and that is
>>>>>>>not destruction. I believe in the necessity of scientific work in the
>>>>>>>classical sense, I believe in the necessity of everything which is being
>>>>>>>done and even of what you are doing, but I don't see why I should
>>>>>>>renounce or why anyone should renounce the radicality of a critical work
>>>>>>>under the pretext that it risks the sterilization of science, humanity,
>>>>>>>progress, the origin of meaning, etc. I believe that the risk of
>>>>>>>sterility and of sterilization has always been the price of lucidity."
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>>>Derrida is lying. Since his term `d�construction' is derived from
>>>>>>Heidegger's term `destruktion', the destructive implications are there,
>>>>>>brought out by the argument from etymology, favored by the Nazi and the
>>>>>>Nazi apologist alike.
Silke:
>>>>>Zeleny is lying, but he can't help it.
Zeleny:
>>>>You are out of it. See Rodolphe Gasch�, _The Tain of the Mirror:
>>>>Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection_, Chapter 7, pp 109-121.
moggin@nando.net (moggin):
>>> I don't have the book handy, but the last time I heard Gasche,
>>>he was arguing that the implications of Heidegger's _Destruktion_
>>>differ significantly from the English "destruction." David Farrell
>>>Krell takes the same tack, noting that _Zerstorung_ would have been
>>>closer.
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>Arguing about implications is scarcely a Heideggerian move.
moggin:
> Neither do I dance like an Egyptian.
Your personal habits are quite beside the point here.
Zeleny:
>>Check his Greek etymologies against Liddell & Scott -- always good for
>>a giggle.
moggin:
> I thought we were discussing the relation of _destruktion_ and
>deconstruction: you claimed Derrida is lying when he distinguishes
>them, and stated that "deconstruction" possesses the "destructive
>implications" of Heidegger's "_destruktion_."
As I said, implications are beside the point. My etymological
argument satisfies Heidegger's (and a fortiori, Derrida's)
demonstrative criteria with room to spare.
moggin:
> All this on authority
>of Gasche, in a passage you didn't quote; but as I said, I've heard
>Gasche contend that "_destruktion_" doesn't imply "destruction" (an
>argument also forwarded by Krell, on the basis I mentioned).
How phallogocentric of you to judge a text on the basis of an oral
presentation! "We understand this task as one in which by taking _the
question of Being as our clue_, we are to _destroy_ [_Destruktion_]
the traditional content of ancient ontology ..." (Heidegger cited by
Gasch� on p 112). Read the book, or I will sic Silke on you.
Zeleny:
>>What better way to judge a writer than by applying his master's lofty
>>intellectual standards?
moggin:
> I can't see Heidegger as Derrida's "master" -- but more to the
>point, Heidegger doesn't rely on Gasche to authorize his etymologies.
Tell your problems to an optician. All I want from Gasch� is his
corroboration of the historical link between Derrida's term and its
Heideggerian ancestor, which is well-known anyway.
Cordially, - Mikhail | God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum."
Zeleny@math.ucla.edu | Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum."
itinerant philosopher -- will think for food ** www.ptyx.com ** MZ@ptyx.com
ptyx ** 6869 Pacific View Drive, LA, CA 90068 ** 213-876-8234/874-4745 (fax)
Subject: [Fwd: Re: Food for thought and clarification]
From: "Jack Sarfatti, Ph.D."
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 1996 11:24:28 -0800
Return-Path: estaylor@cris.com
Received: from well.net (root@well.net [206.15.64.201]) by mh1.well.com (8.7.6/8.7.5) with ESMTP id MAA02110 for ; Tue, 5 Nov 1996 12:55:10 -0800 (PST)
From: estaylor@cris.com
Received: from tribune.concentric.net (tribune.concentric.net [199.3.12.34]) by well.net (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id MAA24548 for ; Tue, 5 Nov 1996 12:46:31 -0800 (PST)
Received: from cliff.cris.com (cliff.cris.com [199.3.12.45])
by tribune.concentric.net (8.7.5/(96/10/25 1.9))
id PAA19340; Tue, 5 Nov 1996 15:46:29 -0500 (EST)
[1-800-745-2747 The Concentric Network]
Errors-To:
Received: from 206.173.66.61 (cnc026061.concentric.net [206.173.66.61])
by cliff.cris.com (8.8.0)
id PAA24424; Tue, 5 Nov 1996 15:46:26 -0500 (EST)
Date: Tue, 5 Nov 1996 15:46:26 -0500 (EST)
Message-Id: <199611052046.PAA24424@cliff.cris.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Subject: Re: Food for thought and clarification
To: sarfatti@well.com
X-Mailer: SPRY Mail Version: 04.00.06.17
Thanks for your reply earlier....it answered my questions with good detail and
motivated me for some more research.
It's fascinating to me the variety of perspectives that exist on these issues,
from so many different disciplines. Physics has a universal appeal, but some
domains of science do not unify well, if at all. Mental
activity/neurophysiology/quarks, for example to state the matter very
roughly....are the "higher" elements really derivable from the lower with the
paradigms we presently have? I remain a skeptic and tend to agree more with
someone like Noam Chomsky about these matters, but nonetheless do appreciate
your remarks.
BTW, what specific books or articles do you recommend by Prigogine and Hameroff
on some of the thermal decoherence and 2nd Law of Thermodynamics issues you
addressed??
Scott
estaylor@cris.com
P.S. The below quote, generalizing your ideas, I find quite interesting:
As I said, any form of matter, like a superfluid, in which thermal
decoherence is defeated, the way the microtubules do it is only one way,
will be conscious. We physicists are interested in universal structures.
This prediction is a crucial test of my theory. Even neutron stars and
pots of superfluid can be conscious under the right conditions.