Subject: Paper Announcement
From: lkh@cei.net (Lee Kent Hempfling)
Date: Thu, 05 Dec 1996 19:33:31 GMT
The following paper is now posted on line at:
http://www.aston.ac.uk/~batong/Neutronics/wave.htm
Wave Computation
A Quantum-Relativity Perspective
Lee Kent Hempfling
Chairman, CEO
Neutronics Technologies Corporation
http://www.aston.ac.uk/~batong/Neutronics/
email: lkh@bigfoot.com
1 December, 1996; Revised 4 December, 1996
KEYWORDS: Physics, Quantum, Combinatorial, Computation, Classical,
Relativity, Newtonian, Einstein, Gravity, Atomic.
ABSTRACT:
Albert Einstein said: "The general theory of relativity renders it
likely that the electrical masses of an electron are held together by
gravitational forces." [1a] Since the strong and weak forces are
linked to gravity [1] [5], and the electron is only observed when it
is caused to be observed [4] [6], and an electron is observed to be
both a particle and a wave [4][6][7], then it lends to the logical
conclusion that either the electron is not both a particle and a wave
(or a particle OR a wave) and that there is, perhaps, a better and
more accurate and less cumbersome manner by which to describe both a
particle and a wave as well as gravitational forces.
Einstein not only linked energy and matter, he also said:
"Gravitational field and matter together must satisfy the law of the
conservation of energy." (and of impulse)[2][1b] This rigid
four-dimensional space of the special theory of relativity is to some
extent a four-dimensional analog of H. A. Lorentz's rigid
three-dimensional aether.[1c]
The one good thing about the Standard Model [7} is the incomprehension
of the duality of waves and particles. If it weren't for the accepted
equality of them both, the constant reference to particles (such as
Quantum Computing and the Spin, and bosons and quarks and the rest),
one might begin to believe that modern day physics had settled on the
particle as the definition of the wave-particle. Perhaps it has? Yet
the definition as both [5][4] remains in place.
It might be considered unusual for a paper on wave-computation to
begin with gravity, but it is necessary to clarify the uncertainty.
Laying the cornerstone is a requirement of understanding what
real quantum computation actually is. This paper proposes that when
experimental criteria are set to prove or disprove a theory based on
an observation the cause of the observation will not be
considered [4]. It proposes that all subsequent evidence is to prove
or disprove the observation, and not the cause. It proposes that
experimental proofs of an observation can and do support the
perspective of the observation without regard to the cause. It will
further propose a simple solution which will lead to the process of
wave computation as a natural phenomenon of material existence.
Lee Kent Hempfling...................|lkh@cei.net
chairman, ceo........................|http://www.aston.ac.uk/~batong/Neutronics/
Neutronics Technologies Corporation..|West Midlands, UK; Arkansas, USA.
Subject: Re: Restraint re: Sokal
From: mkagalen@lynx.dac.neu.edu (Michael Kagalenko)
Date: 5 Dec 1996 18:55:02 -0500
Michael Turton (mturton@stsvr.showtower.com.tw) wrote:
]In article <585i8r$m4c@lynx.dac.neu.edu>,
] mkagalen@lynx.dac.neu.edu (Michael Kagalenko) wrote:
]>Ken MacIver (nanken@tiac.net) wrote:
]>
]> It seems that MacIver complains that pomo types were insufficiently
]> ridiculed by Sokal. It does not suffice merely to prove that editors
]> of prominent "Science Studies" magazine would publish abject nonsense.
]>
]>
]
] ST is not a prominent science studies magazine. It is a cultural
]studies rag which decided to do a special issue on science studies, since
]some cultural studies people think and write about science. The vice is
]also versa, some science studies people do cultural studies.
I stand corrected - he ridiculed prominent "cultural studies" magazine.
] I've said it before, Sokal's hoax proved nothing except that,
]judging from the contributions on the Net, the science studies critics know
]next-to-nothing of the people, literature, issues and claims of the various
]science studies scholars.
You might have saiid it before, but it is still wrong. Sokal's hoax
proves that the maxim "it's all in the text" is higly capable
of leadiing astray those who take it seriously. Particularly,
it might lead those people to take deep-sounding gibberish seriously.
]In this I share Silke's complaint, though not her
]philosophy. During this whole debate, I have seen not a single posting
]referencing someone outside of some out-of-context quotes from Derrida, who
]is not a science studies scholar.
Do you mean someone like Harding, or Haraway, or Wertheim ? Their
writings abound with silliness.
] Pull up some offensive stuff from Pinch
]or Collins (the presentation on cold fusion in _The Golem_ is a dandy)
See this summer's isssues of "Physics Today", which contain very
good critique of the book that you mention (its chapter on relativity,
in particular).
]or
]Knorr-Cetina or Latour or Bloor et al and then I'll believe.
Why, happy to oblige ! Look at this cutie, courtesy of Alan Sokal
(one of the footnotes to "Transgressing the Boundaries")
==========================================================================
According to the traditional textbook account, special relativity is
concerned with the
coordinate transformations relating two frames of reference in
uniform relative motion. But this
is a misleading oversimplification, as Latour (1988) has pointed out:
"How can one decide whether an observation made in a train about the
behaviour of a falling stone can be made to coincide with the
observation
made of the same falling stone from the embankment? If there are
only one, or
even two, frames of reference, no solution can be found since the
man in the
train claims he observes a straight line and the man on the
embankment a
parabola. ...
Einstein's solution is to consider three actors: one in the
train, one on the
embankment and a third one, the author [enunciator] or one of its
representants, who tries to superimpose the coded observations
sent back by
the two others. ...
[W]ithout the enunciator's position (hidden in Einstein's
account), and without
the notion of centres of calculation, Einstein's own technical
argument is
ununderstandable ... "
[pp. 10-11 and 35, emphasis in original]
In the end, as Latour wittily but accurately observes, special
relativity boils down to the
proposition that
" more frames of reference with less privilege can be accessed,
reduced,
accumulated and combined, observers can be delegated to a few more
places in the infinitely large (the cosmos) and the infinitely
small (electrons),
and the readings they send will be understandable. His
[Einstein's] book could
well be titled: `New Instructions for Bringing Back Long-Distance
Scientific
Travellers'." [pp. 22-23]
Latour's critical analysis of Einstein's logic provides an eminently
accessible introduction to
special relativity for non-scientists.
==========================================================================
Tee-he-he. That is just too precious bit of "deep thinking" to miss.
I posted some
]excerpts and commentary last summer on a.p. from the now-famous issue of
]ST, but nobody seemed much interested so I discontinued (no longer have the
]issue, sorry!).
It's on the web, where everybody can happily peruse and enjoy it.
]This was the great contribution of _Higher Superstition_
]-- they knew the lit and the people, and so wrote effectively.
And were met with accusations of being part of "conservative backlash".
Which, I submit, played no small role in Sokal's choice of venue of
discourse.
--
ABILITY,n. The natural equipment to accomplish some small part of the meaner
ambitions distinguishing able men from dead ones.
-- Ambrose Bierce, "The Devil's Dictionary"
Subject: Re: Can science provide value? (was: Where's the theory?)
From: jti@isleta.santafe.edu (Jeff Inman)
Date: 5 Dec 1996 23:34:05 GMT
patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola) writes:
>jti@santafe.edu (Jeff Inman) writes:
>>patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola) writes:
>>>If you want to claim that calling something "knowledge" is putting
>>>a value on it, go ahead. But it's neither a value created by nor
>>>internal to science.
But, yes. It is. If this "knowledge" is nothing without the notion
that appearance has some relation with Nature, and science presumes
that "knowledge" is worth persuing, then this amounts to an assumption
that science is at least on the scent trail of Nature. That's all I
meant by attributing value to "knowledge".
>>>Science just seems to be the most effective
>>>way that has yet been found to produce knowledge.
Here you confirm my suspicion, above. If you don't suppose that
"knowledge" has some real fundamental truth value, then how can you
possibly propose to measure the effectiveness of something that
produces it?
Perhaps all you mean is that you are elaborating the mechanism of
observation. BUt then you would be obliged to weigh values like "good
and evil", etc, which you have denied a scientific interest in.
> jti:
>>This complicates things if I interpret your previous statements to
>>mean that science doesn't actually produce knowledge either. (If
>>"knowledge" would reliably pertain to how things are.) I was thinking
>>that you meant Knowledge, but really you just meant "knowledge". If
>>you're willing to concede that, then it seems to me less controversial
>>to allow you to say you attach no value to what you produce. If this
>>bothers you, then I'll suspect that you regard your "knowledge" as
>>Knowledge, after all.
>
>This is rank nonsense. Either I believe that science produces Knowledge,
>or I attach no value to the works of science? I, personally, attach
>value to many things -- the beauty of a sunset, the harmonic complexity
>of a violin concerto, the depth of complexity of an Eco novel, or the
>enriching symbolism of a painting by Bosch.... none of which are values
>that I necessarily expect to share with any one person, nor are they
>values internal to (e.g.) the novel itself.
I guess one problem is that you don't understand what is meant by the
verb "to value", in this context. It means more than merely to attach
personal emotional identification with. This is where the trick for
"science" lies. By emotionally distancing oneself from something, one
does not illustrate a lack of valuing of that thing. Thus, even the
results of supposdely dispassionate investigation can still be said to
be valued. Valuing merely implies that one places something into a
metaphysical continuum. Thesis: there is no way not to value the
things one treats. If one holds observation to be linked to Nature,
and holds Nature to have certain necessary properties, and uses this
view to identify himself and his place among things, then observation
has some kind of value.
Patrick:
>I also value science. As a mathematician, I appreciate the beauty of
>precision of thought that it demands; as a sybarite, I appreciate the
>conveniences that have been produced by people acting in the name
>of "science"; as a scientist myself, I appreciate the fun of continual
>puzzle-solving. None of these values are things that are only found
>in science -- one can be a brilliantly-precise philosopher or novelist,
>for example.
>
>Science is a game; one that relies, fundamentally, on the *assumption*
>that the universe is both consistent and as-we-perceive-it.
My point, maybe just a suggestion, is that claiming that the universe
is consistent (etc) amounts to an argument about Nature, what it is.
You serve Truth, in this sense, because you are convinced that facts
must reveal themselves in certain ways (e.g. by being consistent). I
do not have to disagree with this to point out that it is an
unsupported assumption, opposed to the possiblity that one selects a
mode of interpretation of things which is consistent with his
expectations of consistency. Kinds of facts that would undermine this
mode of experience are "unscientific".
It seems to me that the kind of assumption you subscribe to (which I
haven't exactly denied, in my own case, by the way) must require you
to treat quantum mechanical issues as being mere interpretations of a
mathematical model, rather than as descriptions of nature. (I'd
actually be gratified to learn that this is what physicists do, but I
know there are those who insist that QM is a description of Nature.
And even if one says "interpretation" one still presupposes that there
is something being interpreted.) Or perhaps by "consistency" you
merely mean consistent in mathematical terms, so that it causes you no
difficulty to suppose that events occur without any formalizable rule,
so long as the mathematics which describe the range of possibilities
is gramatically correct. But that seems to me to be an unusual
interpretation of the notion that "the universe is consistent".
What are facts?
>Science, then, will demonstrably produce "knowledge" --
>descriptions of how observations of the world have been consistent in the
>past and predictions of they will continue to be consistent in the future.
Nevermind that the understanding of what is being observed changes?
As Moggin once tried to point out, "mass" is not the same thing now as
it was 300 years ago. The moon is not the same thing, either, for
example.
>If you want to equate this with Knowledge, go ahead, lots of ill-informed
>people do. If you want to explicitly deny that this is Knowledge, lots
>of ill-informed people do that as well.
>
>What I will not permit you to do (in the sense that if you try to do it,
>I will dismiss you from my consideration as a rational, thinking being), is
>commit case confusion. If you think that a pursuit of knowledge means
>that Knowledge is valued (or similarly that one has to both believe in
>and value Knowledge to be able to scientifically address knowledge), then
>you're (at best) committing a fallacy of equivocation.
A fallacy of equivocation, eh? Very scientific. I am saying, and I
think I have legitimately drawn it out of your statement about
assumptions, that while you claim to be dealing only in uncomitted
speculation about appearances, it remains true that you posit that
there is a Nature underlying those appearances, and that it is
consistent, and that this consistency is reflected in observation.
Without necessarily disagreeing with that, I think it makes sense to
argue that this amounts to a secret commitment. And I also think that
your view brings a lot more to Nature than is commonly acknowledged as
"assumed".
Anyhow, this all was a fine point embedded in the discussion of
whether science can investigate values (ignoring the question about a
valuation implicit in your assumption). Perhaps we can merge this
sub-thread with the larger skein by noticing how difficult it would be
to investigate the strength of the assumption you referred to.
Are you quick enough to take your glasses off and work on them while
you can still see?
--
"The more you're afraid of them, the more they'll try to get you."
Subject: Re: Ultimate Particles
From: tdp@ix.netcom.com(Tom Potter)
Date: 6 Dec 1996 00:59:50 GMT
In <5874ik$moi@sjx-ixn8.ix.netcom.com> tdp@ix.netcom.com(Tom Potter)
writes:
>
>In <32A670EA.6BD9@gasbone.herston.uq.edu.au> Warlock
> writes:
>>
>>logical Scientist lover wrote:
>>
>>> The work I have done suggests that Energy is universal in type
>>> and that its "condensation" states which we call the Elementay
>>> Particles of Mass obey a simple fifth power law!
>>> It would seem that Energy ontainment (mass) is much more
>>> geometrically oriented than expected.
>>
>>
>>Woah, woah, woah. Way beyond my league (see the response to
Hermital).
>>I don't suppose you could repeat that in laymans terms could you?
>
>The physical properties ( Of reality ) that we observe,
>and measure, form a simple matrix defined by the equation:
>
>property(X) = tan(A)^L * tan(B)^M * time(period)^N * C^(L+M) / G^O
>
>where:
>
> tan(A) = velocity(body A) about the system center of mass
> ---------------------------------------------
> C
>
> tan(B) = velocity(body B) about the system center of mass
> ---------------------------------------------
> C
>
> time(period) = a common property shared by bodies A and B
>
> C = a constant used to express the more fundamental
> time as space. Known as the speed of light
>
> G = a constant used to express the more fundamental
> time-space as a mass. Known as the
> universal gravational constant.
>
> L,M N and O are integers which define to
> place in the matrix where each property is.
>
>Now, man is programmed to perceive conserved "objects" (Particles)
>moving through homogenous media ( time, space and flux ).
>This perception has to do more with the "object" man,
>rather than with fundamental reality.
>
>What man percieves are "object-like"
>and "media-like" falls at certain places
>in the matrix defined by my equation, above.
>
>For a clear view of where these properties ( Objects and media )
>fall in the matrix, visit my Web site,
>and download my Windows-based, hypertext,
>physics tutorial, which develops a
>unique "Physical Property Chart", which
>shows the relationships between the physical
>properties, in a few simple steps.
>
>Tom Potter http://pobox.com/~tdp
One point I neglected to emphasize is that
"C" and "G" are UNNECESSARY constants that
arose as man began to piece together the
relationships between the properties. If
the values of "C" and "G" were set equal to one,
as they should be, we could forget about them,
and the confusion of properties they suggest,
and see that fundamental reality consists only
of time and a few angles.
And these times and angles exist at points
which are fundamentally memory elements,
ultimately in the "mind" of the "observer".
Subject: Re: Restraint re: Sokal
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 01:03:46 GMT
In article <587ncm$3mr@lynx.dac.neu.edu>, mkagalen@lynx.dac.neu.edu (Michael Kagalenko) writes:
... snip ...
>
> Why, happy to oblige ! Look at this cutie, courtesy of Alan Sokal
> (one of the footnotes to "Transgressing the Boundaries")
>==========================================================================
>
> According to the traditional textbook account, special relativity is
>concerned with the
> coordinate transformations relating two frames of reference in
>uniform relative motion. But this
> is a misleading oversimplification, as Latour (1988) has pointed out:
>
> "How can one decide whether an observation made in a train about the
> behaviour of a falling stone can be made to coincide with the
>observation
> made of the same falling stone from the embankment? If there are
>only one, or
> even two, frames of reference, no solution can be found since the
>man in the
> train claims he observes a straight line and the man on the
>embankment a
> parabola. ...
>
> Einstein's solution is to consider three actors: one in the
>train, one on the
> embankment and a third one, the author [enunciator] or one of its
> representants, who tries to superimpose the coded observations
>sent back by
> the two others. ...
>
> [W]ithout the enunciator's position (hidden in Einstein's
>account), and without
> the notion of centres of calculation, Einstein's own technical
>argument is
> ununderstandable ... "
>
> [pp. 10-11 and 35, emphasis in original]
>
> In the end, as Latour wittily but accurately observes, special
>relativity boils down to the
> proposition that
>
> " more frames of reference with less privilege can be accessed,
>reduced,
> accumulated and combined, observers can be delegated to a few more
> places in the infinitely large (the cosmos) and the infinitely
>small (electrons),
> and the readings they send will be understandable. His
>[Einstein's] book could
> well be titled: `New Instructions for Bringing Back Long-Distance
>Scientific
> Travellers'." [pp. 22-23]
>
> Latour's critical analysis of Einstein's logic provides an eminently
>accessible introduction to
> special relativity for non-scientists.
>==========================================================================
>
> Tee-he-he. That is just too precious bit of "deep thinking" to miss.
Well, with this type of stuff, no wonder we've all this "deep
thinkers" posting nonsense while being convinced that they actually
know relativity. Talk about "the blind leading the blind".
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: NASA lies, again.
From: nemesis@alpha-centauri.com (Darkstar)
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 20:37:58 GMT
In article <585l9h$jhm@news1.halcyon.com>, elf@halcyon.com (Elf Sternberg) says:
>
> sfk@zipcon.net (Shea F. Kenny) writes:
>
>> Well, as any number might suppose, I've devoted a bit of time
>>to considering lunar exploration, and various means of determining
>>the useful features of the lunar surface, and subterrain. NASA's
>>claim that there's water on the moon in a deep crater, seems on the
>>face of the claim, simply false.
>
>> This is not a difficult matter to determine. NASA's method of
>>survery, is that of radar, which cannot determine anything beyond much
>>beyond dimension. In short, radar cannot determine the composition of
>>the structure it is measuring. It can only determine it's size and
>>shape. It determines it's size, relative to the dimensions of the
>>moon it's self.
>
> Uh, Shea? Your cute little demonstration of how radar "doesn't
>work" in this case is completely erroneous. For one thing, you're
>forgetting that, given that we know the general amount of background
>radiation in the area being surveyed (and we do in this case; there are
>no cellular phones on the moon), we get a lot more back than simple
>doppler signals. We get back frequency modulation, amplitude
>modulation, and most importantly, signal intensity. Not how long the
>signal took, but *how much* signal came back.
Uh, Elf? Isn't the frequency modulation we get back a doppler signal?
Isn't the signal intensity due to the modulated amplitude of the returned
signal? And why do you think the time domain information of the return
signal is not important? It is true that radar can be used to dertermine
somethings besides size and shape. It may be able to tell a few things
about the composition due to the intensity of the returned signal but it
is still conjecture that ice has been found. One question raised that I
would like to see answered is: If it is ice, why has it not sublimated by
now, being in a vacum?
> If you're willing to read the article in Science magazine
>article at:
>http://www.sciencemag.org/science/scripts/display/full/274/5292/1495.
>(don't worry, I know you won't read it), you can read the complete
>details of how NASA came to the conclusion that there was ice on the
>moon. Basically, it comes down to this: during what was turning out to
>be a routine survey with routine results, a bright spike consistent
>with signal striking a highly reflective surface, and a signal ratio
>consistent with that surface being crystallized water (ice, Shea, ice),
>came back. There will be other probes to confirm the data (from the
>description in the article, the opportunity for a trans-polar lunar
>orbit is pretty rare) but in the mean time, the results are consistent
>with there being water on the Moon.
>> For example. Let's say a given crater measures a certain amount
>>of pixel address. ( for simplification ) Now, the whole lunar image,
>>rendered in the same resolution, or converted from another, is a
>>certain amount of pixels. The image being meaured for actual size,
>>meaning a given feature of the lunar surface, is a portion of that
>>whole image. So, if the whole of the lunar image were to be say 800
>>pixels, that would translate into a number of miles per pixel, or
>>number of meters per pixel. Thus, a crater numbering a given pixel
>>dimension, would be a certain number of miles or meters in dimension.
>>
>>
>> Ok. So, how does this exclude radar from determining what the
>>composite materials of a given image are in terms of elements
>>contained in the structure?
>>
>> Radar works like this, in case you don't know. It sends a radio
>>signal outward, from a transmitter. That's the thing sticking out
>>from the center. This center acts as an aiming device, so as to
>>calculate a complex set of data, arising from the re-positioning of
>>the transmitter, in order to determine the amount of change which
>>occurs from having changed the position of the transmitter, from the
>>time of transmitting, and blah, blah.
>>
>> The surrounding material of the aiming device or transmitter, is
>>the capture device or collector. It recieves the radio signal which
>>is actually produced by the transmitter, that whic is reflected by a
>>solid object, which was the objective of the transmitter, or aiming
>>device. This collection of data, is the change which occurred from
>>the original transmition point, to the end transmition point. The
>>amount of change being calculated as the time it takes for a radio
>>signal to be reflected from one point, as compared to the next point.
>>If one point takes longer or shorter to collect, such point is said to
>>be lower or higher, respectively. A low point taking longer to
>>collect from the transmitter, a high point taking less time to return
>>to the radar installation, collector.
>>
>> Since most know how radar works, you must understand now my
>>premise. Radar cannot detect anything but surface, not elemental
>>composition. It's only function is to determine dimension, in one of
>>three aspects. Or all three. But not it's elemental composition.
>>
>> In order to determine elemental composition, the simplest way is
>>to use light refraction. Radar, is a spectrum of light, however it
>>typically uses only one frequency. Elements are determined by a
>>number of light frequencies, in terms of either absorbtion or
>>reflection.
>>
>> Elements both absorb and reflect light, or partitions of the
>>electromagnetic spectrum, however they absorb more than one at a time
>>thus, the radar would have to emit more than one frequency to
>>determine absorbtion or non-reflection in more than one aspect for
>>each resolution, in order to determine the presence of a single
>>element. It would have to emit a frequecy for each frequency a
>>particular element absorbs. Then move on to the next resolution.
>>( and never mind the complications this brings up )
>>
>> It would simply be next to impossible, never mind the simple
>>capacity of radar to determine composition in the first place, due to
>>using a single frequency, per mission. Different radars use different
>>frequencies, for different purposes.
>>
>> In short, it would simply take a spectographal analysis of the
>>materials in the crater, to determine what elements compose it's
>>walls. This would entail blasting these elements with energy, so as
>>to show their basic electronic state, or capacity to absorb energy.
>>This entails knowing the temperature of the elements, at the time of
>>measuring their light reflection. Meaning, whatever light enters the
>>spectrometer, it must be known the temperature of the gas emitting the
>>light. I think. Close enough.
>>
>> At least it can't be done with radar. Radar only bounces off
>>solids. It only meaures time, thus calculates distance since the
>>transmitter remains stationary and radio signals travel at a fixed
>>rate.
>>
>> So, again NASA is presenting false information, so as to excite
>>the public into believing there is a reason to persue government
>>activities in space. Or something along those lines.
The thing that really bugs me about NASA is that they dribble out bits
of information at such times as to maximize funding potential. The do
this all the time, a bit here a bit there, like with the mars rocks.
They should be more free in diseminating scientific information to the
taxpaying public instad of treating that information as though it was a
commodity.
>> Ok, so I've had a few too many cinnamon liquers. Too bad. I've
>>gone to too much detail. Everyone knows how radar and spectrometry
>>work. So, why do you let them get away with it?
>>
>>
>>Shea F. Kenny (Moonbear, Lunar Development Corporation, et al)
>> 713-0782 Need a Taxi at Seatac Airport? 713-0782
>> 4p.m. to 3a.m. 7-days.
>> Moonbear is a proud sponsor of this post.
>
> You can pretend to have a brain, Shea, but don't pretend to be
>educated. You're bad at it.
>
> Elf !!!
>Elf Sternberg Balkanize Usenet!
>elf@halcyon.com
>Public key available http://www.halcyon.com/elf/index.html
Hey, Elf, if you are routinely going to chastize Shea on his name-calling
in all his other posts you should not be trying to antagonize him into
doing that here, it seems a little hypocritical ;-)
Darkstar
Subject: Re: I hate it when they do this!
From: coolhand@Glue.umd.edu (Kevin Anthony Scaldeferri)
Date: 5 Dec 1996 19:45:14 -0500
In article <587m8r$643@dismay.ucs.indiana.edu>,
Gregory Loren Hansen wrote:
>In article <32A8596A.2781@math.mcgill.ca>,
>Jan Rosenzweig wrote:
>>Gregory Loren Hansen wrote:
>
>>> One that we used in class goes something like
>>>
>>> dy/du dy dw
>>> ----- = -- --
>>> dx/dw du dx
>>>
>>> I can't remember where this came from, it was part of a derivation. That
>>> kind of operation would make a mathematician cringe.
>>
>> No it wouldn't. A derivative is an infinitesimal fraction, i.e.
>>limit of fractions. Since taking a limit commutes with any continuous
>
>Try that for, oh, say y=x^2.
>
>1/(dy/dx) = dx/dy if and only if dy/dx has no dependence on x.
>
1/(dy/dx) = 1/2x = +- 1/2 sqrt(y) = dx/dy
holds at all points where dy/dy is not zero. The plus or minus arises
because y=x^2 does not have a global inverse. The sign then depends
on which of the two inverses you are interested in
>> Talking about Fourier series, it's not so difficult - take any
>>nonperiodic function. Or a function with a discontinuity (e.g. a shock
>>wave - keep studying physics, and you'll find out that such things
>>exist, and you deal with it very much in physics). Sure, you can expand
>>it as a F. series. However, if f is your function and F it's F. series,
>>there are points x for which f(x) is NOT equal to F(x).
>
>A square wave is the simplest example. But those spikes on the edges have
>zero width and finite height, so we can usually ignore them.
I'm not sure what the point of this example is. A square wave
definately has a Fourier series, and this series converges to the
function everywhere except at the discontinuities. If you chose to
define your square wave function in the right way, the series
converges to the function everywhere.
>
>I don't think you can do a Fourier series or transform on, say, the Cantor
>dust or the Koch curve. But we usually don't use anything like in
>physics.
Certainly, but those types of function don't occur in the physical
Hilbert space, so as long as you are working in the H. space, you
don't have to worry.
--
======================================================================
Kevin Scaldeferri University of Maryland
"The trouble is, each of them is plausible without being instinctive"
Subject: Re: I hate it when they do this!
From: coolhand@Glue.umd.edu (Kevin Anthony Scaldeferri)
Date: 5 Dec 1996 19:34:36 -0500
In article <587mg2$6ab@dismay.ucs.indiana.edu>,
Gregory Loren Hansen wrote:
>In article <5879oc$3t2@latte.eng.umd.edu>,
>Kevin Anthony Scaldeferri wrote:
>>In article <585k2e$kkq@dismay.ucs.indiana.edu>,
>>Gregory Loren Hansen wrote:
>>>
>>>One that we used in class goes something like
>>>
>>> dy/du dy dw
>>> ----- = -- --
>>> dx/dw du dx
>>>
>>>I can't remember where this came from, it was part of a derivation. That
>>>kind of operation would make a mathematician cringe. But the professor
>>>was careful to point out that in this case we could get away with it.
>>
>>
>>The equation you wrote is completely valid if x(w) is a bijection and
>>x'(w) != 0 for any w. (Hmm...might be ok if x(w) is just injective,
>>too)
>
>Okay, I have to admit I have no idea what you just said. I thought
>1/(dy/dx) = dx/dy is only true if dy/dx is not a function of x. I can't
>think of any counterexamples.
If f is a one-to-one function from the space X onto the space Y, then
there is an inverse function g from Y to X such that g(f(x)) = x.
Moreover, if f'(x) != 0, then g'(f(x)) exists and equals 1 / f'(x).
>
>>You are going to have to provide more details here. There are valid
>>'tricks' for solving some PDE's, including many that are commonly
>>encountered in quantum mechanics. The general approach that you
>>learned in math class many be much harder then the specialized
>>technique that the physicists use.
>...
>>But if you are always working in an L_2 space (which physicists are),
>>you know that your functions are expandable, so why worry about
>>functions that aren't in the space?
>
>Like they said, physicists have a different approach to math than
>mathematicians do.
Well, one might say that physicists are concerned with what is, while
mathematicians are concerned with what could be. (Before anyone jumps
on me, let me remind you that even far-out theoretical physicists are
usually still trying to describe what we observe). Physicist don't
tend to worry about mathematics that isn't relevant to physics. When
it is discovered that new mathematics has become relevant, they learn
it. Until then, most of them would prefer to think about physics.
The issue I have is with mathematicians who get superiority complexes
about this (or physicists who do the same). There are definately
places where physics proceeds non-rigorously, but the typical example
given do not actually have this problem.
--
======================================================================
Kevin Scaldeferri University of Maryland
"The trouble is, each of them is plausible without being instinctive"
Subject: Re: Can science provide value? (was: Where's the theory?)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 23:34:57 GMT
In article <586ru7$qpl@tel.ast.lmco.com>, virdy@pogo.den.mmc.com (Mahipal Singh Virdy) writes:
>In article , wrote:
>> jti@isleta.santafe.edu (Jeff Inman) writes:
>
... snip ...
>>>
>>>This complicates things if I interpret your previous statements to
>>>mean that science doesn't actually produce knowledge either. (If
>>>"knowledge" would reliably pertain to how things are.)
>>
>>No, knowledge pertains to things as they appear to be. Concern with
>>"things as they are" is in the province of philosophers and
>>theologians.
>
>Though I share Mati's semi-frustration with this issue, I must point out
>that this is exactly the kind of sentiment that gets scientists in
>trouble in the POV of philosphers and theologians. My concern is a
>simple one: *How* can the philosophers and theologians make a better
>assessment of "things as they are" when they are inadequately versed
>with the Science of Nature?
I think that they can start by adopting the attitude which science
adopted long time ago (and which served it very well), i.e. humility.
What science in effect says is "no, we don't think that we can get all
the answers to all to possible questions, right now. Lets see what we
can answer now, to some level of precision, then we'll see what we can
do next, and so on." In other words, it is progressing in managable
steps, seeking "working solutions" (yes, "working", the word that
modern philosophers seem to hate), with a full realization that the
solutions are not "ultimate", that anything that's being done may be
later redone, better. And the word "better" is crucial here since it
implies a mindset which views a closer approximation to observations
as being better, not a mindset insisting that anything that's not
guaranteed to be exactly right is wrong. Not that there is anything
strange or mystical about the scientific mindset, it is just the one
that was adopted through history by all the people that were in touch
with reality.
>
>See, one can't really STOP at saying scientists study "things as they
>appear to be". IMHO, scientists can't help _but_ pursue "things as they
>are". What _else_ is there to pursue? Sure, they may be incorrect about
>unavailable data==facts but that's a minor point since Science is
>self-correcting. I set up the following lines of reasoning to help me
>remember what science tries to do. Consider the following three arbitrary
>rank state vectors:
>
>X_Measured == XM Things as they are measured to be
>X_Theoretical == XT Things as they are theorized to be
>X_Actual == XA Things as they are
>
>XM - XA = 0_MA The difference between Measured and Actual
>XT - XA = 0_TA etctera... only T instead of M
>
>Subtracting these two equations yields:
>XM - XT = 0_MA - 0_TA == Zero Ideally.
>
>Notice how the "Actual" seems to drop out. :-)
>
>Basically as (XM-XT) approaches zero, we by default must be getting Closer
>to Actuality == Home. As the Grand Funk song goes "I'm gettin' closer to
>my home... someday... someday". "I'm your Captain" is the title. I think
>it's Grand Funk. Anyway --- great song.
>
Yep, you see, that's exactly the scientific mindset. Closer is
better. Now try to explain it to the crybabies who whine "but I want
it all and I want it now."
>Many would see this exercise as trivial, others would not. I'm one of
>the "others". The point is, the "Actual"=="things as they are" plays a
>dominant role in the actions of the scientists. It's unavoidable for
>Science to not deal with "things as they are".
Yes and no. Yes, it is if not unavoidable then at least difficult to
avoid, for a scientist, to think that "things as they're observed to
be" are at least an approximation to "things as they are". Which can
be true at some level but there may be deeper, underlying layers of
which we're totally oblivious. Think about the following analogy.
You deal with a computer (at the user level) and you know all it takes
to get things done. You know that if you want to see what's in a
given directory you click an a folder and it opens. Then you want to
run something so you click it and it runs. And you never even bother
to think (and most people don't even know) that all these things you
see on the screen are just icons, symbols for the real complex stuff
that goes inside the computer. That when you "click on a folder"
you're just bringing an representation of a location (your mouse
pointer) on a representation of a directory (the folder icon) and by
clicking a button initiate a whole complex set of events, cause
various binary codes to be read in, processed in an appropriate way,
initiate other binary codes, resulting eventually in a highly specific
periodic sequence of electric fields being applied to some grids in
the CRT so as to display in front of your eyes a set of dots which
represents in some way the contents of the directory.
So, is the description in terms of icons and mouse moves "the way
things are" are "the way they appear to be". Well, it is a perfectly
adequate description providing you with a consistent (ideally) set of
rules which can be followed to achieve the desired results. On the
user level you'll never need more than this. At the same time, at the
programmer level it is woefully inadequate and a different, deeper
description is needed. But even this one is still dealing with
representations and if you're a hardware designer you find another,
deeper yet, layer.
That's why I would insist on the distinction between "the way things
are" and "the way they appear to be". We know that we deal with
"things the way they appear to be". We hope that this is an
approximation to "the way things are" and at some level it seems to be
so. But, we should always keep at the back of our mind the
possibility that deeper layers do exist, as well as the fact that
unless we engage in things which involve these deeper layers, it
doesn't matter.
... snip ...
>
>PS... Please don't email me at my address above anymore. I no longer have
>this account. Also, I shall not be able to interact for a while either.
>I'm not avoiding conversing, I'm just without Internet Surfboard. :-)
>
Well, I hope you get a new one soon.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Can science provide value? (was: Where's the theory?)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Fri, 6 Dec 1996 01:32:02 GMT
In article <587m5d$am2@tierra.santafe.edu>, jti@isleta.santafe.edu (Jeff Inman) writes:
>patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola) writes:
>>jti@santafe.edu (Jeff Inman) writes:
>>>patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola) writes:
>
>>>>If you want to claim that calling something "knowledge" is putting
>>>>a value on it, go ahead. But it's neither a value created by nor
>>>>internal to science.
>
>But, yes. It is. If this "knowledge" is nothing without the notion
>that appearance has some relation with Nature, and science presumes
>that "knowledge" is worth persuing, then this amounts to an assumption
>that science is at least on the scent trail of Nature. That's all I
>meant by attributing value to "knowledge".
>
>>>>Science just seems to be the most effective
>>>>way that has yet been found to produce knowledge.
>
>Here you confirm my suspicion, above. If you don't suppose that
>"knowledge" has some real fundamental truth value,
Define "real fundamental truth value"
... snip ...
>
>>This is rank nonsense. Either I believe that science produces Knowledge,
>>or I attach no value to the works of science? I, personally, attach
>>value to many things -- the beauty of a sunset, the harmonic complexity
>>of a violin concerto, the depth of complexity of an Eco novel, or the
>>enriching symbolism of a painting by Bosch.... none of which are values
>>that I necessarily expect to share with any one person, nor are they
>>values internal to (e.g.) the novel itself.
>
>I guess one problem is that you don't understand what is meant by the
>verb "to value", in this context. It means more than merely to attach
>personal emotional identification with. This is where the trick for
>"science" lies. By emotionally distancing oneself from something, one
>does not illustrate a lack of valuing of that thing. Thus, even the
>results of supposdely dispassionate investigation can still be said to
>be valued. Valuing merely implies that one places something into a
>metaphysical continuum.
In your definition, perhaps.
>>
>>Science is a game; one that relies, fundamentally, on the *assumption*
>>that the universe is both consistent and as-we-perceive-it.
It relies an assumption of consistency. As for "as we perceive it",
no.
>
>My point, maybe just a suggestion, is that claiming that the universe
>is consistent (etc) amounts to an argument about Nature, what it is.
No, not an argument, just an accumulated experience. Yes, I know that
according to you experience is just a superstition. But I much prefer
to rely on experience than on meaningless verbiage, no matter how
profound it is made to sound.
>You serve Truth, in this sense, because you are convinced that facts
>must reveal themselves in certain ways (e.g. by being consistent).
There is no "must" about it. See "experience" above.
>I do not have to disagree with this to point out that it is an
>unsupported assumption,
"Unsupported by philosphers" you mean? And who cares about a support
by philosophers.
> opposed to the possiblity that one selects a
>mode of interpretation of things which is consistent with his
>expectations of consistency. Kinds of facts that would undermine this
>mode of experience are "unscientific".
Lets hear some facts undermining the relativity, or Maxwell's
equations for this matter. You keep mumbling about science ignoring
facts but I'm yet to hear what facts are being ignored.
>
>It seems to me that the kind of assumption you subscribe to (which I
>haven't exactly denied, in my own case, by the way) must require you
>to treat quantum mechanical issues as being mere interpretations of a
>mathematical model, rather than as descriptions of nature. (I'd
>actually be gratified to learn that this is what physicists do, but I
>know there are those who insist that QM is a description of Nature.
It is a description of Nature in the sense of being consistent with
our observations of Nature, so far. If you ask me "is this the way
Nature actually works or is it just a mathematical model of a specifis
layer of nature we perceive?" my answer will be "I don't know". Which
is the one thing the whole "philosophy" crowd seems unable to learn,
the readiness to admit to "I don't know".
>And even if one says "interpretation" one still presupposes that there
>is something being interpreted.)
Yes. So, what's the problem? Is it that "we can't actually prove
that there is something out there". So, since we can't also prove
that there isn't, we can just as well assume that there is something
out there and proceed on this.
>
>What are facts?
>
Why won't you answer it.
>>Science, then, will demonstrably produce "knowledge" --
>>descriptions of how observations of the world have been consistent in the
>>past and predictions of they will continue to be consistent in the future.
>
>Nevermind that the understanding of what is being observed changes?
The understanding growes. Is this a problem?
>As Moggin once tried to point out, "mass" is not the same thing now as
>it was 300 years ago. The moon is not the same thing, either, for
>example.
>
Really? Why? They are the same thing, only our knowledge of them
changed. Same as with a child growing up. What the child understands
by "mother" at an age of one year is quite different from the
understanding at an age of, say, ten. Which doesn't imply that mother
changed.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
