Subject: Re: Where's the theory? (was: Specialized terminology)
From: Anton Hutticher
Date: 18 Nov 1996 00:26:31 GMT
Hi, Silke,
weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
> I'm sorry -- that is the real world. Politics, business, even Usenet.
> Perhaps your love of science is due to the fact that you perceive it
> differently? This is not a putdown but a serious speculation. If you feel
> so strongly that manipulating people with words is something to be
manipulating people by giving them correct information which then maybe
changes their actions or by feeding them crafty word constructions which
leads them astray in the direction you intend. (Characteristic utterance:
OOOh, if I had known it was *that way* I never would have done that. But
you tond me *this way* despite you knowing").
> avoided, you would have to run very far from the real world indeed; you
> might end up in a realm where words are replaced by numbers as far as
> possible. It's even a solution; but don't tell me that you have entered
> the real world.
I probably should have been clearer about what I meant with real world
in this sentence. Of course in a sense everything is the real world,
including politics etc.
What I meant with reality was more or less: That part of our world which
is not amenble to be changed by words but by actions. Actions, which
can be found out by sustained logical thinking and reliably lead to
the same results. Reality wonīt be manipulated by words, but of course
our perceptions of it may.
For instance, what about a gifted rhetorician who so convincingly
argues a case that everybody agrees that this man must be guilty. And
then without pause, he argues the case again with nothing about the
case changed and now convinces the crowd the man is innocent. Set
against a chain of evidence which can lead to a conviction or a
dismissal but not both. Except of course when someone manipulates it.
For instance, AIDS was denied in several countries and a lot of
manipulation went on to cover it up. Nevertheless AIDS did not
go away, it marched on at least as strongly as if the problem had
been acknowledged. The same with BSE. Regardless of what
the final outcome will be, it will not be decided by a comittee
concerned with manipulating people with words. Only if decisions
reflecting reality (there I go again) and acting upon it are taken
will beneficial changes become more likely.
The point is: if you convince everyone that you can fly a Jumbo over
the atlantic on one gallon of fuel and no tricks played you still
would die by reality intruding upon your "reality".
Thats basically the way I used "real world": What do you do when
something happens that you cannot talk away but which with the right
actions might go away.
Of course manipulating politicians are reality. But what they
produce has a strange habit of conflicting with reality more often
when they manipulate than when they do not. (Reality again seen as
that which intrudes upon you pleasant fancies, whether you called it
or not).
Anton
> : In the previous post they were simply based on the notion that philosopers
> : disagree "forever", without an apparent progress towards agreement. This
> : is a sign of games being played. You can forever disagree whether or not
> : it is good to have a certain rule in a game. When reality intrudes,
> : you cannot forever disagree.
>
> That strikes me as wrong; decisions are made in conflict all the time;
> they do not depend on agreement. Should that bomb be dropped or not?
> Don't tell me that people won't keep disagreeing, before, while, and
> after the decision is made. THere will be argument and conviction, and
> perhaps a few people will even change their minds because of it, but
> that's about all you get.
Yes, but the honest disagreement mostly ends when the results come in.
Reality intrudes and terminates interminable arguments, regardless. It
is rare, even in such cases as whether the bomb should be dropped that
the positions remain exactly the same after. So reality intrudes, but
not much.
> If you disagree about the amount of fuel
> : necessary to fly a Jumbo over the atlantic ocean or about the medicine
> : a sick child has to get you will be forced towards agreement when the
> : results come in. This puts a stake on developeing methods to find the
> : probable result beforhand and agree upon it.
>
> What you fail to see is that decisions like that are _easy_; that it is a
> privilege and a luxury to make decisions based on certainty.
Thats what I love about science. Its a hard method to make decisions
easy. Ideally the right decision suggests itself. Donīt forget that
this privilege and luxury of certainty in science only comes about
because a lot of honest people used a tough and painstaking method
for a long time to produce a body of highly certain knowledge.
Sorry, but somehow I do not see anyone else trying hard to to the same
with (their specific) useable mental tools.
> : So it seems that philosophers are simply playing games for their own
> : vanity instead of offering help to people with questions.
>
> That's the wrong conclusion; there are some who do precisely that, no
> question; there are also those who actually try to find the truth. Your
> objection is to the fact that they don't find it -- okay, that's
> deplorable. But it can't be blamed on the process.
No, I blame it on the people.
> : Which is a pity since I think philosophy has to offer something to
> : people.
>
> No, you don't, not from what you say above. You think that philosophy
> would have to offer something to people if it stopped being philosophy
> and became a science with predictive power.
Well, if itīs that what it takes. Philosophy will only have to offer
something if it changes its methods and becomes a science? It has
happended to "natural philosophy". It may happen to "ethics phil."
- Or possibly even decon? -
>
> : I do not know what "the poststructuralist" says, I only know what those
> : people I come in contact with say and do.
>
> My point about Plato and Kant was designed to demonstrate that it is
> _not_ a question of poststructuralism or postmodernism at all, that this
> is an eternal element of philosophy.
*Must* it be eternal?
> : This may be a pop poststructuralism which has as much similarity to
> : what Derrida at al say as Stalinism has to the ideas of Marx or
> : various social darwinist ideas have to Darwins ideas. But I can only
> : say: You (philosophers) gave them the weapons and it is not only
> : scientific ideas which can kill millions when misused. So I find it
> : terrible that philosophers do not even have a reliable method for
> : finding agreement, if not truth.
>
> Find it terrible all you like -- for someone invested in finding the
> truth you are pretty intent on denying truth here --- there is no
I am not sure what truth I am denying. Philosophers certainly had
their say in erecting inhumane philosopies. People *do* use deconstrution
as a weapon - see THE SHIT WHCH KILLS.
> reliable method for finding agreement in ethical questions. Perhaps
> that's bad; if you look at regimes which declare disagreement
> disagreeable, you wont be looking at a pretty picture. Not in intention,
> but in effect you are calling for ideological totalitarianism.
I am calling for "evidence be king", " to hell with feverish imagination".
I am calling for finding these methods or at least trying to.
> It's a fact, though; as we know, decisions are made anyway. Usually, they
> are not made on the basis of ethicists' recommendation, if that assures
> you (it shouldn't, though).
Thats why it is so important to to it the best way possible. Because
decisions must be made, even by deciding to not decide.
>
> : One example: On the cause of HIV most scientists have a definite
> : opinion and one scientist with a few followers has a very different
> : one. I have listened to their arguments and the difference in the
> : plausibility of their arguments being true was overwhelmingly in favor
> : of the virus hypothesis.
>
> Good.
>
> I remember a professor of mine saying, "I don't care for deconstruction
> if it doesn't give me a reason to condemn the Holocaust." I asked her why
> she thought she needed one. Is that what you have in mind?
I have in mind people who say: "I care about deconstruction, because
if I want to condemn Holocaust it will give me reasons to, and if I
want to convince people that it was the best thing since sliced bread
it will be invaluable in that, too."
> What would you rather have: agreement or truth? That's not a rhetorical
> question; it seems as if you want the reassurance of agreement and don't
> give a damn whether it's true or not. No hung juries for you. I find that
> scarier than disagreement.
Agreement by truth. If its undecideable, bad but ok, that happens. If
it is undecideable, because nobody cared to get the data and nobody
cared to use the data to get to a conclusion, not ok. If there is no
agreement because nobody even cared to get a method by which agreement
can be reached, very bad.
> : But if you are asked: "What shall we do? Should we outlaw Holocaust denial
> : because of these reasons or should we tolerate it because of those."
> : you have to make a decision. Not enacting a law is also a decision.
>
> : You can of course dissociate yourself from any pronouncement on matters
> : which influence our world. But reality has a habit of intruding and
> : asking questions of you, like as above: Is it right to forbid Holocaust
> : denial. If you know your opinion is not better than the opposite one
> : except when vanity is taken into account, how do you cope with being
> : expected to give counsel.
>
> It doesn't work like that; in a situation like that, I would give my
> considered opinion (provided I'd be as qualified as I could be), and it
> would be the truth as best as I could determine it. I'd be convinced of
> it, and I'd have arguments to back it up. And so would the other side. It
> looks like a game to you. Why?
Because I am not convinced of the "(best and honestly) considered opinion"
part of it. Humans are apt to deceive themselves. If you donīt have
an "external judge" (such as reality intruding with unexpected outcomes)
correcting you again and again, you are very likely to be wrong alreaty
after pondering your problem for a few units ( whatever they are: Minutes,
logical statements, subproblems...).
>
> : It not good if people say:
> : Well we did not even care to find out if the positions
> : "relief from hearing a lie again and again and seeing it used to influence
> : youngsters etc" stands above "liberty of saying your opinion regardless
> : of what it is"
> : or the other way round.
>
> And people don't say that; nobody I know says that -- what's your point
> here? People care, and care passionately --- I don't understand what you
> are driving at.
Initially it seemed that people did not care to find out what opinions
e.g. Derrida had. Putting their own interpretation on it seemed so much
fun that nobody wanted to search for rules, which put strong limitations on
that power of free interpretation. So people seemed not to care to find
out whether the position "Philosopher X means this" stands above
"Philosopher X means that", except by declaring that person the winner
which is most powerful at wordplay. Sort of "god exists by two pin-downs
(Schulterwuerfe?) to one".
> : to dull mechanical grinding out points of agreement.
>
> Perhaps that's exactly what the fun word wars are about?
>
> : Funny game as long as long as "deconstructing HIV" is
> : not used in the real world.
>
> Get off it; discourse analysis won't help with the virus/no virus
> question, and it wouldn't try; it might very well help in determining and
> analyzing the rhetoric surrounding some decisions made in regard to AIDS,
> though; it might very well help in analyzing the reaction of the medical
> community to heretics (both those who turn out to have been wrong and
> those who turn out to have been right).
Why is it that whenever philosophy is used at all outside the field of
Philosophy it is used as a weapon as in "The shit which kills". So
philosophy is used (I think abused) and philosophers donīt protest:
Do *you* think
'HIV' science is inherently insular, regressive and constantly imploding
upon its ritualistic fetishisms of 'viral' mutations, strains, and loads.
With over 36 billion dollars having been spent world wide on 'HIV'
research, 'HIV' can be made to perform in a multiplicity of infinite
manoeuvres..." from "Deconstructing HIV", by Alex Russell
is a "right" use of deconstruction.?
> I never suggested, not ever believed, that meaning is "produced" by the
> hearer; neither does deconstruction, even though that's a common enough
> misconstruction.
Why is this "a common enough misconception". Either someone deliberately
misunderstands everything said about decon etc. or you are lousy
communicators, *if* trying at all.
I am sorry to see the anxiety that interpretation evokes
> in you; I can't help you with that, though.
Its wilfull, wanton, haphazard... interpretation which makes me anxious.
Interpretation, honest to god and as good as you will ever do it,
is ok. But that not the picture I got.
Sorry.
> : Why are philosophers above the common urge to have other people
> : benefit from what one knows and can do.
>
> Why would they be indeed? What tells you that they are?
My experience with a lot of experts in various fields. Most of them
liked to help and also liked to share their knowledge,except of course,
when business or other reasons stood against it.
Damaging your interests by helping others puts a damper on peoples
willingness to share.
>
Anton Hutticher
(Anton.Hutticher@sbg.ac.at)
I hate to tell but I probably wonīt see any reply, except in e-mail.
Subject: Re: What is the Cause of Time Dilation?
From: tsar@ix.netcom.com
Date: Sun, 17 Nov 1996 15:32:01 -0800
Cees Roos wrote:
>
> In article <328DFA96.6C8F@ix.netcom.com>,
> wrote:
> >
> > Cees Roos wrote:
> > > > they are equally good. One might consider the simplest of the two better
> > > > > (Occam, you know..).
> > > >
> > > > Not necessarily. Epicycles did a wonderful job of prediction planetary motion
> > > > with a geocentric universe, the Copernican system did/does an equally good job
> > > > with a heliocentric universe. Which is the "correct" theory?
> > >
> > > Perfect example! Both are correct, but Copernicus is less complex, and
> > > consequently preferred.
> > >
> >
> > I think the preference follows more from the fact that Copernicus'
> > model was a bit more in line with reality. I think this is the best
> > way to pick and choose among models ... when such a clear cut
> > distinction is available.
>
> I don't understand your way of arguing. You yourself state that the two
> theories did an equally good job. In that case, how can you decide that
> one of the two is more in line with reality? I maintain, that the
> criterion has been complexity of the theory, not alignment with reality.
>
One is more in line with reality because it's premises (axioms)
have been verified .... which makes it the "correct" theory. Same
with any theory; prediction capability is great, but you must verify
the premises to know you have arrived at the truth ... or that portion
of it. Any number of "theories" can give good predictions ...
when Sirius rises the Nile floods (usually) but one event is not
necessarily the cause of the other. If you settle for accurate
predictions you have not the best degree of certainty.
> > > > It may well be possible to have invariant time AND still have the obser
> > vations
> > > > which confirm SR,
> > >
> > > I don't see how. But even if, for the sake of the argument, we assume
> > > this possibility, the invariant time is orthogonal to SRT, i.e. it makes
> > > no difference whether it exists or not, because SRT yields correct
> > > predictions as it is.
> > >
> >
> > It makes a difference when you begin to put together your
> > cosmological model.
>
> A satisfactory cosmological model is possible without the concept of
> invariant time. There simply is no need for such a thing.
>
The point is that you can come up with a satisfactory model
with or without invariant time ... but both cannot be in accord
with reality. Not to mention the variant time may or may not be
variant as described by SR. Of course the existing evidence is that
it is, but we've just begun to climb that particular tree, and
we'll know much more as more experiments are done.
> > Especially if you make the premature
> > assumption that because your foundation (SR) makes "perfect"
> > predictions it must be correct.
>
> I bet you are unable to cite any article from me containing the
> assumption that any theory must be correct.
> On the other hand, as long as a theory makes correct predictions, it is
> a good working hypothesis.
>
I agree. My point strictly addresses the logic of confirmation
in accordance with reality. The usefullness of SR is not the issue.
> > > > or variant time which does not encompass the assymetrical
> > > > predictions of the "twins paradox" (among other effects).
> > >
> > > Again, I don't see how.
> > >
> >
> > Nor do I. The truth must be discovered/confirmed empirically
> > though, not hypothetically.
>
> Agreed. Do you see that denying a prediction (which is hypothetical as
> long as there is no empiric data), is also hypothesizing, but in this
> case based on no theory at all,and consequently totally premature?
Of course. The question is open.
> Besides, the "twins paradox" is a consequence of time dilation, which
> is observed and utilized routinely and on a daily basis.
>
While you'll find popular acceptance of this claim, you'll not find
universal acceptance. "Some" still have questions regarding these
observations. (Cranks all the SRians claim of course.) However,
even assuming time dilation, the step from predicting which
twin will be younger, to knowing which twin will be younger is
taken by experiment. Until then the possibilities are greater
than the prediction, i.e. the earth-bound twin ages less, they
both age the same. One doesn't know until one knows.
>
> > > > But you are accepting the "prefered" theory as fact, long before many experiments
> > > > have been developed to test it.
> > >
> > > Yes, and I will do that as long as it stands, i.e. as long as it is not
> > > falsified.
> > >
> >
> > Much the same logic kept the geocentric universe scenario
> > around for a long time. Of course independent verification/testing
> > was not well received either.
>
> Wrong example. You allude to two equivalent theories. The shift in
> favour was due to complexity. Later, when Newton formulated his
> mechanics, the difference in complexity became still more decisive.
>
Many observations confirmed the "heliocentric" universe in
favor of the geocentric.
> >
> > > > You have the cart before the horse when you
> > > > say someone must disprove the theory ... or accept it. Some things remain
> > > > to be seen.
> > >
> > > Science progresses by falsifying theories, but as long as a theory gives
> > > right predictions, and is not falsified, I don't see what's wrong with
> > > accepting it.
> >
> > It pretty much stops the discovery process cold.
>
> No. Every verified prediction is a new discovery. When a prediction is
> falsified, there is a need for a better theory, not earlier.
> Of course, one can speculate about alternative possible theories, and if
> one finds such an alternative which is less complex, the new one will be
> preferred, vide Ptolemy vs. Copernicus.
>
Then you're accepting it with the caveats.
> > > On the other hand, if you have an equally 'strong' alternative, feel
> > > free to believe it. Only, if it's equally strong, there will be no
> > > conflict. The present discussion could be an indication that the
> > > two viewpoints pro and contra are not equivalent.
> > >
> >
> > Nope. Don't have an alternative.
>
> Then what's your point?
>
The process of determining certainty.
> > Someone brighter than me, and starting
> > down the path much sooner would have a much better chance to find
> > an alternative ... if one exists. But to find such a alternative
> > he/she will have to abandone the assumption that what is currently
> > known is the last/best word on the subject.
>
> It is, for the time being.
>
Well to each his own.
> > Einstein took that
> > tack until the day he died ... if you can trust the literature.
> [snip]
> > > > In some very limited circumstances there is a great deal of evidence regarding
> > > > SR's predictions.
> > >
> > > Unfortunately, the limited circumstances are all we have. It is possible
> > > to make all kinds of assumptions about what's outside, but we will never
> > > know one way or the other. Discussing such assumptions might be a
> > > comfortable passtime, but will always remain purely speculative.
> > >
> >
> > We'll soon have less limited circumstances ... unless we abandone
> > science for "new age physics" and such (which could happen).
> > The point is you cannot make any assumptions about what's outside
> > except to model it and see if the model conforms to reality.
>
> But then it's no longer outside, is it? As long as it is, you are merely
> speculating.
>
The process of determining certainty is as valid as the certainty it
validates.
> [snip]
> > > All predictions of SRT have been correct so far. Nobody claims eventual
> > > further predictions will all be correct. As long as this is so, why not
> > > be content with a satisfactory theory?
> > >
> >
> > Oh but
> > they do. The "twins paradox" for example is claimed to be a
> > decided issue ... but it surely is not; and won't be until one twin
> > climbs in a rocket while the other stays home ... or some such
> > variation.
>
> Would it be possible to you to see a speeding particle in a particle
> detector as an example of a 'twin in a rocket'? You see, in the 'twin
> paradox' the twins are the metaphor for 'anything' in a certain frame.
>
I don't agree with the substitution.
> > There are many claims/predictions which have not
> > been substantiated ... not even FTL.
>
> They have not been falsified either.
>
It's still early in the game.
> > > Let's wait and see.
> >
> > I agree.
> > regards ... W$
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: Anton Hutticher
Date: 18 Nov 1996 01:22:54 GMT
moggin@mindspring.com (moggin) wrote:
> It's not half that complicated -- as I already explained, I'm using "hill"
> in the usual sense, where a flat hill is an oxymoron. If you want to give
> the word another definition which allows for hills to be flat, you go ahead.
>
> From the looks of it, though, you don't want to posit flat hills -- you're
> just making the earth-shaking observation that some hills are tall, while
> others are short. I can go along with that one. But in the ordinary sense
I want to posit that it makes sense to talk about "degenerate hills"
with a "hilliness" of zero, just as it makes sense to talk about
triangulums with height zero, looking like lines.
> of the term, a perfectly flat plane ("100% planeness) doesn't qualify as
> a hill -- in fact, "hillness" would be the common description of that kind
> of landscape.
>
> >Which would also explain your troubles with the common and scientific usage
> >of words like true, false, correct, incorrect...Just a platonic speculation.
>
> Just an unnecessary explanation, like the one above, since I' m not having
> any trouble with them -- I don't know what difficulties you're referring to,
> but they're entirely yours.
If you donīt understand (or just detest) the concept of properties
going continuously from one extreme to the other, like full day and night
being the extremes and "day(li)ness" going from 100% to 0, true and
false with truth going from 100% to 0, hill and hole, with "hilliness"
going from 100% to 0 and dare I say "holyness" going opposite, then
you really will have trouble with scientific thinking.
Best you avoid it.
Anton Hutticher
(Anton.Hutticher@sbg.ac.at)
Good-bye, and thanks for the fishiness
Subject: Re: What is a constant? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: moggin@mindspring.com (moggin)
Date: 18 Nov 1996 01:15:02 GMT
Anton Hutticher :
>>> >> >So far we know about your philosophical stance only that it enables
>>> >> >you to claim that people are inveterate liars.
moggin@mindspring.com (moggin)
>>> >> As I recall, "inveterate liar" was your phrase, aimed at me. I've
>>> >> never used it.
Anton:
>>> >I didnīt say you used it. I said your philosophy enables you to claim
>>> >that people are inveterate liars.
moggin:
>>> If I haven't called anyone an inveterate liar, then how do you know?
Anton:
>>Why should I have to find an instance of your calling someone an
>>inveterate liar in order to conclude that your philosophy *enables*
>>you to call people that.
moggin:
> I didn't say that you had to find one -- I pointed out that you _hadn't_
>found one, and asked what other evidence you were relying on, instead.
Anton:
>Inference from your postings: Like: Can people generally talk truth
>about age, size, bus arrival times, physical data (newton or non) etc.
>Answer: Given moggins medieval usage of true/false, right,/wrong:
>No! Their answers will necessarily be wrong.
False inference, due to your mistaken assumption about my use of
terms. Even if you were right about my use of true and false, it would
still be a false inference, since as you just said, I'd call those answer
"wrong," not "lies." But what matters is that, as I said before:
>> That's not my position.
Anton:
>It came across as such. Maybe I am a bad reader, maybe you are a
>bad communicator. (Scotty, fix that *!! commmunicator).
Those are two possibilities.
Anton:
>> >One of the reasons of arguing with you is that I think you are not
>> >an isolated incidence of a lost sheep bleating up the wrong tree.
>> >You have ignored too many explanations of how substantially common
>> >and scientific usage of certain words differs from yours and I have
>> >seen far to many people argue in the same style as you.
moggin:
>> Meaningless, since your idea of my "style" is absurd, and what you
>> call "explanations" are just your favorite strawmen.
Anton:
>We are bound to disagree.
Maybe -- but you've never given any support for your interpretation.
Instead, you just keep bleating it in every direction, and repeating it in
every post, while you steadfastly ignore the objections I've raised -- so
there's no reason to agree with you at all. Nothing personal, Anton, but
you're full of shit.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: Where's the theory? (was: Specialized terminology)
From: weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck)
Date: 18 Nov 1996 01:36:17 GMT
Anton Hutticher (Anton.Hutticher@sbg.ac.at) wrote:
: Hi, Silke,
: weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck) wrote:
: > I'm sorry -- that is the real world. Politics, business, even Usenet.
: > Perhaps your love of science is due to the fact that you perceive it
: > differently? This is not a putdown but a serious speculation. If you feel
: > so strongly that manipulating people with words is something to be
: manipulating people by giving them correct information which then maybe
: changes their actions or by feeding them crafty word constructions which
: leads them astray in the direction you intend. (Characteristic utterance:
: OOOh, if I had known it was *that way* I never would have done that. But
: you tond me *this way* despite you knowing").
You use manipulating as a synonym to intentionally misleading -- that is
already problematic, but if I go along with it for the sake of argument,
as I'm willing to do just once, I'll have to ask you why you think that
poststructuralist thinkers willingly mislead their readers? Since that
seems to be your claim in the context in which we've been talking -- do
you have any evidence for that? Do you have any evidence that Derrida
doesn't speak the truth as best as he knows it?
: > avoided, you would have to run very far from the real world indeed; you
: > might end up in a realm where words are replaced by numbers as far as
: > possible. It's even a solution; but don't tell me that you have entered
: > the real world.
: I probably should have been clearer about what I meant with real world
: in this sentence. Of course in a sense everything is the real world,
: including politics etc.
: What I meant with reality was more or less: That part of our world which
: is not amenble to be changed by words but by actions. Actions, which
I'm sorry, ANton, words _are_ actions; Ob-Book: "How to do things with
words." Not a poststructuralist book, btw.
: can be found out by sustained logical thinking and reliably lead to
: the same results. Reality wonīt be manipulated by words, but of course
: our perceptions of it may.
That is simply wrong; reality gets manipulated by words all the time;
every time you yell at your children or compliment a woman or incite a
people to murder, you are acting onto the world. I am not intentionally
misunderstanding you -- I do have an idea what you are talking about; the
question then remains of what parts of reality are amenable to the
approach you favor and which aren't; next, whether those realms which
aren't should be abandoned by thinking altogether. In the end, it's quite
simple: science cannot provide value, and every discourse that involves
value will have to incorporate insights from without science.
: For instance, what about a gifted rhetorician who so convincingly
: argues a case that everybody agrees that this man must be guilty. And
: then without pause, he argues the case again with nothing about the
: case changed and now convinces the crowd the man is innocent. Set
: against a chain of evidence which can lead to a conviction or a
: dismissal but not both. Except of course when someone manipulates it.
In other words, you'd like to abandon defense attorneys. I'm sure you're
not alone, but I doubt that it would lead to a better world any time soon.
: For instance, AIDS was denied in several countries and a lot of :
manipulation went on to cover it up. Nevertheless AIDS did not
: go away, it marched on at least as strongly as if the problem had
: been acknowledged. The same with BSE. Regardless of what
: the final outcome will be, it will not be decided by a comittee
: concerned with manipulating people with words.
You are contradicting yourself; the very fact that someone tries to
hush up BSE --- that is his acting in words -- has consequences in
the real world; for instance, people dying. Therefore it is necessary
to know words and how they work extremely well. In other words, learn
how to read. More strongly, acquaint yourself with discourse analysis
and deconstruction.
[..]
: > they do not depend on agreement. Should that bomb be dropped or not?
: > Don't tell me that people won't keep disagreeing, before, while, and
: > after the decision is made. THere will be argument and conviction, and
: > perhaps a few people will even change their minds because of it, but
: > that's about all you get.
: Yes, but the honest disagreement mostly ends when the results come in.
Oh, please. Honest disagreement on Hiroshima ended after the bomb was
dropped?
: Reality intrudes and terminates interminable arguments, regardless. It
No; not as long as value is concerned.
[...]
: Thats what I love about science. Its a hard method to make decisions
: easy. Ideally the right decision suggests itself. Donīt forget that
: this privilege and luxury of certainty in science only comes about
: because a lot of honest people used a tough and painstaking method
: for a long time to produce a body of highly certain knowledge.
Granted; science will still not tell you whether dropping a nuclear bomb
on Japan was right or wrong.
: Sorry, but somehow I do not see anyone else trying hard to to the same
: with (their specific) useable mental tools.
Somehow I don't see you trying to look very hard at the very hard work
that's being done in philosophy.
: > : So it seems that philosophers are simply playing games for their own
: > : vanity instead of offering help to people with questions.
: >
: > That's the wrong conclusion; there are some who do precisely that, no
: > question; there are also those who actually try to find the truth. Your
: > objection is to the fact that they don't find it -- okay, that's
: > deplorable. But it can't be blamed on the process.
: No, I blame it on the people.
That's a ridiculous stance, if you forgive me for saying so; value is not
amenable to scientific determination, and that's that. You want to
terminate moral discourse while engaging in it.
: > : Which is a pity since I think philosophy has to offer something to
: > : people.
>
: > No, you don't, not from what you say above. You think that philosophy
: > would have to offer something to people if it stopped being philosophy
: > and became a science with predictive power.
: Well, if itīs that what it takes. Philosophy will only have to offer
: something if it changes its methods and becomes a science? It has
: happended to "natural philosophy". It may happen to "ethics phil."
: - Or possibly even decon? -
I doubt it.
: >
: > : I do not know what "the poststructuralist" says, I only know what those
: > : people I come in contact with say and do.
: >
: > My point about Plato and Kant was designed to demonstrate that it is
: > _not_ a question of poststructuralism or postmodernism at all, that this
: > is an eternal element of philosophy.
: *Must* it be eternal?
For the reasons given above, yes, moral philosophy will be eternally like
this.
:
: > : This may be a pop poststructuralism which has as much similarity to
: > : what Derrida at al say as Stalinism has to the ideas of Marx or
: > : various social darwinist ideas have to Darwins ideas. But I can only
: > : say: You (philosophers) gave them the weapons and it is not only
: > : scientific ideas which can kill millions when misused. So I find it
: > : terrible that philosophers do not even have a reliable method for
: > : finding agreement, if not truth.
: >
: > Find it terrible all you like -- for someone invested in finding the
: > truth you are pretty intent on denying truth here --- there is no
: I am not sure what truth I am denying. Philosophers certainly had
: their say in erecting inhumane philosopies. People *do* use deconstrution
: as a weapon - see THE SHIT WHCH KILLS.
No, I don't see. What you posted before didn't have any connection to
deconstruction whatsoever (or to philosophy, for that matter). The truth
you are denying is the limit of scientific method.
: > reliable method for finding agreement in ethical questions. Perhaps
: > that's bad; if you look at regimes which declare disagreement
: > disagreeable, you wont be looking at a pretty picture. Not in intention,
: > but in effect you are calling for ideological totalitarianism.
: I am calling for "evidence be king", " to hell with feverish imagination".
: I am calling for finding these methods or at least trying to.
Evidence for what? Tell me a philosophical problem decon is addressing
that could be solved by "evidence."
[...]
: > I remember a professor of mine saying, "I don't care for
deconstruction
: > if it doesn't give me a reason to condemn the Holocaust." I asked her why
: > she thought she needed one. Is that what you have in mind?
: I have in mind people who say: "I care about deconstruction, because
: if I want to condemn Holocaust it will give me reasons to, and if I
: want to convince people that it was the best thing since sliced bread
: it will be invaluable in that, too."
Strange crowd you hang with; really, are you, the proponent of rigor and
evidence, content to argue with caricatures and out of ignorance of the
texts you comment on? How is that? How is it that the very standards the
lack of which you deplore in the humanities are worth nothing as soon as
you want to proclaim your opinion? This is a serious question, and I'd
like you to give it a shot.
[..]
:
: > What would you rather have: agreement or truth? That's not a rhetorical
: > question; it seems as if you want the reassurance of agreement and don't
: > give a damn whether it's true or not. No hung juries for you. I find that
: > scarier than disagreement.
: Agreement by truth. If its undecideable, bad but ok, that happens. If
: it is undecideable, because nobody cared to get the data and nobody
: cared to use the data to get to a conclusion, not ok. If there is no
: agreement because nobody even cared to get a method by which agreement
: can be reached, very bad.
WHAT DATA?
[...]: >
: > It doesn't work like that; in a situation like that, I would give my
: > considered opinion (provided I'd be as qualified as I could be), and it
: > would be the truth as best as I could determine it. I'd be convinced of
: > it, and I'd have arguments to back it up. And so would the other side. It
: > looks like a game to you. Why?
: Because I am not convinced of the "(best and honestly) considered opinion"
: part of it. Humans are apt to deceive themselves. If you donīt have
: an "external judge" (such as reality intruding with unexpected outcomes)
: correcting you again and again, you are very likely to be wrong alreaty
: after pondering your problem for a few units ( whatever they are: Minutes,
: logical statements, subproblems...).
Would you care to stick with the example at hand? How would you relate
the paragraph above to the question of Holocaust denial? What kind of
data would you consider? How would you interpret the data? How would you
erase your own humanity in considering what constitutes date in this context?
: > : It not good if people say:
: > : Well we did not even care to find out if the positions
: > : "relief from hearing a lie again and again and seeing it used to influence
: > : youngsters etc" stands above "liberty of saying your opinion regardless
: > : of what it is"
: > : or the other way round.
: >
: > And people don't say that; nobody I know says that -- what's your point
: > here? People care, and care passionately --- I don't understand what you
: > are driving at.
: Initially it seemed that people did not care to find out what opinions
: e.g. Derrida had. Putting their own interpretation on it seemed so much
: fun that nobody wanted to search for rules, which put strong limitations on
: that power of free interpretation. So people seemed not to care to find
: out whether the position "Philosopher X means this" stands above
: "Philosopher X means that", except by declaring that person the winner
: which is most powerful at wordplay. Sort of "god exists by two pin-downs
: (Schulterwuerfe?) to one".
That's a good description of the folks who've never read any Derrida.
[...]
: > Get off it; discourse analysis won't help with the virus/no virus
: > question, and it wouldn't try; it might very well help in determining and
: > analyzing the rhetoric surrounding some decisions made in regard to AIDS,
: > though; it might very well help in analyzing the reaction of the medical
: > community to heretics (both those who turn out to have been wrong and
: > those who turn out to have been right).
: Why is it that whenever philosophy is used at all outside the field of
: Philosophy it is used as a weapon as in "The shit which kills". So
: philosophy is used (I think abused) and philosophers donīt protest:
: Do *you* think
: 'HIV' science is inherently insular, regressive and constantly imploding
: upon its ritualistic fetishisms of 'viral' mutations, strains, and loads.
: With over 36 billion dollars having been spent world wide on 'HIV'
: research, 'HIV' can be made to perform in a multiplicity of infinite
: manoeuvres..." from "Deconstructing HIV", by Alex Russell
I don't know -- I don't have the data to judge that claim.
: is a "right" use of deconstruction.?
No. Deconstruction is a process of reading closely; I don't see a text
being read in the above, merely assertions made.
: > I never suggested, not ever believed, that meaning is "produced" by the
: > hearer; neither does deconstruction, even though that's a common enough
: > misconstruction.
: Why is this "a common enough misconception". Either someone deliberately
: misunderstands everything said about decon etc. or you are lousy
: communicators, *if* trying at all.
People mistake deconstruction for reader-response-criticism; why? because
they're poorly educated.
[...]
:
: > : Why are philosophers above the common urge to have other people
: > : benefit from what one knows and can do.
: >
: > Why would they be indeed? What tells you that they are?
: My experience with a lot of experts in various fields. Most of them
: liked to help and also liked to share their knowledge,except of course,
: when business or other reasons stood against it.
No, I got that part; what makes you think philosophers don't share these
concerns? Have you ever looked at Adorno's work?
Silke
Subject: Re: Flat hills
From: matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein)
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 01:39:09 GMT
In talk.origins moggin@mindspring.com (moggin) wrote:
>106331.1520@compuserve.com> wrote:
>
>>>I'm new to this business and apologise if I've sent this already (I got
>>>an error message of some sort), but I'm interested by the concept of
>>>flat hills. If you talk about flat hills then I don't immediately understand
>>>what you mean - I need to hear more. Perhaps you mean something
>>>"ordinary" (say, a hill with a flat top) and that can be easily explained.
>>>But if no amount of context makes it any clearer then communication
>>>will grind to a halt. I will conclude that you are using either "flat" or
>>>"hill" in a way which has nothing to do with the words as I know them.
>
>matts2@ix.netcom.com (Matt Silberstein)
>
>>The original subject was generalization as in "General Relativity
>>generalizes Classical Mechanics". The specific point was that
>>rienmannian curved space as used by Einstein was a generalization of
>>space and Euclidean flat space is a specific instance of this space.
>>The metaphor of hills vs. plains was used. Moggin suggested that the
>>generalization from plains was more plains. I (I think it was me, but
>>I can be wrong) suggested that a better metaphor generalized from
>>plains to hills. (I now realize I should have said from plains to
>>valleys/plains/hills.) From that point the discussion has continued.
>
> Well, let's be clear -- "from plains to more plains" isn't the best
>way to describe my example.
I agree, you used the term "wider plains".
> I said that generalizing the concept of
>plains would bring in prairie, tundra, etc.
I don't remember that. Do you have a reference like a post id? I can't
find an article by you with either "tundra" or "prairie". And, btw, I
accept either step as a reasonable generalization, from plains to
valleys/plains/hills or from plains to prairie/tundra/desert. They
just generalize around a different aspect. I don't, however, see going
from plains to wider plains as a generalization.
>By contrast, you replace
>the idea of "plains" with an entirely new category (called something
>like "natural features," or "parts of the landscape") which refers to
>plains along with a number of other things that aren't plains at all.
>
No, I don't think I did that. Though plains to plains/tundra does.
> Note that your metaphor isn't "better." (Where do you get _that_
>from?)
Uh, from the daemon inside my head that gives me ideas? As I said
above I said it was a better metaphor. I did not say that it was
gordonesquely better.
>The idea was to illustrate the two, different ways that we've
>been using the term "generalize." I agree that you've replaced the
>idea of "plains" with a wider (that is, a more general) class of items,
>but you haven't generalized _from_ plains. You've just put them in
>a broader category.
>
That is part of the discussion, one I don't want to get back into. I
was trying to give some context to the issues as requested.
Matt Silberstein
-------------------------------------------------------
Though it would take him a long time to understand the principle,
it was that to be paid for one's joy is to steal.
Mark Helprin
Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 03:10:52 GMT
In article , moggin@mindspring.com (moggin) writes:
>moggin:
>
>> And yet irrelevant to the topic at hand, which is whether or not religious
>>mysticism has played a role in scientific thinking. You say not, but you're
>>arguing, "If it works, use it," which supports the conclusion that religious
>>mysticism is a useful part of science.
>
>Mati:
>
>>That's a topic switch now,
>
> On the contrary -- it's precisely the topic we're discussing; that
>is, the one that you recently decided to ignore, or forgot about, or
>whatever the case may be.
>
>>in the right direction at least, towards
>>where this discussion started (Maupertois and Fermat). Of course
>>religious mysticism may influence science (that's what I said in my
>>initial example).
>
> That's what you attempted to deny, although you didn't get very
>far. You tried to separate the religious motivations of M and F from
>their work as physicists in order to show that the one was unrelated
>to the other.
Don't even try it. You can go back to my post and you'll find that I
stated, explicitly, that their work was inspired by religious
motivation (do you really believe that everybody has such short
memories that you can play those games?). What I said following this
was that the results of this work stand on their own, without any
relation to whatever inspired Fermat and Maupertois. I gatehr that
part of your difficulty here is that you still can't get used to the
idea that the results of somebody's work may be completely separated
from whatever the originator had in mind. Can't help you with this,
though.
>I disagreed, and offered the example of Newton.
Which was faulty, in the sense that:
1) He stated explicitly that he offers no explanations.
2) He couldn't have gotten a different result regardless of what his
religious beliefs were.
>You've now switched sides and taken up my position.
I just stick to the position that was stated in my first post on the
subject. You're welcome to find it and repost it if you want.
> It may influence a person to get involved in
>>science, in the first place, in may influence the choice which area of
>>science to pursue and what kind of approaches to consider. Scientists
>>aren't problem solving machines and they're often influenced by
>>extrascientific factors in their thinking. This is all part of the
>>"scaffolding of science". But, I'll repeat it again, the final
>>product stands or falls on its own, with total disregard to the
>>ideology of the author (in fact with total disregard to the identity
>>of the author).
>
>Repeat it as often as you like -- it was never at issue.
It was the only issue, as far as I'm concerned.
>We were discussing whether or not religion played a role in science
>-- you seem to have conceded that it does, so the rest is moot.
Since I've never claimed otherwise, there is nothing to concede. You
should get out of this habit of deciding what the other side claims
regardless of what is actually being claimed.
>One small note -- the product never "stands or falls on its own,"
>but only in the eyes of other scientists, who are, as we now appear
>to agree, liable to be influenced in various ways.
No, you still don't get it quite right. You forget the real business
of empirical evidence (you really seem to have an aversion to it).
Scientists are human and liable to be influenced by their beliefs,
biases, preconceptions etc. But, they don't ignore clear cut
evidence.
A little example may illustrate this. When Fresnel submitted to the
French Academy of Science his treatise on wave theory of light, it was
initially rejected by the academy. Thye president of the Academy,
Poisson (himself quite a name in the history of science) noticed that
according to Fresnel's theory, if you put a round object in the path
of light emanating from a small source (to be technical, coherent
source), you should get a bright spot in the middle of the round
shadow. This, Poisson declared, is an obvious absurd, thus the theory
cannot be true (there is little doubt that the fact that Poisson was a
strong opponent of the wave theory gave him the motivation to search
for possible "nonsensical" consequences of Fresnel's theory). But,
Fresnel and Arago performed the experiment and, lo and behold, there
was indeed a bright spot in the middle of the shadow. In view of this
evidence the Academy, with Poisson at its head, was forced to reverse
its previous decision.
So, views, beliefs, superstitions nonwithstanding, eventually evidence
>>somebody else would and nothing much would change.
>
>moggin:
>
>>> O.k., so you're not arguing with Newton's colleagues. And I know
>>>you're not arguing with me -- so who is this verbiage directed to,
>>>and why should they care about it?
>
>Mati:
>
>>Oh, this one is simple. This verbiage is directed to all those folks
>>on sci physics who follow this newsgroup because they're interested in
>>physics, in what it does and doesn't say and in the way it works. As
>>to why they should care about anything I say, this is entirely up to
>>them. They usually know how to skip a post they don't care about or
>>killfile an author they find boring and tiresome.
>
> So you're not pretending it was relevant to our discussion, but
>relying on the indulgence of your audience. Is that more or less
>the idea?
No. I'm not bringing in things that aren't relevant to the
discussion. You may question their relevance but you certainly don't
have the power of sole decision on this. The idea is that I'm trying
to convince you, win an argument against you, "score points" and other
such childish ideas. I'm educating the audience, that's all.
>
>Mati:
>
>>>>In any case a statement like "although it seems to work, we cannot use
>>>>it because it doesn't make sense" is clearly unscientific.
>
>moggin:
>
>>> And where do you find that statement? You're setting up another
>>>strawman.
>
>Mati:
>
>>Believe me, I'm not interested in strawmen. They end up cluttering
>>the basement. But you seemed to argue that there was a need for a
>>special ideological bend (or shall we call it, "mystical mindset") in
>>order to accept the Newtonian formulation of gravity. What I'm saying
>>is that all that was needed was the readiness to use something that
>>works.
>
> I never argued anything remotely like that, although you clearly
>feel a need to argue _against_ it. My point was that Newton's ideas
>derived, at least in part, from his religious outlook, and that they
>contained some elements which outraged those of his colleagues who
>didn't share his mystical leanings. You tried to dispute the notion
>that (in your words) "one of the centerpieces of physics is based on
>religious mistycism," but what you should have said (given what
>you're saying here) is that ideas which are based on mysticism are
>acceptable in science so long as they "work."
>
What I said was plain and simple, namely that given:
1) Newton's laws of motion.
2) Keppler's laws.
The "law" of gravitation" follows as an inevitable conclusion. Get
it? Inevitable. Thus any beliefs Newton might have had aren't
relevant since non of them could've influenced the outcome. If you
want to dispute this you've to dispute my statement above regarding
the inevitability of the outcome. Anything else is an obfuscation.
>moggin:
>
>>>... a law can't explain anything, as I've observed before -- it just
>>>describes certain regularities.
>
>Mati:
>
>>Not quite so, but let me elaborate a bit. What we call in science an
>>explanation is indeed a description, in terms of more basic concepts
>>and quantities. Now, what does "basic" mean here and who decides
>>what's basic. Well, if we can take a large set of phenomena and show
>>that they can be described in terms of a smaller set of "items" we
>>consider the new set to be more basic. Just like in mathematics where
>>you can describe a huge (infinite, in fact) body of results as being
>>the consequence of a small set of axioms (take Euclidean geometry as
>>an example). It may be possible that the "more basic" set above can
>>be described in terms of a yet smaller set of "items" which are "yet
>>more basic". "But," you may say, "eventually when asked to explain
>>you basic set, you cannot do it, you can just describe it."
>>Precisely. Just like in math, you can explain everything in terms of
>>the axioms but you cannot explain the axioms, you can just describe
>>them. "Ex nihilo nihil fit" is still valid, you cannot escape it.
>>The difference between physics and math here is that in physics you're
>>never sure (and never will be) whether your current "basic set" is as
>>basic as it can get or whether there is a further, more basic, layer
>>underlying it.
>
> As before, I don't have an interest in disputing the philosophy of
>science with you -- especially since you've claimed science doesn't
>have any philosophy. If you want to use "explanation" as you just
>described, I won't make an issue out of it, even though...well, I'll
>just stop there. But "ex nihil nihil fit" isn't necessarily valid --
>it's a debated proposition.
I have no doubt that among philosophers everything is a debated
proposition. Frnakly, I couldn't care less. Until you'll be able to
demonstrate an explanatory system containing no element which is
simply accepted as "that's how it is", philosophical debates on the
subject are of no interest to me.
>moggin:
>
>>> You claimed that religion was irrelevant to physics.
>
>Mati:
>
>>No, I didn't. I specifically mentioned cases of physicists who were
>>motivated by their religious beliefs. What I claimed was that the
>>results stand on their own and are judged on their correspondence to
>>empirical evidence, not on their correspondence to religious beliefs.
>
> That's what you say now -- but what you said was another matter.
>You brought up the religious beliefs of M and F merely in order to
>dismiss them as irrelevant "rambling."
As indeed they are.
> You had nothing to say about
>how theories are judged -- you didn't even mention it. Instead, you
>claimed that it was to false to say that any important part of physics
>was ever based on religious mysticism.
That's right. And there is no contradiction involved (though perhaps
we use the word "based" in different sense. There is no important
part of physics based on religious mysticism (by the way, I didn't say
"there never was" since I wouldn't vouch for Ancient Egyptian or
Babylonian Science). Based, in science, means justified by, supported
by or derived from (as an example, Euclidean Geometry is based on
Euclide's Axioms, period. whatever it was that motivated him to pick
the axioms is not part of the "base"). As for the possibility of
various scientists being inspired by religious mysticism, sure, that's
just what my original example was about. But what inspired them isn't
part of physics.
>
>Mati:
>
>>>Instead you've chanted your mantra: "Does it work or doesn't it?"
>>>That's beside the point, as I've said,
>
>moggin:
>
>>As you've wrongly said, since this is exactly the point of science.
>>You seem to have a great dislike to this notion, but it is there
>>nevertheless.
>
> You don't have any idea what I think about it, since I haven't said a
>thing on the subject. That's because it's irrelevant to the issue you
>raised -- namely whether any significant part of physics was based
>on religious mysticism. Now you claim that you meant to talk about
>something else: how science judges ideas.
No, that's not something else, that's extremely relevant.
>You're so confused, that
>may be true -- but asking, "Does it work or not?" merely tells you
>(hold onto your hat) whether or not a given concept "works" -- it
>doesn't inform you of the nature of the idea, or of its provenance.
Well, guess what? Physics cares first of all whether a given concept
works. It may sound very low brow to you, but that's how physics
operates. And, it is not asking for your approval.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: the gravitational wave detection revolution
From: awb116@psu.edu (Aaron Bishop)
Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 03:23:50 GMT
Hello again. A few days back, I offered the following post:
> I've been thinking about a little experiment I saw a while back
>that caught my attention. This one professor took a disk of aluminum,
>rotated it about an axis through its center ( like a record ), then
>placed a magnet above it. What happened was that the magnet somehow
>recieved a slight upwards force.
> I missed his explanation of the phenomenon, so I'll just guess
>that the moving particles of aluminum somehow reflected a portion of
>the magnetic radiation. The faster the atoms travel, the more
>magnet-thingies hit the aluminum, and the more bounce off. Maybe sort of
>like raindrops in a slight drizzle progress to an observed downpour as a
>car is taken from a slow speed to a high velocity ( I know I didn't say
>that well ). The magnetic waves would then fly back up to push on their
>source.
> Why can't the same be done with gravity. I've read that Einstein
>thought the two forces to be one in the same, and they are definitely
>related in many ways... Perhaps the aluminum atoms need only move faster,
>Or maybe a thicker plate needs to be used.
To which I received several replies, all "No, it can't be done".
Today I came across the following news item:
In article <56kfi6$bel@news2.cais.com>,
packer@cais.cais.com (Charles Packer) wrote:
[
[Anti-gravity can be produced by rotating a ceramic disk
[at high speed in liquid nitrogen. Objects weighed in
[a balance beam above it lose about two percent of their
[weight. So says a news item in Science, the most prestigious
[American science journal. The brief article, in the issue
[of October 11, says the project is being carried out by
[U. of Alabama professor Ning Li at Marshall Space
[Flight Center, funded by a NASA grant.
[
This would seem to indicate that "Yes, it can be done ( with
ceramics at least )." I would like to close by just giving a couple
more maybe's. Maybe vibration of the disk at an ultra-high frequency
and a large amplitude would give better results. Maybe reflection of
gravity would be better pulled off if the disk's molecules were more
evenly spaced, like a mosquito net. And finally, maybe this is the
reason occupants of UFO's don't get splattered when their craft performs
a 20-G snap ( that one's out there, I know, so feel free to laugh ).
Goodbye.
- Aaron Bishop
