Subject: Specialized terminology (was: What is a constant?)
From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 16:49:17 -0600
-*---------
In article <55qse9$gjm@netnews.upenn.edu>,
Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
> I don't think the term "constant" is very important here, since
> Derrida immediately corrects it to "center" -- a center, in the
> specific context, is something that grounds the play allowed
> within the confines of a game. ...
How is this different from "underlying assumptions," a phrase
known and understood by everyone from businessfolk to engineers
to musicians? I am trying to understand why this specialized
terminology has been introduced. From the subsequent
explanation, it does not seem as if the terminology -- center,
play, etc. -- provides any more rigor than existing and
well-understood terms.
So now we know what Derrida (should have) said: "The Einstein
constant is not an underlying assumption (of physics)." (I'm
assuming that the context of his comment makes physics the domain
-- er, "game" -- of concern.) But as with many of Derrida's
passages, once one understands what he is trying to say, two
responses immediately beckon:
(1) Like, DUH.
(2) What is the purpose of the specialized terminology (and
elsewhere, of the painfully convoluted prose)?
> Since Derrida is mostly concerned with structuralism and explicitly
> with Levi-Strauss, I give you an example from that area, concerning
> myth: in order to prove that there is mythical structure that is
> universal (which is, in a very simple nutshell, L-S's project), you
> would have to be able to distill the ur-myth which provides the
> rules to which all specific myths would have to adhere; think for
> instance of Propp's Morphology of the Russian Folk-Tale. Since we
> never _have_ the ur-myth, however, but only variations, this center
> would be introduced retrospect by the work of the mythologist; ...
This all makes perfect sense, *especially* if one replaces the
phrase "this center" with the phrase "its underlying assumptions."
> ... however, once the center is defined, it would restrict the
> play possible within the mythology at issue -- any newfound
> myth that didn't adhere to the central (hypothetical) myth would
> be a serious problem. ...
Translation: once one has a theory of an ur-myth, any actual
myth that doesn't fit the theory poses a challenge to the theory.
(Note the translation is shorter and more clear. What purpose
does Silke's terminology serve??)
> ... There are people who claim that there is only one Russian
> folk-tale that adheres fully to Propp's definition of what a
> Russian folktale is supposed to be.
In other words, they think Propp's theory is poppycock.
-*--------
There are a variety of reasons for introducing specialized
terminology. Some of the good things it achieves are:
CONCISENESS
Mathematicians could just say "Assume S is a set with a
binary, closed, associative operation + that has an identity
and inverse." But this gets long to type and tricky to read
time after time after time, so we define the term "group"
to mean just this kind of thing, and now when I say
"group," Siemon knows exactly what I mean.
NAMING NEW THINGS
How else will we refer to that new species, if it doesn't
have a name? (This, of course, is a special case of the first,
since we could always identify a new thing through a definite
description.)
CLARITY
Attaching a name to a commonly used description or set of
assumptions in a field is a good way to demarcate their
ubiquity and provide useful context to one's readers.
But terminology has a cost, and often its bad results are greater
than its good:
OBSCURITY
If physicians use Latin abbreviations, patients cannot read
prescriptions themselves.
HABIT
Careless writers become accustomed to creating terminology,
and they create far more than is useful.
TERMINOLOGY ENVY
"Those folks in the technical fields have all the fun!"
Once upon a time (this is my myth of the academic good old days)
English teachers studied the how and why of terminology. Perhaps
Silke can explain to me why literary theory needs the term
"center" in this odd sense? From her example so far, this term
makes it more difficult to say what is more easily and clearly
said without it.
Russell
--
The difference between life and a movie script is that the script has
to make sense. -- Humphrey Bogart
Subject: Re: When social critics wimp out ... (was: Nietzsche)
From: Andrew_Perry@Brown.edu (Andy Perry)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 1996 20:46:55 -0500
In article <55m32g$1f14@uni.library.ucla.edu>, zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu
(Michael Zeleny) wrote:
>>>>To continue the pain analogy: pain can have significance, and the
>>>>significance of a pain admits of judgment and can be argued over. (Is
>>>>this a serious pain? Is it a sign of a heart attack, or just gas? Is it
>>>>"real" in the sense that it comes from a real limb, or is it a "phantom"
>>>>pain, from a leg which was recently amputated?) But the brute fact of
>>>>pain is experiential, and judgments are overlaid later.
>
>>>I fail to see the relevance of this analogy. Your point that pains
>>>can bear cognitive content (and indeed they do, as witness their
>>>diagnostic utility) is clearly insufficient for establishing their
>>>communicative role. To reverse your analogy, even deliberately
>>>produced gibberish could serve as a means of achieving valid insight
>>>in its sender's mind. But such utility would hardly sustain your
>>>original contention quoted above.
>
>>Could you give an example of what you have in mind when you speak of
>>enlightenment via gibberish?
>
>Note that I was speaking of insight, rather than enlightenment.
>Presumably, a XXIInd century psychiatrist might be able to diagnose
>his deranged patients by analyzing their nonsensical utterances, not
>unlike a mediaeval physician who might have tasted their urine for a
>similar purpose. Unfortunately, present-day development of psychiatry
>does not allow us to diagnose Derrida's cognitive ailments by perusing
>his logorrhetic eructations.
Well, now it's my turn to question your analogy. You were talking about
DELIBERATELY PRODUCED gibberish (which is what you claim Derrida utters).
But your example is of a madman, who has no idea that what he is producing
is gibberish, and certainly isn't trying to "trick" his audience by
"disguising" it as sense.
>>>>By the same token, once you accept the distinction between experience and
>>>>judgment (as you do), it seems to me foolish to assert that meaning
>>>>resides all on one side of the fence, and not at all on the other. You
>>>>yourself want to evaluate the meaning of some of Foucault's actions (or a
>>>>crude parody thereof), but in order to evaluate it, it's gotta be there,
>>>>no?
>
>>>The point is that the meaning of words or actions is informed by
>>>relevant aspects of the external reality, and hence underdetermined
>>>by "what it seems like" to the agent or his audience -- which is the
>>>sole plausible candidate for incorrigibility.
>
>>The point is that you persist in talking about the meaning of words, and
>>figuring out what it is, which is already GRANTING my point, which is that
>>the meaning, whatever it is, is there to be figured out.
>
>If every event has a cause, every event has a natural meaning. But
>surely the same does not go for communicative meaning. Not every cause
>communicates.
Fair enough. But remember that we are talking only about events whose
cause is (at least partly) human volition. That would seem to complicate
things.
>>What you want to claim is that there is a situation in which both agent
>>and audience AGREE that they are in fact agent and audience, and that a
>>third party can come in and prove them wrong; prove, that is, that no act
>>of signification is taking place at all. And furthermore, you want to
>>say, this proof can be successful WITHOUT CHANGING THEIR MINDS. That is,
>>the third party can prove to a fourth party that the act in question is
>>not a communicative act, while the people who foolishly believe themselves
>>to be agent and audience persist in this belief. I just don't see it,
>>myself.
>
>Note that you are denying the possibility of exposing any linguistic
>mystification.
No, I'm really, really not. I am denying the possibility of proving that
something is linguistic mystification without exposing it as such.
"Without changing their minds," remember?
>A classic example of ignorant imputation of meaning to
>a patently meaningless utterance comes from Paul's Epistle to Titus,
>which alludes to Epimenides as follows:
> One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said,
> The Cretans are always liars, evil beast, slow bellies.
> This witness is true.
>To cite a more recent occurrence, you appeared to regard Peter Ramus'
>alleged statement: "Everything Aristotle ever said was wrong", as
>meaningful. Presumably, if Ramus indeed made such a claim, he thought
>that he was expressing a true proposition thereby, and a fortiori that
>it was meaningful. And yet logic tells us that as a pragmatic version
>of the Liar Paradox, it cannot mean anything at all.
You have an incredibly impoverished concept of meaning. "Come here!";
"Yaba daba doo!"; and "What time is it?" are all meaningful utterances,
and none of them has any truth value at all. To claim that only
utterances which are either true or false are meaningful is just silly.
Now, you might want to say that Ramus (and Derrida) are PURPORTING to
utter propositions which make truth claims....You may want to, but you
can't, because if the utterances are purporting to do anything, they are
clearly not meaningless, by definition.
>> And I'll tell you why. You want to claim that meaning is a
>>property which can inhere in a text independent of its interpreters. I,
>>on the other hand, subscribe to Collingwood's model of
>>meaning/understanding:
>>
>>"The reader may object that if what is here maintained were true there
>>could never be any absolute assurance, either for the hearer or for the
>>speaker, that the one had understood the other. That is so; but in fact
>>there is no such assurance. The only assurance we possess is an empirical
>>and relative assurance, becoming progressively stronger as conversation
>>proceeds, and based on the fact that neither party seems to the other to
>>be talking nonsense. The question whether they understand each other
>>_solvitur interloquendo_. If they understand each other well enough to go
>>on talking, they understand each other as well as they need; and there is
>>no better kind of understanding which they can regret not having attained"
>>(_The Principles of Art_ [London: Oxford University Press, 1938, 1958],
>>pp. 250-1).
>
>This nominalistic profession of faith is hardly surprising since
>Collingwood derided propositions as "ghosts of departed sentences."
>Its underlying fallacy is conflation of expressing with awareness and
>understanding. It is perfectly possible for a speaker to express more
>or less than he actually understands, provided that he lacks perfect
>awareness of the relevant facts or linguistic conventions. Likewise,
>it is perfectly possible for his audience to over- or under-interpret
>his words, provided that its ignorance is a match for his pretension.
Note that you are not evaluating Collingwood's claim above, since you are
using words like "understand" and "express" in senses which are completely
different from those in which he uses them. So, all you are saying is
"when I say understand, I don't mean what he means." That's your right,
of course, but it constitutes neither evaluation nor argument.
But, leaving that aside for the moment, haven't you just disproven your
larger point? You just as much as said that it is perfectly possible for
a snake oil salesman (say, Derrida, in your account) to actually be saying
meaningful stuff, despite himself.
>>Without your rather silly implicit metaphysics, it seems to me, the ONLY
>>way to correct the impression that something is meaningful is to CONVINCE
>>either agent or audience that it isn't.
>
>Consider the case in which speaker actively obfuscates the nonsensical
>nature of his gnomic utterances, which are received as gospel by his
>delusional and logically inept audience. My claim is that this is an
>accurate description of the situation between Derrida and his acolytes.
>For an example, refer to Silke's contortions over "Einstein's constant"
>being "the very concept of variability."
Okay, look, this seems to me to be the crux of the matter. I am not
claiming for a second that a speaker cannot bamboozle a hearer. But, what
on earth leads you to believe that the speaker is uttering things which
are utterly devoid of meaning, rather than things which mean in misleading
ways? Here's the question I want to ask:
How can something be intentionally made to appear meaningful, without
bearing any meaning? Isn't meaning unavoidably generated by the
appearance of meaning?
--
Andy Perry We search before and after,
Brown University We pine for what is not.
English Department Our sincerest laughter
Andrew_Perry@brown.edu OR With some pain is fraught.
st001914@brownvm.bitnet -- Shelley, d'apres Horace Rumpole
Subject: Vietmath War: elliptic curves seen as the way to proving FLT
From: Archimedes.Plutonium@dartmouth.edu (Archimedes Plutonium)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 00:13:09 GMT
VIETNAM: Ten Thousand Day War, series filmed 1980
" Ho Chi Minh trail a lifeline and a legend... Cutting the Ho Chi Minh
trail is seen as the key to ending the war.
But bombing the trail increases the cost of the war to a billion
dollars. The trail is never closed.. The Americans lose 500 planes
over the trail. "
++++
That was the Vietnam War and such silly putty ideas by US
politicians, advisors and military people. To think that the key to
winning the Vietnam War was to end a supply route-- Ho Chi Minh trail.
Likewise, silly putty idea that to think that the elliptic curves
allied with Axiom of Choice allied with p-adics would crack Fermat's
Last Theorem.
The silly buzzards of mathematics do not yet realize that if in
mathematics you require these awfully long proofs means not that you
are so clever, but that your whole entire notion of what you are trying
to prove was a falsehood, a delusion, a Burk and Wills inland sea when
there was no inland sea. And the more monsterous of a mathematical
falsehood the more pages of abstruse , abstract and goofy ideas one has
to muster in order to convince other fellow birdbrain math people. They
say they are convinced not because they are convinced but because it is
so long and they do not understand it and others around them say they
are convinced, hence they give in, they cave in and say they beleive
it, yet they do not even understand it.
How could anyone convince Newton or a Newton follower that "time
dilates" or "space contracts". Likewise, how in the world could I
convince Andy Wiles, Barry Mazur, John Conway, Ken Ribet that their
"Finite Integers" lacks precision. Lacks mathematical precision and
that the reason their FLT proof is so long, cumbersome, arcane and uses
every kitchen sink of mathematics, is because whenever you have a foggy
statement using foggy numbers, then you must build up this huge
delusional edifice.
P-adic = Infinite Integer proof of FLT is easy. FLT is false because
counterexamples exist. You see, a P-adic proof of FLT requires one
paragraph. Not the 100 or 1000 page delusional baloney of Wiles. The
Wiles delusion is the mathematicians modern day layers upon layers of
epicycles that Copernicus finally dissolved away.
Subject: Re: Specialized terminology (was: What is a constant?)
From: Andrew_Perry@Brown.edu (Andy Perry)
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 1996 20:22:03 -0500
In article <55r4ld$aji@peaches.cs.utexas.edu>, turpin@cs.utexas.edu
(Russell Turpin) wrote:
>-*---------
>In article <55qse9$gjm@netnews.upenn.edu>,
>Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
>> I don't think the term "constant" is very important here, since
>> Derrida immediately corrects it to "center" -- a center, in the
>> specific context, is something that grounds the play allowed
>> within the confines of a game. ...
>
>How is this different from "underlying assumptions," a phrase
>known and understood by everyone from businessfolk to engineers
>to musicians? I am trying to understand why this specialized
>terminology has been introduced. From the subsequent
>explanation, it does not seem as if the terminology -- center,
>play, etc. -- provides any more rigor than existing and
>well-understood terms.
>
>So now we know what Derrida (should have) said: "The Einstein
>constant is not an underlying assumption (of physics)." (I'm
>assuming that the context of his comment makes physics the domain
>-- er, "game" -- of concern.) But as with many of Derrida's
>passages, once one understands what he is trying to say, two
>responses immediately beckon:
>
> (1) Like, DUH.
>
> (2) What is the purpose of the specialized terminology (and
> elsewhere, of the painfully convoluted prose)?
Okay, I'm coming in very late to this discussion, and I have no interest
in reading up on what's gone before, so I have no clue what Einstein is
doing here. However, if we leave him out for a moment, I can give a few
more general answers to Russell's question about the use of the term
"center" in Derrida.
1) Derrida is a post-structuralist. This is often taken to mean that he
is a critic of structuralism (which he is), but it equally means that he
is building upon structuralism. In one of his first papers (and the first
one to be given in the U.S.), "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse
of the Human Sciences," Derrida basically deconstructs Levi-Strauss's
system, which is a structural analysis of myth. "Center" is one of the
first terms he uses in this paper, for very specific reasons which I will
address in a moment. The point of this paragraph is merely that he
introduced the term initially in a context which made a lot of sense.
Whether it makes sense in the context you are currently discussing, I
can't judge, 'cause I don't know what it is.
2) So, why "center?" Well, Derrida asserts that the concept of structure
(which Levi-Strauss relies upon) necessarily implies a center. Without a
center, there is no structure, he says. Why is this claim useful?
Essentially, because Derrida decided that he wanted to develop a SPATIAL
METAPHOR. As soon as he has asserted that all structures have a center,
he immediately further asserts that a structure has its center elsewhere.
This, I would assert, is a useful rhetorical move: the effect is to
defamiliarize the concepts of structure and center, by positing a spatial
relationship between the two which is counter-intuitive. Lacan had
already engaged in an extremely similar project, positing a "topology of
the subject" which suggested, for example, not only that that the self
exceeds the "I," but that the unconscious is located outside the self
("The unconscious is the discourse of the Other"). At base, then, the
choice of "center" is meant to allow a "topological" discussion of things
like meaning and subjectivity, one in which metaphors of space and
position are constantly deployed.
>
>> Since Derrida is mostly concerned with structuralism and explicitly
>> with Levi-Strauss, I give you an example from that area, concerning
>> myth: in order to prove that there is mythical structure that is
>> universal (which is, in a very simple nutshell, L-S's project), you
>> would have to be able to distill the ur-myth which provides the
>> rules to which all specific myths would have to adhere; think for
>> instance of Propp's Morphology of the Russian Folk-Tale. Since we
>> never _have_ the ur-myth, however, but only variations, this center
>> would be introduced retrospect by the work of the mythologist; ...
>
>This all makes perfect sense, *especially* if one replaces the
>phrase "this center" with the phrase "its underlying assumptions."
Well, here, Derrida is explicitly following the lead of his object text.
You might say he is engaging in a bit of critical parasitism, taking L-S's
term and having a field day with it.
>
>> ... however, once the center is defined, it would restrict the
>> play possible within the mythology at issue -- any newfound
>> myth that didn't adhere to the central (hypothetical) myth would
>> be a serious problem. ...
>
>Translation: once one has a theory of an ur-myth, any actual
>myth that doesn't fit the theory poses a challenge to the theory.
>
>(Note the translation is shorter and more clear. What purpose
>does Silke's terminology serve??)
Derrida would emphasize that the center is the only thing which allows
there to be any "play" at all. Without a center, there would be no
structure, no rules to play with, only chaos. The claim, then, would be
not only that actual myths challenge the theory, but that without an
actual structure of some sort (which is the object Propp and Levi-Strauss
are trying to get a handle on) there could be no multiplicity designatable
by the term "myths." I don't know if that answer's your question or
not...
>> ... There are people who claim that there is only one Russian
>> folk-tale that adheres fully to Propp's definition of what a
>> Russian folktale is supposed to be.
>
>In other words, they think Propp's theory is poppycock.
Yes, but in this specific case (ie, Silke's last sentence compared to your
last sentence), it is clearly the case that Silke's description is more
useful than yours. It provides important detail, which you lack, since
there are many different kinds of poppycock in the world.
>
>-*--------
>
>There are a variety of reasons for introducing specialized
>terminology. Some of the good things it achieves are:
>
> CONCISENESS
> Mathematicians could just say "Assume S is a set with a
> binary, closed, associative operation + that has an identity
> and inverse." But this gets long to type and tricky to read
> time after time after time, so we define the term "group"
> to mean just this kind of thing, and now when I say
> "group," Siemon knows exactly what I mean.
>
> NAMING NEW THINGS
> How else will we refer to that new species, if it doesn't
> have a name? (This, of course, is a special case of the first,
> since we could always identify a new thing through a definite
> description.)
>
> CLARITY
> Attaching a name to a commonly used description or set of
> assumptions in a field is a good way to demarcate their
> ubiquity and provide useful context to one's readers.
You leave out something like "RESONANCE" or "TROPOLOGY." The ability to
set up a whole system of terms, revolving around a central trope (in this
case, spatial metaphors), which is more than the sum of its parts.
Obviously, "center" would be a superfluous term in the example we're
looking at, if it were the only term of its kind being used. When
combined with other terms, they create a set of analogies which operate an
several levels at once. On some levels, they make the argument more
intuitively graspable (hence, helping out conciseness and clarity), on
other levels, they are meant to function NON-intuitively, which is to say,
for rhetorical effect (which actually also renders Derrida's writing more
concise, since it requires fewer words to have the same effect).
--
Andy Perry We search before and after,
Brown University We pine for what is not.
English Department Our sincerest laughter
Andrew_Perry@brown.edu OR With some pain is fraught.
st001914@brownvm.bitnet -- Shelley, d'apres Horace Rumpole
Subject: Regional Salmon Sonar Program Supervisor: Vacancy Announcement
From: tomk@fishgame.state.ak.us
Date: 6 Nov 1996 23:22:42 GMT
Regional Salmon Sonar Program Supervisor
Alaska Department of Fish and Game
Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim Region
Anchorage, Alaska
RESPONSIBILITIES: Provide technical and operational supervision for
sonar-based, salmon passage assessment projects on the mainstem Yukon,
Kuskokwim, Noatak, and Aniak Rivers. These projects provide daily estimates
of salmon passage. This position assures that these sonar programs are
providing good quality information for fishery management decisions.
QUALIFICATIONS: B.S.+ experience required; M.S. or Ph.D.+ experience
preferred. This is a supervisory position which requires solid educational
background and technical skills in hydroacoustics and electronics. Experience
in riverine hydroacoustics and fisheries are desirable. Good writing,
communication, and administrative skills are necessary. On the job training
will be available.
SALARY: Starting at $49,116 plus benefits.
CLOSING DATE: Open until filled.
CONTACT: Send resume and three references to Tom Kron, Alaska Department of
Fish and Game, Commercial Fisheries Management and Development Division,
Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim Region, 333 Raspberry Road, Anchorage, Alaska 99518;
907/267-2166; FAX 907/267-2442; tomk@fishgame.state.ak.us. A State of Alaska
employment application for register placement and further consideration will
be provided on request.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Subject: Re: Specialized terminology (was: What is a constant?)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 02:26:05 GMT
Silke-Maria Weineck wrote:
> > I don't think the term "constant" is very important here, since
> > Derrida immediately corrects it to "center" -- a center, in the
> > specific context, is something that grounds the play allowed
> > within the confines of a game. ...
turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin):
[...]
> So now we know what Derrida (should have) said: "The Einstein
> constant is not an underlying assumption (of physics)." (I'm
> assuming that the context of his comment makes physics the domain
> -- er, "game" -- of concern.)
The paraphrase Silke offered you was "ground." And I'm very
doubtful about your interpretation. But let's press on.
But as with many of Derrida's
> passages, once one understands what he is trying to say, two
> responses immediately beckon:
> (1) Like, DUH.
If you want to claim that's true for much of what Derrida has
to say, your job is to show it. But you've got a back-log of such
comments to support, and you show no signs of getting to it, so I
won't expect you to do any better here. With that out of the way,
let's look at Derrida's remark. He doesn't claim to be making any
revolutionary comments about physics -- he's answering a question
from Hyppolite about the paper which he just gave. The question
asks him to relate certain of the ideas he presented to Hyppolite's
thoughts about relativity. Most of Derrida's reply goes off in a
different direction -- it's plain that physics interests Hyppolite
more than Derrida. But in the end Derrida makes a brief comment
about Einstein -- the one that's attracted so much attention.
> (2) What is the purpose of the specialized terminology (and
> elsewhere, of the painfully convoluted prose)?
See "Structure, Sign, and Play" -- the paper that Derrida
had just finished reading, and which Hyppolite was asking about.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: This Week's Finds in Mathematical Physics (Week 93)
From: baez@math.ucr.edu (john baez)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 18:05:04 -0800
In article <55nu0n$gij@agate.berkeley.edu>,
Stephen Parrott wrote:
> I say "believed" because I know of no rigorous proof,
>though "formal" calculations (i.e., algebraic manipulations with
>analytically ill-defined operators) do lead to this conclusion,
>and it seems treated as a fact within physics.
[...]
> I don't think the No Ghost Theorem is yet properly understood.
>My guess is that it will ultimately be understood by reformulating
>it in a completely different context.
I'm no expert on this stuff, obviously, but let me note...
Richard Borcherds, writes "In spite of several
statements to the contrary in the mathematical literature, the
original proof of the no-ghost theorem by Goddard and Thorn is
mathematically rigorous". This is from his paper "Automorphic
forms and Lie algebras", available at
http://www.pmms.cam.ac.uk/Staff/R.E.Borcherds.html
And he had better be right, for his own sake, because he uses
this theorem in his proof of Conway and Norton's "monstrous
moonshine conjectures" --- see "Monstrous moonshine and
monstrous Lie superalgebras", also available above. More precisely,
he uses it to construct some generalized Kac-Moody superalgebras;
he says that the idea of using the no-ghost theorem to prove
results about Kac-Moody algebras goes back to Frenkel's paper,
"Representations of Kac-Moody algebras and dual resonance
models", Lect. Appl. Math. 21, AMS (1985) pp. 325-353, and he
says this paper also contains a proof of the result.
Probably your point that these calculations are "formal" is
understood and regarded as acceptable within this body of
mathematics literature. Work on vertex operator algebras typically
uses formal power series to the hilt, and while an analytically
minded mathematical physicist might properly regard this with disdain, it
is perfectly rigorous as pure algebra, and the algebraists love it.
(In fact, it lets them do a lot of this stuff over an arbitrary field.)
Of course, a theorem can be rigorous and still not properly understood!
Subject: Vietmath War: THE WALKING DEAD movie; math graduate students
From: Archimedes.Plutonium@dartmouth.edu (Archimedes Plutonium)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 01:03:15 GMT
THE WALKING DEAD movie 1995
Cole: Now why can't you just go along with the program.
Hoover: Because the program is fucked. You ever wonder why they recruit
kids right out of High School. Not because they are in the best shape
physically. But because they are in the worst shape mentally. (Movie
shows Hoover pointing to his head and turning the screws.) They haven't
got a clue as to what the fuck they gettin into.
++++++
Math Education Report
US President: What is the report of mathematics education in the US?
NSF spokesman: Mr. President,the mathematics education in the US is
fucked. They needlessly teach math in every year of High School yet
science is not taught every year in High School. They teach math in
every year of Elementary School and Junior High and High School yet
they teach only one year of physics or chemistry and those are not even
required.
US President: How did the situation get like that of a topheavy math
teaching and a light and lackadaysical science teaching?
NSF spokesman: Sir, I got like that because the SAT tests of Princeton
NJ has 1/2 of the test with mathematics and not 1/2 of the test with
science. Therefore the High Schools across the nation are topheavy in
the math garbage.
US President: And so our entering college students know calculus but
they have no idea of important things like Maxwell Equations, Cell
theory of biology. (Shows the President pointing to his head , and
turning the screws.)
====
It should be pointed out that mathematics has never had a revolution
with its Number Theory. We have taken for granted that "finite" for
Finite Integers makes sense. And noone has asked the question can you
have a number that was completely, 100% finite? Or do all numbers need
a component, and ingredient of infinity in order to be born a full
fledged number. That is why I say "finite numbers" are merely a foggy
notion, a misconception that appears to work but in the world of
mathematics that begs of 100% precision, "finite" is fools gold or an
optical illusion, or a mirage.
The Finite Integers were the 1993 "walking dead". It is only a matter
of time that physicists find a region of physics where P-adics are
necessary and essential and where finite integers simply do not work.
Once this is found, then mathematics will be henceforth forever changed
for the better. On that day, no longer will exist Finite Integers and
all Integers, all Counting Numbers will be Infinite Integers or
p-adics. We will still use finite integers for common everyday
discourse just as most of us use Newtonian Mechanics for rough
approximations. But when we want to do real, 100% truthful mathematics
we have to use the p-adics or Infinite Integers, just as we have to use
Quantum Mechanics and not Newtonian Mechanics when we want to do 100%
physics.
That was quite a good movie THE WALKING DEAD. But I am partial to all
Vietnam movies and make a habit of watching all Vietnam Movies. The
complex social milieu of the Vietnam War is an excellent genre of
movies. The portrayal of individualism in the Western genre is another
artform. Anyone know where this movie THE WALKING DEAD was filmed,
looked like southern California with those palm trees?
Keep the Vietnam movies a-coming. And please, film them in a real
jungle, not some California florist adaption. I think one of those
Vietnam movies -- 300 Spartans was filmed in Arizona even, (sic ? ) it
is a hard stretch of imagination to picture Vietnam as the flora of the
Arizona or California desert, no matter how low budget of a film.
Subject: Re: How Much Math? (Was: Re: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: jac@ds8.scri.fsu.edu (Jim Carr)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 20:18:59 -0500
In article <55djag$jlh@panix2.panix.com> +@+.+ (G*rd*n) writes:
>
>The mystery for me is this: I studied and got a reasonably good
>grade in elementary Calculus. Prior to this study, I had what we
>might call an intuitive grasp of Newtonian mechanics -- for instance,
>I could "feel" and visualize the planetary system, and beyond that I
>could do the arithmetic given reasonably simple cases.
Key concept: simple cases. Did you visualize accurately what happens
in a 3 or 4 body planetary system where one of those bodies is a
comet moving through the orbits of the others?
>Then I studied Calculus. Afterward, what I would call my
>understanding or view of Newtonian mechanics was pretty much
>the same as it had been before I studied Calculus, except now I
>had some additional tools to use if I wanted to work on it.
If you did not go any more deeply into mechanics than you did
without calculus, I can understand this viewpoint. For example,
I doubt if you did anything with a driven damped non-linear
oscillator in your earlier study of mechanics.
>Therefore, I have to draw the conclusion that those who assert
>that one must know Calculus to understand Newtonian mechanics
>are using the words "Calculus" and "understand" differently than I
>do,
I don't think so, I think they have a bigger view of what Newtonian
mechanics consists of than you do. That is, they use the words
"Newtonian mechanics" differently -- perhaps more like Newton
would have used them given that he invented the calculus and
related numerical tools in order to develop and use his mechanics.
>and they must be using them to refer to a state of mind which I
>haven't experienced, something sort of mystical which can't be
>explained to me because I haven't studied _enough_ Calculus, or
>something.
Or perhaps studied enough, to go beyond the superficial.
Certainly, in my experience, that is when I obtained a deeper
insight into what any particular subject is and how it is related
to other material. As an example, I am currently reading Derrida's
Introduction to Geometry and some Autodynamics pages, alternately.
Very interesting exercise, that. I recommend it.
--
James A. Carr | "The half of knowledge is knowing
http://www.scri.fsu.edu/~jac/ | where to find knowledge" - Anon.
Supercomputer Computations Res. Inst. | Motto over the entrance to Dodd
Florida State, Tallahassee FL 32306 | Hall, former library at FSCW.
Subject: Re: Is glass a solid? --how to judge textbooks
From: Gavin Tabor
Date: Tue, 05 Nov 1996 16:15:30 +0000
Peter Mott wrote:
>
> Doug Craigen wrote:
> >
> > Stephen La Joie wrote:
> >>
> >> Triple Quadrophenic wrote:
> >>> The 26th October issue of New Scietist has an article on volcanoes. In it
> >>> the author, Erik Stokstad, says "...glass flows like a liquid...". If even
> >>> NS is spreading the myth what hope for the rest of us.
> >>
> >> What if indeed!
> >>
> >> I noted that my ol' Chemistry textbook says that glass flows like a liquid,
> >> and it was written by a Cal Tech Prof,
> >
> > Name of the text and edition please. I am trying to accumulate a list of errors
> > in text books after all. (http://cyberspc.mb.ca/~dcc/phys/errors.html)
>
> The problem here is that now matter how many books you look
> up the glass transition and glassy behavior, this subject is
> still actively investigated, with new results coming out all the
> time. In general, glass behavior is poorly understood. Worse,
> however, is that the little that is understood is either poorly
> explained or simply not covered. Most books are astoundingly
> bad at covering the glass transition.
>
> Hence, this an effective way to judge how good a given book is.
>
> If you want to judge how good a materials science textbook, just look
> up the section on the glass transition. In most cases, the subject
> is covered in the most pathetic way: it typically shows a break
> in the volume/temperature curve, and it calls the break the
> "glass transition temperature" and lets it go at that. If the
> book is semi-good, you'll get a short discussion on the shear modulus.
> If the book is good, the modulus discussion will include both the
> storage and loss modulus. If the book is a great, you'll also see
> time-temperature superposition, a discssion of the shift factors,
> and comparison of mechanical to dielectric spectroscopy. If the book
> is the top-rate, you see a discussion on atomistic motion, showing the
> distinction between movement due to mechanical yielding and viscous/
> viscoelastic flow, with an explanation of activation volume, covering
> Eyring, KWW, and WLF theories.
>
> If see a book that discusses all of these things, and covers polymeric,
> oxide, ceramic, and metallic glasses, BUY IT IMMEDIATELY no matter how
> expensive it is. If you can't buy it, steal it.
>
> Peter Mott
I don't suppose you have any recommendations that I could
beg, borrow or steal?
--
Gavin Tabor
Subject: Re: Anyone have an energy storage cap?
From: hill@rowland.org (Winfield Hill)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 03:25:45 GMT
Alan \Uncle Al\ Schwartz, said...
>
>ferrick@ixc.ixc.net (patrick ferrick) wrote:
>>Alan \"Uncle Al\" Schwartz (uncleal0@ix.netcom.com) wrote:
>>: Baseball cap, pipe cap, fool's cap, lens cap, nurse's cap, dental cap,
>>: spending cap, kneecap, caps as opposed to lowercase, bottle cap.
>>
>>Ok, OK, very funny...! What I am looking for, of course, is a capacitor
>>that is designed specifically to discharge quickly through a flashlamp.
>>Any of you jokers have one that you'd like to sell us? Thanks!
You've got to realize Patrick, that we all get a little punch drunk here,
dealing with every kind of imaginable thing day after day! A lack of
responsive answers not only means we lack a good answer, but want to let
off a little steam as well! For example, I've been making high-energy
capacitor storage banks lately, but your requirements just didn't
match the parts I was familiar with so I had no ready answer, but was
still curious about a right answer (but in this case not enough to go look
it up....) if in fact there was one.... On the other hand, a silly
reponse to Uncle Al, well that was more available from my fingertips.
Anyway, Steve started it.
Having sobered up, I'll mention that the energy storage obtained with a
wide variety of real voltage and capacitance combinations always seems to
work out to about the same energy/volume ratio, as you'd expect from
simple physics. Also, your energy and space constraints (300-500J ...
3x4x7") don't look out of line to me for the best electrolytic technology.
But your sample values (40 uF / 5KV) yeild 1000J, not 500J. I do hope you
find a solution and tell us about it.
--
Winfield Hill hill@rowland.org _/_/_/ _/_/_/_/
The Rowland Institute for Science _/ _/ _/_/ _/
Cambridge, MA USA 02142-1297 _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/
_/ _/ _/ _/ _/
http://www.artofelectronics.com/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/_/_/_/
Subject: Re: Depleted Uranium in big jets. (was: Spent...)
From: jac@ds8.scri.fsu.edu (Jim Carr)
Date: 6 Nov 1996 20:59:46 -0500
jac@ds8.scri.fsu.edu (Jim Carr) wrote:
+
+BJ Nash wrote:
+}
+} Lets not lose sight of the fact we are talking about SPENT uranium, no
+} more dangerous than lead....but with different danger properties...
+
+ This is patently false. It is scary that someone in the aircraft
+ remanufacturing business is unaware of the fact that "depleted
+ Uranium" = U-238 is radioactive.
wen@infi.net writes:
>
>What is false is that we are _not_ talking about "spent uranium." The
>proper term is spent fuel. Spent fuel contains all kinds of nasty little
>isotopes and is highly radioactive.
That is correct. I made that point elsewhere in my comments. We
are, as you say below, talking about depleted Uranium, which is the
isotope U-238 (technically, it can still have a low percentage of
U-235, but very much less than found in nature). Nothing you wrote
changes this fact, or the fact that U-238 is radioactive.
>Depleted Uranium is used quite often in the ac and other industries.
>Naturally occurring U ore contains about .720% of U-235 which is the
>fissionable material. Depleted uranium is processed down so that it
>contains only about .2-.3% of the U-235 isotope. I think you can now see
>that there is not significant hazard.
Those facts do not change the fact that U-238 is radioactive and has
a specific activity only about a factor of 5 or 6 less than U-235.
The radioactivity of natural U is hardly changed by removing some
of the U-235 during the enrichment process. It may be below
regulatory concern when handled properly, but it is *not* Lead.
I think you are confused by the fact that U-235 is a nuclear explosive
and carefully controlled for that reason. That fact is completely
independent of the fact that both isotopes alpha decay and produce
a documented health hazard if present as dust in the air. My other
article explained the elementary ways one can protect workers from
exposure by even a thin coating. However, if a worker ignorant of
the low-level radiation hazard and, worse, ignorant of the pyrophoric
properties of U metal, were to cut into the counter weight, bad things
would happen and the NRC guys would come trooping in with their yellow
booties and lengthy forms and fines.
--
James A. Carr | "The half of knowledge is knowing
http://www.scri.fsu.edu/~jac/ | where to find knowledge" - Anon.
Supercomputer Computations Res. Inst. | Motto over the entrance to Dodd
Florida State, Tallahassee FL 32306 | Hall, former library at FSCW.