Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 06:15:44 GMT
matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein)
> >> Can we accept that the terms "generalize" and "considerably" different
> >> are what is often call a term of art. That is, it depends on who is
> >> applying the term.
moggin@nando.net (moggin)
> > Yes, unquestionably. Take that as given when you read what I
> >say below.
matt:
> >> I can see why you want to call the theories
> >> considerable different. However, in a very real sense we can also call
> >> them similar. It does not seem to me to make sense to argue any more
> >> over whether some is "considerable" different, "somewhat" different,
> >> or what have you.
moggin:
> > Well, there _was_ a reason to argue about it, and a very specific
> >one, but I hesitate to mention it (I don't want to fan the flames). So
> >instead, I'll go back to an analogy you offered. (You may not recall,
> >but you did talk about this before.) It was based on fast food.
Matt:
> I will believe this because you say it, but I have no memory of this
> at all and it does not ring the slightest bell. But it is probably
> true that we did discuss this. And I am willing to take credit for
> almost anything, so I will take credit for this.
I thought it was a good post, so it stuck in my mind -- in fact,
I may have it tucked away somewhere. If I can find it (no guarantee --
I keep a random assortment, most of which go missing when I try to dig
them up), I'll post it again.
moggin:
> >In my
> >sense of the term, you said, generalizing from a hamburger would give
> >you ten hamburgers. You were pretty unimpressed by that result -- you
> >preferred to generalize to milk shakes and french fries, in order to
> >create a more powerful concept of "fast food." (I hope I'm remembering
> >corrrectly, but I think that's how it went.)
Matt:
> It sounds good to me, so lets accept it.
moggin:
> > I never replied (that was when I had to leave for for a few weeks),
> >but here what's I wanted to say: generalizing from one hamburger to ten
> >is more significant than you may realize. If you _couldn't_ do that,
> >then you wouldn't have a concept of a "hamburger" that you could apply
> >whenever you ate a ground beef patty on a bun -- that category wouldn't
> >exist.
Matt:
> I think I see the difficulty here, and it is one of reference, not
> meaning. The sentence "generalizing from one hamburger to ten
> hamburgers" does/did not seem significant to me because the concept of
> hamburger was already in the sentence. But you did not mean that, you
> meant "generalizing from this think here on my plate that I am going
> to eat right now to the ten hamburgers I am going to eat next week."
> (Silly note for consistency's sake, not actual cows were killed to
> support this analogy.)
Personally, I was thinking of them as soy-burgers, for just that
reason.
> Now, Moggin, I don't want the above to sound like I am in anyway
> faulting you. It looks like you used some words in a perfectly
> reasonable way, and I interpreted them in a different, but equally
> reasonable way.
Got it. This may be one of the few times we've cleared up a
confusion, instead of creating one.
> Now to the analogy. Of course you are right. Both are reasonable uses
> of generalize. They take you in somewhat different directions, but
> they both generalized. I think it is time for a little pitch. I am in
> the middle of reading "Fluid Analogies" by Douglas Hofsteader. (ISBN
> not available right now.) The whole book is devoted to the different
> ways people can generalize, how they do it, and the significance of
> the mental ability. A great book and full of insight into the thinking
> process. To sum up the book in a short, pithy, and misleading
> sentence, generalization is the core process to human thought.
Thanks for the tip. I haven't read him, except for a few
_Scientific American_ columns, since _Godel, Escher, Bach_. I'll
keep it in mind. (Nietzsche says a few interesting things, too --
try the "On Truth and Falsity" essay if you're ever in the mood.)
moggin:
> > Now, I see why you want a wider concept to use in discussing fast
> >food -- but from my point of view, you aren't generalizing from the idea
> >of hamburgers when you add milk shakes and french fries. How could you
> >be? A hamburger doesn't contain anything that you could generalize to
> >produce either a milk shake _or_ french fries -- forget about both. No
> >matter how much you widen the concept of a hamburger, it won't encompass
> >them.
> > So when you offer the broader category of "fast food," I'd agree
> >with you that it's more general than the category of "hamburgers," but
> >at least in my sense of "generalize," it's not a generalization _of_
> >"hamburger." See the difference? Generalizing "hamburger" would take
> >you as far as cheeseburgers and even bacon-cheeseburgers. It could
> >include both Whoppers and Big Macs. And you can replace the concept of
> >"hamburger" with the more general notion of "fast food," which covers
> >hamburgers as well as other items on the menu. But saying that you've
> >generalized on hamburgers and arrived at milk-shakes ain't kosher.
Matt:
> Undeniable true. But for the reasons implied, not those stated. (That
> is to say, I liked the joke.)
> Really both are valid generalizations. You can go from the think on
> the plate to fast food, other sandwiches, things in your home town,
> etc. Which generalizations are valid and which are not depends on
> context and usefulness.
Agreed. That's why I kept saying that I had no dispute with the
scientific use of "generalize" -- I just wanted to be clear about the
distinction.
> So to bring us back to the original idea (I think), Euclidean space is
> flat. But flatness can be seen a specific case of curvature, a
> curvature of zero. Reinmann showed how this generalization worked.
> Einstein picked up on this and showed how it applied to physics. In
> particular space is curved (positively overall, negatively "near" a
> mass). And the space we normally deal with has very close to zero
> curvature.
I was going to avoid that dangerous subject. But o.k. In my
view, it makes no more sense to call flatness a case of curvature
than to say that hills are flat. I gather both of those statements
are true from your perspective, and I'm not arguing differently --
but their truth depends on your concept of generalization. That is,
you can describe both hills and plains in terms of a wider concept,
allowing you to say that you've "generalized" from one to the other.
Nonetheless, a hill is a plain only when it stops being a hill (i.e.,
when it becomes flat), and while "normal" space may be "very close"
to zero curvature, it never gets there (given that space actually
is Riemannian, rather than Euclidean).
-- moggin
P.S. I freely admit that I'm at and beyond the borders of my
knowledge chatting about geometry -- but before you criticize me for
commenting on it, kindly remember who brought it up again. (I was
about to go back to discussing "that French shit," as promised.)
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 04:49:30 GMT
Derrida:
>>>>>>>>>>>"I believe, however, that I was quite explcit about the fact that
>>>>>>>>>>>nothing of what I said had a destructive meaning. Here or there
>>>>>>>>>>>I have used to word _de'construction_, which has nothing to do
>>>>>>>>>>>with destruction. THat is to say, it is simply a question of
>>>>>>>>>>>(and this is a necessity of criticism in the classical sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>the word) being alert to the impliations, to the historical
>>>>>>>>>>>sedimentation of the language which we use-- and that is not
>>>>>>>>>>>destruction. I believe in the necessity of scientific work in the
>>>>>>>>>>>classical sense, I believe in the necessity of everything which
>>>>>>>>>>>is being done and even of what you are doing, but I don't see why
>>>>>>>>>>>I should renounce or why anyone should renounce the radicality of
>>>>>>>>>>>critical work under the pretext that it risks the sterilization
>>>>>>>>>>>of science, humanity, progress, the origin of meaning, etc. I
>>>>>>>>>>>believe that the risk of sterility and of sterilization has
>>>>>>>>>>>always been the price of lucidity."
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>>>>>>>Derrida is lying. Since his term `déconstruction' is derived
>>>>>>>>>>from Heidegger's term `destruktion', the destructive implications
>>>>>>>>>>are there, brought out by the argument from etymology, favored by
>>>>>>>>>>the Nazi and the Nazi apologist alike.
Silke:
>>>>>>>>>Zeleny is lying, but he can't help it.
Zeleny:
>>>>>>>>You are out of it. See Rodolphe Gasché, _The Tain of the Mirror:
>>>>>>>>Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection_, Chapter 7, pp 109-121.
moggin@nando.net (moggin):
>>>>>>> I don't have the book handy, but the last time I heard Gasche,
>>>>>>>he was arguing that the implications of Heidegger's _Destruktion_
>>>>>>>differ significantly from the English "destruction." David Farrell
>>>>>>>Krell takes the same tack, noting that _Zerstorung_ would have been
>>>>>>>closer.
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>>>Arguing about implications is scarcely a Heideggerian move.
moggin:
>>>> Neither do I dance like an Egyptian.
moggin:
>>> Correction -- that should, of course, have been "walk."
Zeleny:
>>>>Your personal habits are quite beside the point here.
moggin:
>>> Then you shouldn't have brought them up.
Zeleny:
>>I did no such thing.
moggin:
> "Arguing about implications is scarcely a Heideggerian move."
So where is the reference to your personal habits?
Zeleny:
>>>>>>Check his Greek etymologies against Liddell & Scott -- always good for
>>>>>>a giggle.
moggin:
>>>>> I thought we were discussing the relation of _destruktion_ and
>>>>>deconstruction: you claimed Derrida is lying when he distinguishes
>>>>>them, and stated that "deconstruction" possesses the "destructive
>>>>>implications" of Heidegger's "_destruktion_."
Zeleny:
>>>>As I said, implications are beside the point.
moggin:
>>> Then you shouldn't have brought them up.
Zeleny:
>>I brought up history, not logic. Refer to Derrida's apposition of
>>"the historical sedimentation of the language which we use" for HIS
>>sense of `implications', which involves him in Heidegger's crypto-Nazi
>>rhetoric by HIS own lights.
moggin:
> Call it what you like, you brought up "destructive implications."
>But you haven't said anything that would support your claim, namely
>that "Since [D.'s] term `déconstruction' is derived from Heidegger's
>term `destruktion', the destructive implications are there...." (And
>needless to say, you haven't shown that Heidegger is using "crypto-
>Nazi rhetoric" -- that's mere demagoguery.)
Derrida:
"The word _déconstruction_ ... has nothing to do with destruction."
Derrida:
"Deconstruction ... it is simply a question of ... being alert to the
implications, to the historical sedimentation of the language which we
use."
Gasché:
"The main concepts to which deconstruction can and must be retraced
are those of _Abbau_ (dismantling) in the later work of Husserl and
_Destruktion_ (destruction) in the early philosophy of Heidegger."
Deconstructively speaking, we have a contradiction. Hence Derrida is
lying, cqfd.
Zeleny:
>>>> My etymological
>>>>argument satisfies Heidegger's (and a fortiori, Derrida's)
>>>>demonstrative criteria with room to spare.
moggin:
>>> You've offered only an argument-from-authority. (The one that
>>>we're presently discussing.)
Zeleny:
>>What else is new? Arguments about history ARE arguments from authority.
moggin:
> Your claim concerns the implications contained in certain terms.
>But you haven't offered any support for it, except to mention Gasche,
>who appears to disagree with you, in any case.
Looks like you are lying, too.
moggin:
>>>>>All this on authority
>>>>>of Gasche, in a passage you didn't quote; but as I said, I've heard
>>>>>Gasche contend that "_destruktion_" doesn't imply "destruction" (an
>>>>>argument also forwarded by Krell, on the basis I mentioned).
Zeleny:
>>>>How phallogocentric of you to judge a text on the basis of an oral
>>>>presentation!
moggin:
>>> ?? Where have I judged a text? You based your case on Gasche's
>>>_The Tain of the Mirror_, but didn't bother to quote whatever you were
>>>thinking of. I replied that while I didn't have the book handy, I'd
>>>heard Gasche argue very differently in the past.
Zeleny:
>>And? Am I responsible for his allegedly arguing in the past?
moggin:
> In this case, yes, since you're relying on his authority.
Not at all. I am relying on the authority of his TEXT, with which you
are admittedly unfamiliar.
Zeleny:
>>>> "We understand this task as one in which by taking _the
>>>>question of Being as our clue_, we are to _destroy_ [_Destruktion_]
>>>>the traditional content of ancient ontology ..." (Heidegger cited by
>>>>Gasché on p 112). Read the book, or I will sic Silke on you.
moggin:
>>> "...until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we
>>>achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being -- ways
>>>which have guided us ever since." Yep, that's Heidegger, alright --
>>>and so? You haven't established anything about Gasche's reading of
>>>"_destruktion_." But two sentences later, Heidegger says explicitly
>>>that _destruktion_ does not have "the _negative_ sense of shaking
>>>off the ontological tradition." (His emphasis.) Which is just what
>>>Gasche emphasized, as I recall.
Zeleny:
>>Why should I give a flying fuck about HIS reading or HIS emphasis?
moggin:
> Because you cited him on your behalf.
I cited him out of context, as per Derridean interpretive technique.
His quaint reading and arbitrary emphasis went down the drain. If you
want to make an issue out of it, address all complaints to the old Boa
Deconstructor himself.
Zeleny:
>>Turnaround is fair play. In deconstructing a deconstructor I am
>>entitled to take his words out of context, imputing "historical
>>sedimentation" as I please. Deal with it.
moggin:
> You're not "deconstructing" shit.
I have that on your unimpeachable intellectual authority?
moggin:
> You claimed that Derrida is
>a liar, but you didn't show it. You also claimed Gasche supports
>your position -- but ditto.
I have no interest in showing anything to the wilfully obtuse.
moggin:
> You haven't even bothered to quote him.
>(The words you took out of context were Heidegger's, although that
>seems to have slipped by you.)
So are you functionally illiterate or just a pathological liar?
Zeleny:
>>>>>>What better way to judge a writer than by applying his master's lofty
>>>>>>intellectual standards?
moggin:
>>>>> I can't see Heidegger as Derrida's "master" -- but more to the
>>>>>point, Heidegger doesn't rely on Gasche to authorize his etymologies.
Zeleny:
>>>>Tell your problems to an optician. All I want from Gasché is his
>>>>corroboration of the historical link between Derrida's term and its
>>>>Heideggerian ancestor, which is well-known anyway.
moggin:
>>> Well, no -- you invoked Gasche to support your your assertion
>>>that "deconstruction" contains "destructive implications" which it
>>>supposedly derives from "_destruktion_." (You also accused Derrida
>>>of lying for saying differently.) That leaves you with an argument
>>>from authority which your chosen authority doesn't seem to support.
Zeleny:
>>I cited Gasché as an authority on etymology. You seem to suggest
>>that I should care about his interpretation, or your reading thereof.
>>What a droll notion.
moggin:
> I don't give a damn what you care about. (Where do you get these
>ideas?) Your only argument was a reference to Gasche, who appears to
>differ with you on the point in question, and a quote from Heidegger,
>borrowed from Gasche, which doesn't support you, either. That's that.
>If you can come up with something better, you know where to reach me.
The sole point in question is the etymology of the term `déconstruction',
as derived from Heidegger's `destruktion' -- a proposition that Gasché
corroborates. If you have other concerns, address them to your mother.
She cares.
Cordially, - Mikhail | God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum."
Zeleny@math.ucla.edu | Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum."
itinerant philosopher -- will think for food ** www.ptyx.com ** MZ@ptyx.com
ptyx ** 6869 Pacific View Drive, LA, CA 90068 ** 213-876-8234/874-4745 (fax)
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 06:33:55 GMT
stewart@Dahlquist.Stanford.EDU (Michael Stewart) wrote:
> > If I failed to suggest it explicitly, then I wasn't being sufficiently
> > clear. However, my reasons for doing so had more to do with how I
> > feel that the words "right" and "wrong" should be used in application
> > to science than with a belief that Newtonian mechanics might be
> > exactly right over some region of velocities.
moggin@nando.net (moggin)
> Maybe it would be better to separate the two issues, then, since
> at the moment, Newton is a heated topic. Anyway, I don't follow the
> distinction that you're drawing here. You were suggesting it, but you
> don't believe it, or you do believe it, but for other reasons?
Michael:
> I don't believe that any theory that we currently have is likely to be
> exactly right. But I wouldn't go around claiming that a theory that
> matches experiment to within experimental errors over a non-trivial
> set of circumstances is wrong. I don't know with any certainty that
> any such theory is wrong.
How about a theory that's considered to make false predictions
beyond a certain, limited range? Like the one you're talking about,
for example -- but for some odd reason, you keep forgetting that part.
When Silke asked (paraphrasing), "Falsification -- that's what y'all
_do_, right?" I thought it was a rhetorical question. Apparently not.
Michael:
> >I still stand by this statement. I think that in a context, like
> >physics, in which experiment is the ultimate adjudicator, that any use
> >of "right" and "wrong" which doesn't take into account the fact that
> >physical theories may be experimentally indistinguishable over a
> >non-trivial set of circumstances isn't particularly meaningful.
moggin:
> We're going over the same ground. Since Newton and Einstein
> are distinguishable, if you want to keep both, on the basis that
> there are some regions where they give similar results, you've got
> to accept the consequence I outlined in my reply to your earlier
> post -- that is, a universe which switches back and forth between
> two different models. Again, I'm not saying that's impossible --
> simply noting what follows from your position.
Michael:
> Well, I'm not a physicist, but my impression is that in many respects
> physics is something of a patchwork. Certainly general relativity
> hasn't been integrated with quantum mechanics. They each have clear
> ranges of practical applicability in which the other may be ignored
> and, presumably, there is some gray area in which we are not sure what
> is going on. I don't think you can rule out the possibility of some
> sort of non-smooth transition in a model which purports to apply
> everywhere. The only propositions which are clearly wrong are those
> which disagree with experimental results.
Like, for example, classical mechanics. Which was the topic.
Your reply was that we can't know Newton is wrong at low velocities,
so it's possible that the universe switches back and forth between
him and Einstein. To which I say, alright -- given that assumption,
it's possible to argue that Newton might be right. But that's the
assumption you require for your case. If you want to defend it, go
ahead.
> Although, I must admit it is somewhat implausible, or from aesthetic
> grounds, I hope it is at least very unlikely.
I'm willing to entertain the idea -- I just want to make clear
that you can't do without it, if you want to maintain your position.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 07:02:28 GMT
moggin@nando.net (moggin):
>> You mean that the math is different in one respect; but there are
>> many significant differences between the two models (presumably arising
>> from that change in the math). And the existence of those differences
>> prevents Einstein from being a generalization of Newton in the ordinary
>> sense of the term. (I gather by now that it has a meaning in math and
>> science which _does_ apply.)
stewart@Kutta.Stanford.EDU (Michael Stewart):
> > I don't think that your objection to the application of the ordinary
> > meaning of "generalize" has anything to do with the mathematics of the
> > theory: as I understand it SR is a general theory and classical
> > mechanics is the special case of SR in which the speed of light is
> > assumed to be infinite. SR covers classical mechanics as a special
> > case. I don't see this as an abuse of the common meaning when applied
> > to two mathematical theories.
moggin:
> The problem is that you have two different models. In what I've
> been calling the ordinary sense of "generalize," generalizing Newton
> would mean applying his theories to new regions, e.g., high velocities,
> and discovering that they still worked great. Instead, we've got a
> different situation -- when applied over broader conditions, his laws
> turn out to be false (given later findings). Thus Newton does _not_
> generalize well, in the ordinary sense of the term.
> Aside: I thought that under relativity, the speed of light
> _isn't_ infinite. So classical mechanics would be the "special case"
> which never occurs. (Same would go for defining it as the limit.)
Michael:
> The reason I referred to the mathematics is because I think that you
> are combining two criteria for determining if SR generalizes classical
> mechanics. It is true that the speed of light is finite. But, for
> the moment ignoring the physical significance of the two theories, do
> you agree that purely as a mathematical theory, SR generalizes (in the
> ordinary sense of the word) Newtonian mechanics by giving a general
> theory which reduces to Newtonian mechanics in a special case? If
> not, under what circumstances would you admit that one mathematical
> theory generalizes another? I'm honestly baffled. I don't see any
> difference between the way it is used in a mathematical context and in
> ordinary use.
I don't have the math to say -- what I understand fits your
description, but the differences between the use of the term in math
and science and its "ordinary" meaning are substantial. (More on
that if you're interested; it's something we've been over lately, so
I'll hold off, otherwise.) Remember, too, that while we can agree
to ignore the "physical significance" of the theories, that's where
their meaning lies -- we're talking about physics, after all.
> But I don't think this is our real point of disagreement: I think it
> hinges on the use of the word in a physical context and not on
> the mathematics.
Michael:
> > The answer depends on your assumptions. If your
> > criterion is purely experimental, then, since it is possible to have
> > multiple theories which make predictions which are not experimentally
> > distinguishable, it only makes sense to compare classes of theories
> > which make equivalent experimental predictions over a particular
> > domain. From this point of view SR does generalize classical
> > mechanics: they both make experimentally correct and experimentally
> > equivalent predictions over a certain range and SR makes
> > experimentally correct predictions over a broader range. This I also
> > fail to see as an abuse of the common usage of "generalize."
moggin:
> It isn't even within shouting distance. All you're saying is
> that you've got two theories which make similar predictions within
> a given span and then diverge from each other, with one of them
> considered to give more accurate results over a broader range. No
> reason there to speak of a generalization, in the ordinary sense of
> the term. But if you just want to say that the theory which makes
> a wider range of good predictions is the more general of the two, I
> don't see any problem.
Michael:
> I almost said this before, but I hadn't thought as much about it.
> Maybe I can do better.
> Thinking about this a little more, I think that my disagreement with
> your position might hinge more on the word "theory" than on
> "generalize". Most of the people who are arguing with you seem to
> want to declare that, in some sense, SR and classical mechanics are
> equivalent at low velocities. I suspect that instead of considering
> specific instances of a theory they (and I) wish to consider classes
> of theories which are equivalent under the equivalence relation of
> making predictions which are the same to within experimental error
> under a given set of circumstances. If you view a physical theory as
> a general mapping from individual experiments to ranges of predictions
> (including the possibility of experimental error) instead of as a
> particular mathematical mechanism used to make the predictions, then
> the two theories are equivalent for low velocities.
> Although, it may look like I'm bending over backward to come up with a
> strange definition, I believe that the assumption that the two
> theories are in some sense equivalent under certain circumstances has
> been implicit in the arguments of some of the people taking part in
> this discussion. It seems to me that this point of view is natural:
> it only seeks to distinguish between theories which can be
> differentiated by experiment and it naturally deals with problems with
> experimentally determined constants which appear in the theories.
As I was saying to Matt, the theories can be distinguished _qua_
theories, as well as through experiment. Your definition eliminates
that possibility; it duplicates your request to ignore their "physical
significance." Sure, if you look only at the experimental results,
and you confine your observations to a certain, limited range, they're
not going to seem very different. Similarly, if I reduce you to your
behavior, and I limit my observations sufficiently, I won't be able to
distinguish you from the Dali Lama. (I may, however, be headed for a
tremendous career as a behavioral psychologist.)
> The last point hasn't come up, but I think it is significant: do you
> really want to limit the use of the word "generalize" in such a way
> that it only applies when one physical theory which generalizes
> another must use the same measured constants, rounded off to the same
> decimal place? It seems to me that at the very least, you must talk
> about a particular theory as a class of mathematical theories with
> slightly differing physical constants. I don't see that this differs
> in principle from the sort of equivalence I mentioned above.
This stuff about decimal places isn't coming from me -- anyway,
the difference between Newton and Einstein isn't that narrow -- they
produce similar results only within a certain, limited range. And
just as importantly, they present two, distinct models. One theory
doesn't generalize another, in the "ordinary" sense, when they're
different theories.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 08:38:37 GMT
Derrida:
>>>>>>>>>>>>"I believe, however, that I was quite explcit about the fact that
>>>>>>>>>>>>nothing of what I said had a destructive meaning. Here or there
>>>>>>>>>>>>I have used to word _de'construction_, which has nothing to do
>>>>>>>>>>>>with destruction. THat is to say, it is simply a question of
>>>>>>>>>>>>(and this is a necessity of criticism in the classical sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>>the word) being alert to the impliations, to the historical
>>>>>>>>>>>>sedimentation of the language which we use-- and that is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>destruction. I believe in the necessity of scientific work in the
>>>>>>>>>>>>classical sense, I believe in the necessity of everything which
>>>>>>>>>>>>is being done and even of what you are doing, but I don't see why
>>>>>>>>>>>>I should renounce or why anyone should renounce the radicality of
>>>>>>>>>>>>critical work under the pretext that it risks the sterilization
>>>>>>>>>>>>of science, humanity, progress, the origin of meaning, etc. I
>>>>>>>>>>>>believe that the risk of sterility and of sterilization has
>>>>>>>>>>>>always been the price of lucidity."
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>>>>>>>>Derrida is lying. Since his term `déconstruction' is derived
>>>>>>>>>>>from Heidegger's term `destruktion', the destructive implications
>>>>>>>>>>>are there, brought out by the argument from etymology, favored by
>>>>>>>>>>>the Nazi and the Nazi apologist alike.
Silke:
>>>>>>>>>>Zeleny is lying, but he can't help it.
Zeleny:
>>>>>>>>>You are out of it. See Rodolphe Gasché, _The Tain of the Mirror:
>>>>>>>>>Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection_, Chapter 7, pp 109-121.
moggin@nando.net (moggin):
>>>>>>>> I don't have the book handy, but the last time I heard Gasche,
>>>>>>>>he was arguing that the implications of Heidegger's _Destruktion_
>>>>>>>>differ significantly from the English "destruction." David Farrell
>>>>>>>>Krell takes the same tack, noting that _Zerstorung_ would have been
>>>>>>>>closer.
zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny):
>>>>>>>Arguing about implications is scarcely a Heideggerian move.
moggin:
>>>>> Neither do I dance like an Egyptian.
moggin:
>>>> Correction -- that should, of course, have been "walk."
Zeleny:
>>>>>Your personal habits are quite beside the point here.
moggin:
>>>> Then you shouldn't have brought them up.
Zeleny:
>>>I did no such thing.
moggin:
>> "Arguing about implications is scarcely a Heideggerian move."
Zeleny:
> So where is the reference to your personal habits?
Where I pointed to it. If you meant something different,
feel free to explain yourself.
Zeleny:
>>>>>>>Check his Greek etymologies against Liddell & Scott -- always good for
>>>>>>>a giggle.
moggin:
>>>>>> I thought we were discussing the relation of _destruktion_ and
>>>>>>deconstruction: you claimed Derrida is lying when he distinguishes
>>>>>>them, and stated that "deconstruction" possesses the "destructive
>>>>>>implications" of Heidegger's "_destruktion_."
Zeleny:
>>>>>As I said, implications are beside the point.
moggin:
>>>> Then you shouldn't have brought them up.
Zeleny:
>>>I brought up history, not logic. Refer to Derrida's apposition of
>>>"the historical sedimentation of the language which we use" for HIS
>>>sense of `implications', which involves him in Heidegger's crypto-Nazi
>>>rhetoric by HIS own lights.
moggin:
>> Call it what you like, you brought up "destructive implications."
>>But you haven't said anything that would support your claim, namely
>>that "Since [D.'s] term `déconstruction' is derived from Heidegger's
>>term `destruktion', the destructive implications are there...." (And
>>needless to say, you haven't shown that Heidegger is using "crypto-
>>Nazi rhetoric" -- that's mere demagoguery.)
Zeleny:
> Derrida:
> "The word _déconstruction_ ... has nothing to do with destruction."
> Derrida:
> "Deconstruction ... it is simply a question of ... being alert to the
> implications, to the historical sedimentation of the language which we
> use."
> Gasché:
> "The main concepts to which deconstruction can and must be retraced
> are those of _Abbau_ (dismantling) in the later work of Husserl and
> _Destruktion_ (destruction) in the early philosophy of Heidegger."
> Deconstructively speaking, we have a contradiction. Hence Derrida is
> lying, cqfd.
First, let's note that you brought up "destructive implications,"
denied it, and then dropped the subject when I pointed it out -- so if
anyone here is lying, it's you.
Now to business. Derrida isn't contradicting himself. I take
it you see a contradiction between his statements and Gasche's. That
wouldn't make Derrida a liar. Gasche is entitled to give any reading
he wishes, whether or not it agrees with Derrida's interpretation of
his own work. Even if Gasche _did_ disagree with Derrida here, that
would simply indicate a difference of opinion.
But as it happens, Gasche and Derrida aren't contradicting each
other. Derrida says that deconstruction doesn't have "a destructive
meaning." Gasche observes that it stands in relation to Heidegger's
concept of _Destruktion_. You assume that _destruktion_ contains the
"destructive implications" which you mentioned earlier -- but both
Heidegger and Gasche say otherwise. As I already observed, Heidegger
says clearly that _destruktion_ does not have "the _negative_ sense
of shaking off the ontological tradition." (His emphasis.) He goes
on, "We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities
of that tradition..." So Derrida's assertion that deconstruction is
not basically destructive is entirely compatible with Gasche's point
that the concept derives, in part, from Heidegger's _Destruktion_.
Zeleny:
>>>>> My etymological
>>>>>argument satisfies Heidegger's (and a fortiori, Derrida's)
>>>>>demonstrative criteria with room to spare.
moggin:
>>>> You've offered only an argument-from-authority. (The one that
>>>>we're presently discussing.)
Zeleny:
>>>What else is new? Arguments about history ARE arguments from authority.
moggin:
>> Your claim concerns the implications contained in certain terms.
>>But you haven't offered any support for it, except to mention Gasche,
>>who appears to disagree with you, in any case.
Zeleny:
> Looks like you are lying, too.
Nope.
moggin:
>>>>>>All this on authority
>>>>>>of Gasche, in a passage you didn't quote; but as I said, I've heard
>>>>>>Gasche contend that "_destruktion_" doesn't imply "destruction" (an
>>>>>>argument also forwarded by Krell, on the basis I mentioned).
Zeleny:
>>>>>How phallogocentric of you to judge a text on the basis of an oral
>>>>>presentation!
moggin:
>>>> ?? Where have I judged a text? You based your case on Gasche's
>>>>_The Tain of the Mirror_, but didn't bother to quote whatever you were
>>>>thinking of. I replied that while I didn't have the book handy, I'd
>>>>heard Gasche argue very differently in the past.
Zeleny:
>>>And? Am I responsible for his allegedly arguing in the past?
moggin:
>> In this case, yes, since you're relying on his authority.
Zeleny:
> Not at all. I am relying on the authority of his TEXT, with which you
> are admittedly unfamiliar.
Until you quoted the text, you were relying entirely on his name.
Now that you _have_ quoted it, we can see that it doesn't support your
argument. (As an aside, you don't seem to remember what I said about
the book.)
Zeleny:
>>>>> "We understand this task as one in which by taking _the
>>>>>question of Being as our clue_, we are to _destroy_ [_Destruktion_]
>>>>>the traditional content of ancient ontology ..." (Heidegger cited by
>>>>>Gasché on p 112). Read the book, or I will sic Silke on you.
moggin:
>>>> "...until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we
>>>>achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being -- ways
>>>>which have guided us ever since." Yep, that's Heidegger, alright --
>>>>and so? You haven't established anything about Gasche's reading of
>>>>"_destruktion_." But two sentences later, Heidegger says explicitly
>>>>that _destruktion_ does not have "the _negative_ sense of shaking
>>>>off the ontological tradition." (His emphasis.) Which is just what
>>>>Gasche emphasized, as I recall.
Zeleny:
>>>Why should I give a flying fuck about HIS reading or HIS emphasis?
moggin:
>> Because you cited him on your behalf.
Zeleny:
> I cited him out of context, as per Derridean interpretive technique.
> His quaint reading and arbitrary emphasis went down the drain. If you
> want to make an issue out of it, address all complaints to the old Boa
> Deconstructor himself.
That's your technique, not Derrida's, so my complaints will have
your address, if I need to make them. Incidentally, it was Heidegger
you took out of context.
Zeleny:
>>>Turnaround is fair play. In deconstructing a deconstructor I am
>>>entitled to take his words out of context, imputing "historical
>>>sedimentation" as I please. Deal with it.
moggin:
>> You're not "deconstructing" shit.
Zeleny:
> I have that on your unimpeachable intellectual authority?
As well as with my observations below.
moggin:
>> You claimed that Derrida is
>>a liar, but you didn't show it. You also claimed Gasche supports
>>your position -- but ditto.
Zeleny:
> I have no interest in showing anything to the wilfully obtuse.
Just as I have no interest in what interests you -- the point
remains that you didn't demonstrate either of the above to anyone.
moggin:
>> You haven't even bothered to quote him.
>>(The words you took out of context were Heidegger's, although that
>>seems to have slipped by you.)
Zeleny:
>So are you functionally illiterate or just a pathological liar?
Zeleny:
>>>>>>>What better way to judge a writer than by applying his master's lofty
>>>>>>>intellectual standards?
moggin:
>>>>>> I can't see Heidegger as Derrida's "master" -- but more to the
>>>>>>point, Heidegger doesn't rely on Gasche to authorize his etymologies.
Zeleny:
>>>>>Tell your problems to an optician. All I want from Gasché is his
>>>>>corroboration of the historical link between Derrida's term and its
>>>>>Heideggerian ancestor, which is well-known anyway.
moggin:
>>>> Well, no -- you invoked Gasche to support your your assertion
>>>>that "deconstruction" contains "destructive implications" which it
>>>>supposedly derives from "_destruktion_." (You also accused Derrida
>>>>of lying for saying differently.) That leaves you with an argument
>>>>from authority which your chosen authority doesn't seem to support.
Zeleny:
>>>I cited Gasché as an authority on etymology. You seem to suggest
>>>that I should care about his interpretation, or your reading thereof.
>>>What a droll notion.
moggin:
>> I don't give a damn what you care about. (Where do you get these
>>ideas?) Your only argument was a reference to Gasche, who appears to
>>differ with you on the point in question, and a quote from Heidegger,
>>borrowed from Gasche, which doesn't support you, either. That's that.
>>If you can come up with something better, you know where to reach me.
Zeleny:
> The sole point in question is the etymology of the term `déconstruction',
> as derived from Heidegger's `destruktion' -- a proposition that Gasché
> corroborates. If you have other concerns, address them to your mother.
> She cares.
I'm surprised you haven't learned to back down more gracefully,
given all your recent practice. Of course "_deconstruction_" derives
in part from Heidegger's concept of "_Destruktion_." That's obvious.
But you claimed that since deconstruction derives from _Destruktion_,
it contains "destructive implications," making Derrida a liar when he
says that deconstruction isn't fundamentally destructive. And that's
the contention you haven't been able to support -- it's based on the
premise that Heidegger's "_Destruktion_" means "destruction," which
you've failed to demonstrate. And as I pointed out, Heidegger's
text disputes you.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: Where's the theory? (was: Specialized terminology)
From: brian artese
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 1996 03:12:55 -0600
Russell Turpin wrote:
> Before telling us or
> showing us how useful his theory is, Derrida must do two things:
>
> (1) Define what he means by center. All sorts of structures
> do not have a center, and it is far from clear what "center"
> might mean in the context of Levi-Straus, structuralism,
> and mythology.
You're right to be baffled. I'm afraid that Perry is a little
confused about "Structure, Sign & Play...". Let me explain
Derrida's conception of the center in relation to Levi-Strauss's
structuralism:
Levi-Strauss did a shitload of work collecting all sorts of myths
disseminated by the several peoples he studied. He would gather in
front of himself, say, all of the disparate creation-myths. His
goal was to find among these stories a common structural framework.
He would find, say, that at the outset of all these stories was a
some kind of movement from beneath the earth to its surface: in one
story, mankind itself emerges onto the earth from an underworld,
through a lake as a passage. In another, some gods are disemboweled
from the earth by a volcanic eruption -- then they give birth to
mankind ... etc. So now he has a structural commonality. He will
find others. When he's done, he will be able to tell *one* story
that is the foundation for all these stories. In this case of the
creation-myth, it will start out: "In the beginning there is a
movement from beneath the earth to its surface..." -- very dry, yes;
but remember that structuralists are attempting to be "scientific."
So in the end, Levi-Strauss claims to have come up with a story that
acts as a foundational structure which "accounts" for all creation
stories. This presumption of a structural framework, Derrida says,
is *itself* the "center" that claims to ground and orient all
creation stories. Remember that Derrida doesn't "believe" in such a
center, he's merely pointing out the implications of this kind of
structural project. When he says that this center "is a center
that's not a center," what he means is that it acts like the hub of
a wheel: it is the thing that keeps all the disparate stories
related to one another, *but it is not itself one of those stories*.
This is important because Derrida's ultimate argument is that
Levi-Strauss's supposedly "foundational" story really *is* just
another creation story. It is *not* a foundation, and the
relational orientation it claims to provide is an illusion. What
Levi-Strauss is really doing is just re-telling a creation story in
*his* language. His story is no more foundational than the Sioux's
creation story. Because since the Sioux story itself delineates the
*same* structural framework as Levi-Strauss's story -- albeit in a
different language, using different images and tropes -- then the
Sioux story has just as much claim to being "foundational" as
Levi-Strauss's. Levi-Strauss's story is just another in a chain of
creation stories. And if all creation stories can claim to be
foundational, then there is no foundation. There is, in other
words, no center from which all the stories arise or toward which
they are oriented. Levi-Strauss forgets his own _bricolage_.
So when Perry says...
> > Derrida would emphasize that the center is the only thing which
> > allows there to be any "play" at all. Without a center, there
> > would be no structure, no rules to play with, only chaos. ...
... he is, unfortunately, exactly wrong. Play is the condition of a
discourse that, at best, moves from one *provisional* center to
another. What is in play are not "rules," but provisional
relationships among signifiers.
-- brian
Subject: Re: s e c (was: How much to invest in such a writer?)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 09:47:14 GMT
moggin :
> >> > It's now been a solid week since Russell got up on his hind
> >> >legs to announce that he had read Derrida's "Signature Event Context"
> >> >(twice!) and offer his conclusion that it was silly and shallow. Now,
> >> >Russell's been tossing names at Derrida's work ("dreck," "gibberish")
> >> >for literally years without ever offering any substantial criticism.
> >> >But this time it seemed as if things might be different -- after all,
> >> >he admitted to reading a specific essay, and even directed himself to
> >> >that, particular text. Yet just as in the past, he never got beyond
> >> >the name-calling stage: labelling "Signature Event Context" "silly"
> >> >and "shallow" turned out to be the sum total of his critique.
vpiercy@ezinfo.ucs.indiana.edu (Van Piercy):
> >> Robert Scholes wrote the best "critique" of SEC that I've seen. I'd have
> >> to run down the cite. It was in _Critical Inquiry_ some years back and
> >> was titled "Deconstruction and Communication," I think. Scholes is not my
> >> favorite critic or anything but he does discuss SEC at length and provides
> >> an interesting and clear headed account of his problems with it.
> Robert Scholes, "Deconstruction and Communication." CRITICAL INQUIRY 14
> (Winter 1988): 278-95.
Thanks. We're now coming up on three weeks, by the way.
moggin:
> > Interesting. Wouldn't mind hearing more. Incidentally, it's now
> >been over two weeks since Russell made his announcement about reading
> >SEC, and he _still_ hasn't gone beyond name-calling -- that's been the
> >total of his criticism. And this from the self-proclaimed "critic of
> >postmodernism."
Van:
> He will talk about science though. In fact, I'm wondering: he practically
> refuses to discuss Continental philosophy in the "Science of the Lambs"
> thread. Is his strategy to endlessly assert a dogmatism of science and
> simply refuse discussion of anything that lies outside that rubric on the
> grounds that if it doesn't make sense within that rubric then it must not
> make sense at all? I don't know. Maybe we'll see (I said I was an
> optimist). I want to respond to his last post there.
Reminds me of a slow-motion version of Travis. You remember him:
showed up last spring spewing all sorts of crap about "post-modernism,"
Derrida, and so on. Eventually admitted he had no idea about any of
it, except what he heard from Gross and Leavitt. His only concern was
with science, and his grudge was really with Ross and Aronowitz (read
"Harding" for Russell). Thing was, he hadn't read them, _either_. So
after months of pointless arguing and name-calling, he finally agreed
to take a look at _Strange Weather_ and come back with some detailed
criticism. Needless to say, he hasn't been heard from since.
[...]
moggin:
>
> >SEC is worth
> >discussing, if only because it takes up Austin, who has some relevance
> >to the analytic types around here. I also found it handy last time I
> >tried answering one of those requests for deconstruction-in-a-nutshell.
Van:
> You know, the thing I've always liked about SEC was that Derrida
> explicitly recognizes the role of intention there when he talks about it
> in a proposed "typology of forms of iteration" where "the category of
> intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from this place
> it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and the entire
> system of utterances" ("Signature Event Context" MARGINS p. 326). One of
> the old hobbyhorses dragged out time and again against Deconstruction has
> been that it destroys intention or dissolves it or something into an
> abyss of interpretation, cynicism and nihilism. What? The bottomless
> chessboard from which no thought or human decency can emerge.
Hey, that's the part I _like_. I also buy the analogy between
deconstruction and the New Criticism, so you can see where I end up on
intentionality. But of course Derrida chooses displacement over
dripping acid or dropping it off a cliff -- that's what he _always_
does (for his own, good reasons, of course).
> Scholes' point is that Austen and the like never mean anything other than
> that limited position of consciousness and intention, even though Derrida
> charges Austen with assigning consciousness a kind of command presence
> over any totatity of signs, where "This conscious presence of the speakers
> or receivers who participate in the effecting of a performative, their
> conscious and intentional presence in the totality of the operation,
> implies teleologically that no *remainder* escapes the present
> totalization. ...no 'dissemination' escaping the horizon of the unity of
> meaning" (SEC 322). Derrida reads them as purists and they read
> themselves as practical folks, Wittgensteinians who don't worry about
> total conscious command over language, either in writing or in personal
> interaction.
Scholes may be worth a look -- off-hand, my preference is still
for Derrida's approach -- but then, I'm something of a purist, myself,
as you've pointed out before.
moggin:
>> By the way, isn't there something a touch odd about using Kant and
>>Hegel to represent "the two sides of the English channel"? Not to say
>>you were wrong: Kant _is_ the Continental most appealing to the Anglo-
>>American school (not counting Wittgenstein, who gets hashed). But that
>>needs thinking on, especially since Kant also offered inspiration to the
>>Romantics (directly and through Coleridge), as well as for neo-Kantians
>>like Cassirer, who doesn't much resemble an analytic philosopher.
Van:
> I suppose it's odd if you take me to see in Kant an antithesis to the
> analytical philosophers, someone they spurn as much as they spurn Hegel.
> Of course I never said that and I didn't mean that he was born in England
> or anything, or that the English found nothing ever on the Continent that
> was philosophically worthy.
I didn't mean odd like that -- I figured you were reading Kant as
their precursor, much as analytic philosophers themelves often do. I
was just referring to the obvious, that Kant and Hegel are both Germans,
and therefore located on the same side of the Channel (unless it's gone
and changed its course). Paul and David have both noted that Vienna is
also on the continent; nonetheless, I nominate Heidegger and Carnap as
the twentieth-century version. And of course the approach goes back to
Aristotle -- I'd name him as the source.
> If one takes Donald Davidson's course in epistemology one reads some Plato
> (an early Continental one could call him), especially the _Theatetus_, and
> then reads Descartes, a figure from the Continent that both traditions
> react to. We didn't read Leibniz but he's considered kosher for
> analytical philosophy from accounts I've seen. And then one goes to Hume
> and then jumps to Bertrand Russell's _Problems of Philosophy_ and C.I.
> Lewis's _Mind and the World Order_. We even read Rorty _Phil. and the
> Mirror of Nature_ near the end of the semester. We didn't read
> Kant--though the Lewis seemed very Kantian to me; and while Kant was
> mentioned in lectures during the semester, not a peep was heard about
> Hegel in the lectures.
> The break seems to be with Hegel: Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard,
> Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida, Foucault, etc. did not
> exist for us. In other words, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on
> the Continent didn't make a dent in our philosophy other than what we got
> through Rorty. Rorty on the other hand does credit a concern with Hegel
> for the more public place of philosophy on the Continent as opposed to its
> more recondite place in the Anglo-American world.
That's the outline, but look at some of the details. Pre-Socratics,
no. Plato only because he's canonical, I suspect. Neo-Platonists, you'd
have to be kidding. Descartes, obviously, but not Pascal. No Berkeley?
No Locke? That's surprising. Hume, but he's never taken seriously. And
then the big split.
> Why *is* Kant important to them but Hegel not? That seems to me a key
> question. Mentioning Cassirer is interesting because of course Kant was
> important to both traditions: but could you say the same thing about
> Hegel? How many analytical philosophers refer to Josiah Royce or the St.
> Louis Hegelians? I think Russell had a youthful fling with Hegel but he
> spit him out big time.
You're right -- he doesn't even get a nod in the hallway. And it
_is_ a significant thing, especially considering his stature (merited
or not), since philosophy is such a conservative discipline. (I know,
analytical philosophers like to pose as rebels -- but c'mon.) I'd like
to pursue Jeff's idea of applying Jung to the question. (Or I'd like
Jeff to, since I've forgotten more Jung than I ever knew.)
moggin:
> >> > That's a terrible performance from a person who proclaims, "I
> >> >am here as a critic of postmodernism." "Appalling" and "pathetic" --
> >> >the terms Chomsky applies to Derrida -- also come to mind, along with
> >> >"charlatan," Chomsky's description of Lacan. Russell has shown, here
> >> >more clearly than ever before, that his claim is empty -- as a "critic
> >> >of postmodernism," he's a fraud. And while Chomsky credits Lacan with
> >> >self-consciousness, Russell appears to believe sincerely in his own
> >> >pose.
Van:
> >> You weren't expecting something different were you?
moggin:
> > On past performance, it would have been foolish to expect any
> >better from Russell, who has never backed up any of his remarks about
> >Derrida. But for the first time I know, he admitted to having read
> >something in specific (namely SEC), and aimed his comments in that
> >direction, instead of at some vague, undefined entity -- that seemed
> >to bode well. And he began a new thread (this one) just to discuss
> >the essay. So it seemed reasonable to think that he would have more
> >to say than, "It's silly." Obviously I over-estimated him.
Van:
> That's too bad. If you have a log of the thread maybe you could post it
> sometime--I'd like to see it.
No, I don't. But I can tell you that it began as a Kalagenko-style
challenge to Brian -- "I say it sucks. Now you've got to prove me wrong."
Van:
> >> It seems people are
> >> going to be rigid in their epistemologies, especially when they think
> >> those epistemologies represent the zenith of human capacity to perceive
> >> truth--all other approaches and modes of knowledge must fail. As soon as
> >> you get such people to make the moves necessary to judge work in a given
> >> tradition by other work in that tradition, you've already accomplished
> >> something essential to your case: you have gotten them to admit a
> >> potential limit, a sense of their own parochialism and relative
> >> epistemological position. And that's why these folks will always refuse
> >> to make that move with you.
> >> Maybe there's something Freudian--unconscious, displaced, repressed--in
> >> the Tantalus-like maneuver or masochism involved when such people keep
> >> circling Derrida's text, promising final solutions, the definitive
> >> reading, feigning but intensifying interest, proposing to remove the final
> >> veil of their extended disputations, and all the while this object of
> >> desire, this supposedly failed text of Derrida's remains at the center of
> >> their deepest public concerns. His text fails for them--they keep
> >> repeating that; but there is a success in sustained, even apparently
> >> negative attention, yes?
moggin:
> > Sure. And it does beg for an explanation. How many times have
> >we seen the same maneuver, where someone tries to criticize Derrida
> >from arm's-length? On the one hand, it's necessary to condemn D.; on
> >the other, he bears some exotic plague, so it's equally necessary to
> >maintain a safe distance. Thus the countless attempts to conclude
> >that Derrida's thinking has just _gotta_ be invalid, for some highly
> >removed reason, eliminating any need to come to grips with his work.
Van:
> Yup.
moggin:
> > That's where Sokal's hoax fits in so well -- it offers a way
> >to point to Derrida, or post-modernism, or critical theory and say,
> >"That _couldn't_ be any good, because Sokal showed it." Whether
> >Sokal showed any such thing is a question easily side-stepped, once
> >the crucial point ("That _couldn't_ be any good!") has been put into
> >place. With that established, the necessity to condemn Derrida, or
> >Foucault, or whoever has been met, without any need to confront their
> >thinking. Name-calling is popular for the same reason -- it offers
> >not only satisfaction, but, in the marketplace of opinion, even some
> >efficacy (witness the efforts to invoke Chomsky's authority against
> >Derrida and "the Paris school"), without any risk of contagion.
> > And yet, I'm sure you'd point out, the job is never finished --
> >the vampire has to be dug up time and again in order to put another
> >stake through its heart. (This _is_ Halloween.) It's an odd ritual,
> >performed over and over at the command of some unstated, probably
> >unknown imperative. Oh, but there's a much simpler possibility, and
> >one already contained in your suggestion above: the case of the
> >"good boy," "not at all precocious in his intellectual development,"
> >who "conscientiously obeyed orders not to touch certain things or to
> >go into certain rooms," but had "an occasional disturbing habit" --
> >Fort...da. Fort...da. Fort...da.
Van:
> Nice points all. Especially the Sokal and Chomsky working as an
> antiseptic--and yet the folks who repeat their opinions on Derrida or pomo
> or theory as conclusive evidence for why one doesn't have to attend to a
> Derrida or Foucault, are also the ones who are always a bit shocked at or
> embarrassed by arguments from authority.
Sometimes the other way around -- I'm thinking of one case where
the attack on arguments-from-authority came _first_ (as characteristic
of post-modernism, supposedly), followed by an argument-from authority
that cited Chomsky against Derrida.
> Yet, as I've seen you mention
> before, Chomsky did not rise above name-calling.
To give Chomsky credit, he didn't claim to do more than offer his
own opinion. I wouldn't guess he was entirely sincere, but nonetheless
he _did_ say (paraphrasing), "You asked what I thought, so I'm telling
you, but it isn't worth my time to give this stuff a serious critique."
> And Sokal didn't engage
> the opposing arguments at all. He just mimicked them in the way one would
> expect an earnest physicist trying to get in on the conversation might: a
> pastiche of sources and garbled reports about his field's arcana. So it
> is that those who champion Experience and experiment rely on authorities
> who likewise champion Experience and experiment, but neither group does
> much experiencing and experimenting, i.e., reading.
That's about the size of it. Much as those who defend "intellectual
standards" never seem to have any (not, at any rate, that they apply to
themselves).
> The best arguments I've seen against people like Derrida or Foucault are
> from people like Said or Charles Taylor or Rorty: people who have taken
> some of the positions on but eschewed others. I think there are still
> fundamental assumptions that such people don't properly attend to, but at
> least there's a conversation and some modifying exchange of ideas.
Said's alright -- naturally I've got some basic disagreements, but
he raises important questions, and he does it in an intelligent way. I
also have some affection for Eagleton -- much more than I used to. Even
Searle has his points -- Limited as he is, I like him better than I do
many of Derrida's defenders (often including Derrida).
-- moggin
Subject: Re: freedom of privacy & thoughts
From: caesar@copland.udel.edu (Johnny Chien-Min Yu)
Date: 7 Nov 1996 02:41:22 -0500
From zeldor@tau-ceti.net Sun Nov 3 15:44:37 EST 1996
From: Zeldor
Date: Sat, 02 Nov 1996 19:57:10 -0600
Organization: The Sirius Sector, outpost 4
>The human brain operates by generating and maintaining ion gradients
>across the cell membranes of neurons. These correlate with the general
>sensory inputs and throughout time will establish interconnections
>between the different neurons to produce what is in general known as
>'sentience'.
All human sensory organs uses electrical impulses to communicate with the
brain and exchange informations.
The human brain is the control center of all human sensory organs and
electrical impulse is used to give orders and receive information.
Therefore, if people can decipher the meaning of the electrical
signals (electrical impulse--human brain waves) of the brain, or can
interpret the electrical impulse pattern (human brain wave pattern),
then these people can "read" other people's thoughts byÿdeciphering the
collected human brain wave pattern (electrical impulse pattern).
I would show readers the scientific information below:
Science information from US: ( Walter Bowart: Operation Mind Control.
1978 p. 268.)
==============================================================
In 1975 a primitive mind reading machine was tested at the
Stanford Research Institute. The machine used a computer which
recognizes a limited amount of words by monitoring a person's silent
thoughts. This technique relies upon the discovery that brain wave
tracings (EEG) show distinctive patterns that correlate with individual
words - whether the words are spoken aloud or merely subvocalized
(thought of).
=========================================================
The above experiments proves the US and Russia were using the same basic
approach to develop methods to read the human minds. Also the US civilian
research have already proven that if they have enough time to collect
enough brain waves patterns (to create a database to translate brain wave
patterns to words), then reading human minds is absolutely possible.
Then, do you believe the CIA had the chance to collect the brain waves
patterns that were needed?!
Yes, I do think so. According to articles from the Washington Post,
80 research institutes (include universities) had worked with CIA in the
mind control program "MKULTRA".
Also 20 years ago, the scientists found that they can use the very
accuracy rada to beam the radio waves (electromagnetic waves) to imitate
the brain waves pattern, then they should can use the electromagnetic
waves (microwaves) to replace wire (without physical contact) to read human
mind.
When should they have this kind technique that to use microwaves
(electromagnetic waves) to imitate the brain waves?
In my own opinion, it should be 1973.
Why?
In 1973, Dr. Sharp serving as a test subject himself, heard and
understood spoken words delivered to him in a echo free chamber via
a pulsed-microwave audiogram (an analog of the word's sound vibrations)
beamed into his brain. This did proved that the device mind machine-"TRM"
indeed succeeded.
Thoughts are just the voice-less (unspoken words) "language" inside the
brains. Language express thoughts with voices. When a person think
or speak the same phrase (like "How are you?"), the electrical representation
(electrical impulse) of the thoughts or the speech inside the brain should be
the same. In 1975, the Standford University tested the Mind reading
machine had proven the same logical idea. (see above)
The above experiments of Dr. Sharp proved that they could use the
microwaves to deliver message (spoken words) to human brains (the
electrical impulses which represent the voices).
Based on the above evidences and logic, then they should also be able to do
the reverse (read a person's thoughts by decoding the electrical impulses
[brain waves] inside the person's brain into language).
This is because to deliever a message using microwaves, they must
translate spoken words ("How are you?") into electrical impulses (brain
waves) which can be interpreted as voices by the brain (like "How are you?).
If they use microwaves to deliver the message to you, then you can hear
the voice in your mind (brain).
The only difference will be that the voices is not "your voices", but
it is as if someone else is speaking (whispering) in your mind ---Other
person's thoughts is delivered to your mind in as speech, but it is not
heard through the ears. [because it's not sound waves].
Then they certainly can (read) interpret the same electric impulses
patterns (brain waves pattern such as the phrase "how are you?") from human
brain waves into language (words as "How are you?"). However at this time,
your thoughts will show up on computer screen as words (voice-less language)
if the collected brain waves is sent to CPU, or if they send your brain
waves (through the use of microwave radiation electronics devices)
directly into another person's brain, then you might whisper to the other
person's mind (without "normal voice"). In other words, the other is
sharing your thoughts.
So based on the same logics, if they can use microwaves to imitate
the electric impulse which describe the language & deliver to human brain,
then on the other hand, they also can interpret the same electric impulse
back to the same language. It must be the same thing.
So since they can creat the words from the brain waves pattern then they
also can translate the words to brain waves pattern, it should be the same
priciple. In 1973, Dr. Sharp proved that they have no problem to
translate the words to microwaves radiation frequency which imitate the
electric impulse (brain waves pettern) to be received & understood by human
brain. On the other hand, it prove that they should have created enough
words (brain waves pettern) in a CPU to interpret human brain waves into
thoughts.
That mean if they have no problem to deliver messages (through the
microwaves brain waves pattern ) to a human brain, then they
should also have no problem to read human thoughts (through the use of
microwaves to read the brain waves pattern [electric impulse] then
interpret to languages).
So they can read human thoughts via microwaves frequency since they can
use the microwaves frequency to deliver message to human brain in 1973.
> The problem with the use of radio transmission with>
>respect to affecting the brain's operation is that the brain uses
>localized gradients which are highly specific with respect to site
>locations within the brain, and far outweigh the effects of long range
>electromagnetic transmition within the localized area of neural action.
In Dr. Jos Delgado's research, he demonstrated that ESB's great
potential for mind control of the brain.
In one of Jos Delgado's ESB experiment, he made monkeys turn
their heads, or smiles, no matter what else they were doing at that
time. This experiment was performed up to twenty thousands time in two
weeks. In the end, Delgado concluded, "The animals looked like
electronic toys."
This type of research result suggests the possibilities of
forcing other to perform acts against their wills. It might be possible
to turn normal every day Joe into an assassin if the proper ESB signal is
sent into his brain.
That's because the brain controls the whole body function and all mental
activities. Therefore ESB could possibly a mean for someone to control
other people's behaviors or alter their behaviors.
In the mid of 1970s, Dr. Delgado shifted his interst from biological
effect of the ESB (electrical stimulation of the brain) to the effect of
the electromagnetic field.
He can use ELF (extremetely low frequency) to produce either sleep or
manic behavior in monkeys. He also has studied the influence of specific
frequencies of magnetic fields on behavior and motions of monkeys. Dr.
Delgado noted that "the eletrical currents produced within the brain by
exposure to such field were hundreds of times lower in intensity than
those require to ESB".
( See page 225 on " Cross Current" 1990 by Dr. Robert Becker)
His research must have become classified, so he didn't publish
any of this in scientific journals.
Why Dr. Degaldo has shifted his interest from ESB to biologic effect
of electromagnetic field ( ELF) since the mid-1970s.
Do you have any logical answer to this question?
However, I have a logical answer as beloew to the question.
This only prove that EMR mind machine should have been invented in
1973. This must be the reason why researchers of mind control would shift
their research method to the electromagnetic waves in order to influence
people without physical contact during the mid 1970s.
Since 1970s the ELF research in mind control are classified in US, our
society has no information about it.
After many years, however, few valueable information are still collected
from some report.
Ron McRae's 1984 book "MIND WARS", described research in the 1970's at
the Stanford Research Institute on the subject of ELF and mind control.
"BECAUSE THE HUMAN BRAIN GENERATES ELECTRICAL SIGNALS IN THE SAME ELF
FREQUENCIES, SCIENTIST SPECULATE THAT TRANSMITTING STRONG SIGNALS IN
THESE FREQUENCIES MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THE NATURAL BRAIN ACTIVITY OF
PERSONS IN THE TARGET AREA, PRODUCING EFFECTS RANGING FROM HYPERTENSION
TO SUDDEN DEATH."
McRae continued: " Initial results coming out of laboratories in the
United States and Canada (show) that certain amplitude and frequency
combinations of external electromagnetic radiation in the brain-wave
frequency STIMULATING HIGHER-LEVEL NEURONAL STRUCTURES IN THE BRAIN.
This electronic stimulation is known to produce mental changes at a
distance,...Because the power levels are so low, the brain COULD MISTAKE
THE OUTSIDE SIGNAL FOR ITS OWN, MIMIC IT (A PROCESS KNOWN AS BIOELECTIC
ENTRAINMENT), AND RESPOND WHEN IT CHANGES."
The June-July, 1989 issue of the West German scientist publication,
RAUM & ZEIT carried an article by Dr. W. Volkrodt, titled:
"Can Human Beings Be manipulated By ELF Waves?"
------------------------------------------------
The article stated: "The technical principal of receivers for
electromagnetic waves is fully analogous with biological information and
communications systems. If several thousand of the hundreds of billions
of nerve cells in our brain resonate with man-made centimeter waves, the
carrier frequency has to be suppressed when the signal is passed on to
the synapses."
"To overcome cell membranes, living organisms use electrochemical
processes involving sodium and potassium ions. This suppresses the
carrier frequency in the high-frequency range just as the demodulation
circuit does in man-made receivers. What remains is the signal impressed
on the carrier frequency, e.g. in the low frequency ELF range. This is
also the frequency range at which our own nervous system normally works."
"Using these frequencies, the nerve fibers convey pain sensations, the
feeling of hungry, tiredness, nausea, and signals on the sense of balance
to points in the brain which invoke these stages in a awake consciousness."
"IF INTERFERENCE SIGNALS ARE SUPERIMPOSE ON THE NATURAL SIGNALS GENERATED
BY THE BODY, E.G. BY USING ARTIFICIALLY CREATED CENTIMETER WAVES AS A
CARRIER, THE BRAIN COULD BE PRESENTED WITH SIMULATED STATES THAT WE
CONSCIOUSLY PERCEIVE, BUT WHICH DO NOT REALITY "
"A state of disturbed sense of balance, which seems to us to be real, is
enough to stop people from being able to run or make them feel dizzy even
when they are lying down."
"IN A 'PSYCHOTRONIC WAR' USING MICROWAVES MODULATED USING ELF WAVES, it
would no longer be necessary to kill whole armies by inducing cardiac or
respiratory irregular signals. The enemy can simply be incapacitated by
disturbing their states of balance or CONFUSING THE ABILITY TO THINK
LOGICALLY. ...The manipulation of human beings, by means of ELF waves is
relatively easy to perform."
In the 1950's, Nikolia Khokhlov, a Soviet KGB agent defected to the West.
In 1976, Khokhlov was asked by the U.S. Government to prepare a report on
secret Soviet parapsychology centers. He interviewed a number of
scientists who had recently left the Soviet Union.
The 2\5\83 issue of THE SPECTATOR reported -
Khokhlov stated: Soviet psychotronic (ELF) weapons "ARE ABLE TO JAM SOMEONE'S
THINKING IN THE SAME WAY THAT YOU CAN JAM THE SIGNALS COMING IN FROM A
RADIO TRANSMITTER. In simple terms, it means that YOU CAN SCRAMBLE
ANYONE'S THINKING PROCESS AND CAN PLANT FEAR AND CONFUSION AT WILL IN
THAT PERSON."
Khokhlov reported that these KGB devices could turn a senior officer
"into a traitor" to his own country.
In the 1950's, Nikolia Khokhlov, a Soviet KGB agent defected to the West.
In 1976, Khokhlov was asked by the U.S. Government to prepare a report on
secret Soviet parapsychology centers. He interviewed a number of
scientists who had recently left the Soviet Union. The 2\5\83 issue of
THE SPECTATOR reported -
Khokhlov stated: Soviet psychotronic (ELF) weapons "ARE ABLE TO JAM SOMEONE'S
THINKING IN THE SAME WAY THAT YOU CAN JAM THE SIGNALS COMING IN FROM A
RADIO TRANSMITTER. In simple terms, it means that YOU CAN SCRAMBLE
ANYONE'S THINKING PROCESS AND CAN PLANT FEAR AND CONFUSION AT WILL IN
THAT PERSON."
Khokhlov reported that these KGB devices could turn a senior officer
"into a traitor" to his own country.
( The above information see "New World Order & ELF Psychotronic
Tranny" by C.B. Baker)
Also the collected information at below prove that the Russia used the
electromagnetic waves as their mind machine tool.
In 1983 there was a public meeting at Loma Linda Va hospital and
released photos, information concerning a Russian Lida machine.
This small transmitter could emitted 10-hertz waves (ELF) for
tranquilization & more better suggestibility. Such similar machine had
been used to POW in Korea.
( See page 321 on " The Body Electric" 1985 by Dr. Robert Becker)
This information prove that Russia used the same idea --the
ELF of eletromagnetic radiation waves as the mind machine tool.
======================
The above information prove that ELF can be used to supress the target's
thoughts & replace a man-made behavior (or will). Also the target (subject)
might would still believe this will is his/her own. It mean that the human
being indeed can be manipulated by ELF.
So The ELF can be used to supress target (people) thoughts & replace
the man-made will or emotion.
The information of Ron Mcrae also proves that US & Canada have
researched mind control technologies with ELF in 1970s. It prove that
their research way are correct & as same as the Russian which has
invented the mind machine & used its mind control techniques on the
American POW in Korea War.
This further proves that EMR mind machine should have been already
invented in the US for a long time ( in 1973). This is because the research
conducted have already moved passed just simply reading the human
thoughts. The researches have advanced to further change human mind and
behaviors since 1970s.
Also the above information prove that the ELF can be used to replace the
function of ESB. It means that the ELF can be used to force man-made
behaviors or emotions onto the target (subject). This function is
very different with the function of simply reading the human mind.
In 1970s, Dr. Robert Becker worried that a device combined with radio
frequency and microwave broadcasts may be able to produce specific
thoughts or moods, such as compliance. It might be used to create an
totalitarian government without the terror: "Tyranny without the
terror". It poses a great danger to the entire society.
( See page 320 on " The Body Electric" 1985 by Robert Becker)
Comparing above facts, what the Dr. Robert Becker concerned
of has become reality.
>These gradients can be overridden through electrical action, however,
Thank you for your approval opinion.
>when those levels are reached the person undergoes severe convultions
>and all of the common effects of 'electroshock' and electrocution are
>observed. People regularly have a vast array of low frequency
>electromagnetic radiation at 60Hz streaming by them all the time from
>the electric lines around them. A mechanic that was testing a battery
>generated a few sparks around his thumb as he jumped a wire between two
>terminals to see if it was good. I am not necessarily sure of the
>wisdom of this, however he seemed to have no ill effects.
Don't try to mislead or misunderstand my words,
First, what you mentioned is the static electricity discharge.
Second, there have been cases associated with electromagnetic radiation at
60 Hz triggering out break of cancer (frequency of radiation emitted by
power lines). Of course, I suppose you believe that cancer is
"harmless".
Furthermore, I am speaking of is the electromagnetic waves
(as the Alternating Current) can be remotely transferred to another
device to convert into the DC (Direct Current) power.
After the electromagnetic waves is converted into DC power, then it can
be used to power the invisible wave weapon such as the low radiation wave
frequency or microwave weapon.
The above remote transferred method which convert the electromagnetic wave
energy (AC) into DC to use is the secret of the invisible wave weapon.
So only the operators use the "power beaming system" pattern to
trasnfer the electromagnetic wave to another device which can convert
this electromagnetic wave (energy) into the DC power, then these kinds of
DC power of invisible wave weapon (such as the low radio frequency weapon,
microiwave weapon, etc.) can seriously injure people's body.
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Alan Yu
The first objective of mind control organization is to manipulate
people's health condition and lives in order to eliminate their
opponents or enemies secretly (die as natural cause).
This objective has been secretly carried out since the late of 1970s
in Taiwan (At that time they simply use the microwave beam or low
radio frequency modulation).
The mind (machine) control system is the national security system of
Taiwan from late of 1970s and should be the same in US or lots free
countries.
Accusing other as insane is the "trademark" of mind control organization.
The shorter the lie is, the better it is. So, the liar can avoid
inconsistency and mistakes that other people can catch.
Only the truth will triumph over deception and last forever.
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