Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 06:48:51 GMT
In article , moggin@nando.net (moggin) writes:
>meron@cars3.uchicago.edu (Mati):
>
>> >> But, the destabilization is not in science itself, it is in the way we
>> >> think about science. Which, as I keep stressing, is not the same
>> >> thing. When I listen to Bethoveen's "Hammerklavier" sonata (the third
>> >> part, to be specific) I may appreciate the genius of the composer. At
>> >> the same time, the feelings the music brings up in me are my own, not
>> >> the composer's. They're related to his work, but they're not his
>> >> work.
>
>moggin@nando.net (moggin)
>
>> > On your account of physics, the music is no more "his work"
>> >than the feelings it inspires in you -- his work consists only
>> >of the notes on the page. Playing them is both unnecessary and
>> >irrelevant. In short, the hammerklavier is superfluous to the
>> >"Hammerklavier." (N.B.: I don't say that to make mock -- it's
>> >a defensible, albeit an awkward position.)
>
>Mati:
>
>> It is defensible. Would I have the ability of hearing the music in my
>> mind just by reading the notes (Some people do, so it is not
>> impossible) then plying it wouldn't be necessery. But, I don't have
>> such ability, not even the ability to play the music for myself. So,
>> I'm like an illiterate story lover, paying somebody to read the
>> stories for me. [...]
>
> Not quite what I meant. In order to make an analogy to your
>idea of physics (it seems to me), you can consider the music _only_
>as notes on the page. No hammerklavier for the "Hammerklavier" at
>all -- including the one playing in your mind. The composition is
>only the written notes, with no reference to the sounds they make
>on an instrument.
No, why? It would be like saying that the formalism of physics is
never to be used, only appreciated as equations on page. Did I ever
said anything of the sort?
No, the equivalent for music would be to say that when listening to it
I don't care what the composer thought about when he wrote it, I don't
care what his beliefs were, how well did he get along with his
contemporaries, how well did he get along with his mistress, etc. The
music speaks for itself.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 06:55:42 GMT
Mati:
> >> >> Also, I'm not sure what you mean by "it became orthodoxy". It was
> >> >> used since it worked.
moggin:
> >> > Wait a minute -- you just finished telling me it didn't exist.
Mati:
> >> Gravity didn't exist???!!!
moggin:
> > Interesting hypothesis, but no, I meant action-at-a-distance.
Mati:
> Oh, good. And I meant that the gravity formula was used, not action
> at distance. How do you use action at distance?
Just as I was saying to you before: to explain the workings
of gravity. It's all very well to talk about inverse squares, and
suchlike, but you're left wondering about the means by which the
force of gravity makes itself felt. How does the Earth pull stuff
toward it? Does it reach out with its hands? Well, no. Does it
chase fluttering objects with butterfly nets? It would seem not.
So _what_, then? Here we have the Earth, and there the moon, some
distance away. Supposedly the Earth, as we put it, attracts the
moon. _How_? By what device is the Earth's gravity able to make
itself felt across space? "Action-at-a-distance" is one reply.
Mati:
>>>>>Mind you, Newtonian gravity is a formula, not a theory. There is no
>>>>>explanation of any sort offered. So, how does a formula become an
>>>>>orthodoxy?
moggin:
>>>> That's a different question, and I'd like to stick with this one,
>>>>for now. Action-at-a-distance _is_ the explanation that Newton gave,
>>>>and the one that eventually became accepted, after the resistance died
>>>>down, even though it meant introducing sheer mysticism into physics.
Mati:
>Sorry but since action at distance is not an explanation (I see
>another semantics argument brewing) and since Newton specifically
>stated that he offers no explanations, I see this argument closed.
Newton was capable of contradicting himself; also of changing
his views. His thinking about action-at-a-distance was complicated
by several factors. One was a conflict between his preferences as
a scientist and his leanings as student of religion -- like most of
his colleagues, he would have preferred a mechanistic explanation
to a mystical one, in his role as a physicist -- yet he borrowed the
concept of action-at-distance from his studies in hermeticism, and
applied it as he saw fit.
Whether or not you consider it to qualify as an explanation is
another question. I already noted (twice, if you count our earlier
go-round) that stripped of its hermetic connotations, action-at-a-
distance is an empty concept: it merely repeats the description it
attempts to explain. I would guess that's what you're thinking of
when you claim it's not an explanation, especially since you called
it a description during our earlier exchange.
-- moggin
Subject: //HELP: Physics Optics|Distance Problem\\
From: upendra@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca (squishie)
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 09:21:42 GMT
Hello, I know that this might now be the correct forum to ask
questions for undergraduate physics problems, but my desperation
forces me to, since i lack the time or opportunity to ask any
available persons at my university for aid, prior to the due date
I have sweated over this problem for hours but without luck, ANY
insight is largely appreciated!
Problem: _
/ / "B"
OBJECT -------->----------------------/\/_______________> Your Eye
. /_/|
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. |
. ^
. |
. | _ "A"
.|o/ /
|/ /
/_ /
I know that "B" is a partiall reflecting planar Mirror , and "A" is a totally reflecting planar mirror.
This is an optical range finding instrument's basic setup to measure
large distances ["B"to"Object"] via measuring the indirect distance
from AtoB and the angle "o"..
Question: Optical Range finders depend on partially reflecting mirrors
to permit the operator to measure the distance to an object. The
principle of operation is similar to that of binocular vision. One set
of rays follows a straight line from object to eye; the other leaves
the object at a slight angle and then, after relflections from two
mirrors, it rejoins the first set of rays at the eye. The mirror
labelled A can be accurately turned to superimpose [shown by RAY maked
with "===>" ] the two sets of rays at the eye. B is a partially
reflecting mirror.
If the distance between A and B is 12.5 cm, then over what "range of
angles" must it be possible to turn mirror A in order that object
distances from 50cm to 200m can be measured. Use the line from A to B
as a reference direction.
[ie: i believe the distance is .50 to 200m from mirror B to the
Object.
HINT: For an object at infinity, mirror A must be turned to an angle
of 45degrees from the line AB. For an object immediately in front of
the "device" the normal to the face of mirror A would be almost
coincedent with the line AB, that is, mirror A would be turned by only
a very small [approx ~0degrees] angle. Find a GENERAL EXPRESSION for
the Tilt angle - call it Theta - as a function of distance , x. THEN
apply the relationship to the distance range specified.
--END--
Anyways, as said, i am rather desperate to get this question answered
correctly and wish to understand it better. If you in anyway can
provide me with some insight, hints, thoughts, comments on the above
problem it would be **greatly** appreciated.
Please, if you will, reply to me via email :
upendra@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca
Thank you for taking the time to read this!
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: caj@baker.math.niu.edu (Xcott Craver)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 08:50:10 GMT
Gregory Dandulakis wrote:
>
>It seems that you forget that science is, like biological
>evolution, a field filled up with dead-end hypotheses.
>These dead hypotheses are many-many more than the success-
>ful ones. And indeed, from time to time, there is radical
>shift into the major "paradigme". "Paradigme" being mostly
>a family/group of theories with "topological homomorphism".
Perhaps you meant "topological homeomorphism?"
It doesn't matter: I'm not sure how you consider "a family/
group of theories" to be homeomorphic or anything-morphic.
Perhaps you can elaborate on your usage?
Remember, it was us dry mathy types that first coined
terms like "nonlinear" and "multidimensional," only to see
them warped into vague trendy terms whose definitions cannot
even be pinned down (indeed, many are ironically used as
weapons against us in these "science wars" which are apparently
going on somewhere: mathematicians are occasionally painted
as "linear" thinkers incapable of "multidimensional" thought!)
[lots of other mathy terms deleted]
I'm not shooting you down for using something other
than the strict definitions of the mathy terms you toss around.
Verily, mathematicians occasionally use them loosely themselves.
I just want to know what you mean when you consider theories
"topologically." At best, I can model the space of scientific
theories as a poset.
>Gregory
.,-::::: :::. ....:::::: @niu.edu -- http://www.math.niu.edu/~caj/
,;;;'````' ;;`;; ;;;;;;;;;````
[[[ ,[[ '[[, ''` `[[. "I'd like a large order of FiboNachos."
$$$ c$$$cc$$$c ,,, `$$ "Okay sir, that'll cost as much as a
`88bo,__,o, 888 888,888boood88 small order and a medium order combined."
"YUMMMMMP"YMM ""` "MMMMMMMM" _____________________________________________
Subject: Re: Have you had an experience of seeing your double, doppelganger or someone elses, please email also if you have. I would like to hear your experience.
From: dpressne@ns.vvm.com (Dan Pressnell)
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 06:55:05 GMT
jakiel@crl.com (Jennifer B. Jakiel) wrote:
:Dan Pressnell (dpressne@ns.vvm.com) wrote:
:: jakiel@crl.com (Jennifer B. Jakiel) wrote:
:: :Yeah, I met my double at a pagan gathering once... she didn't have
:: :the same name as me, and she was just a kid, but she and I looked
:: :a lot alike in the face and had TOO much in common for comfort...
:: Were you a kid at the time, too?
:No, this was last weekend, and I'm 22 years old.
:: What did you have in common that caused you discomfort (besides the
:: face)?
:It was rather more cool 'n nifty than uncomfortable. We both got a big
:kick out of it :)
So what were the similarities, besides the face? How old was the kid?
Dan
Subject: Re: What is a constant? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: august@micron.net(Paul Johnson)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 05:21:50 GMT
> zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
> august@micron.net(Paul Johnson) writes:
>>zeleny@oak.math.ucla.edu (Michael Zeleny) writes:
>>>moggin@nando.net (moggin) writes:
>
>>>> You're in no position to be issuing challenges, but I'll humor
>>>>you, just this once. Logical positivism: meaning is verification;
>>>>a statement that can't be verified is meaningless.
>>>Not. Verificationism is neither necessary nor sufficient as a
>>>characterization of logical positivism. For starters, you must
>>>do justice to the genus and the differentia.
>>Why isn't Verificationism necessary? You seem to want to give
>>primacy to the epistemological position; is that right? So that
>>the genus would be empiricism and the differentia, well,
>>something that distinguishes their empiricism from, say, the
>>radical empiricism of a Mill or a Quine? Is that right?
> Logical positivism IS an epistemological position.
>>But if so, why is the epistemological position more important
>>than the theory of meaning (or the criterion of meaningfulness)
>>or the philosophy of perception--the phenomenalism?
> Because theory of meaning and philosophy of perception are there to
> define the content of that, which is or can be scientifically known.
This is a reason for thinking that these two are inessential?
>>If one sees logical positivism as a cluster of logically independent
>>positions--the Verificationism, the phenomenalism, the moderate-
>>empiricism (perhaps this leaves out something important)--in
>>what way is one going wrong?
> LP is a foundationalist position, and there is nothing cluster-like
> about foundationalism.
The thesis is not that the foundationalism is a cluster, but that
the foundationalism (wrt empirical justification) conjoined to the
verificationism and the phenomenalism and the position wrt the
a priori (what I'm calling moderate empiricism) and the emotivist
metaethics and the metaphilosophy constitute a cluster.
If there were any entailment relations amongst these positions,
then I suppose we might be able to crank out an order of priority.
In the absence of such relations (and I'm certainly open to learning
about any), the thing to do would seem to be to check out the texts
of the leading figures to see which of the positions gets the
prominence, the emphasis, the attention.
I assume that Ayer is competent to present the LP position. Now,
he takes his _Language, Truth and Logic_ to have presented what
he later calls the "classical position" of the Vienna Circle. I
submit that a reading of that work does not support the point of
view that you have taken (the primacy of the foundationalism).
I suppose that LP is dead in the sense that these positions no
longer hang together--these days, they hang separately. But moggin
would have done better to point out that the LP position on the
a priori still commands more support (at least among non-specialists
in epistemology) than either of its dialectical alternatives,
and is still often taught as the default position--the reasonable,
compromise position between the extremes of an implausible
radical empiricism and a "mysterious" rationalism (despite Larry
Bonjour's refutation of this view).
> In the present context, verificationism is
> entailed by F.H. Bradley's semantical views, and hence is equally
> characteristic of his Hegelian idealism.
The relevance of Bradley's views escapes me.
> So you have to factor in
> the special relation to protocol sentences (as undermined by Church's
> review of Ayer, which demonstrated that every sentence stands in such
> relation),
The special relation of protocol sentences to what?
Paul J.
> as well as the particular means of verification that were
> countenanced by the logical positivists, in order to get anywhere.
> The fact that the LP program is incoherent both on its own terms --
> because VP itself is apparently not empirically verifiable, and
> absolutely speaking -- because it fails to circumscribe empirical
> verification, in no way absolves us from the responsibility to
> distinguish it from that, which it radically opposed.
>
> Cordially, - Mikhail | God: "Sum id quod sum." Descartes: "Cogito ergo sum."
> Zeleny@math.ucla.edu | Popeye: "Sum id quod sum et id totum est quod sum."
> itinerant philosopher -- will think for food ** www.ptyx.com ** MZ@ptyx.com
> ptyx ** 6869 Pacific View Drive, LA, CA 90068 ** 213-876-8234/874-4745 (fax)
>
>>>>
Subject: Re: Sophistry 103 (was: I know that!)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 10:04:39 GMT
weinecks@mail1.sas.upenn.edu (Silke-Maria Weineck):
> If I may quickly interfere here in my usual conciliatory voice:
> I think that, yes, Zeleny is right: both Destruktion and deconstruction
> have an etymological connection to destruction;
"Zeleny is right"? More accurately, Zeleny is reciting the
obvious. As I've noted several times now, the connection was
never in dispute. The question is what follows from it. If you
were following the conversation, then you know what's at issue.
> he is right further in
> claiming that Derrida and Heidegger are very attuned to implications
> of this sort
Zeleny claims that Heiddeger's concept of Destruktion contains
"destructive implications," which deconstruction receives as its
inheritance -- he's failed to support either proposition. And as
the thread has gone on, it's become apparent that by "destructive,"
he means "fascistic," leading to the further claim that Derrida is
a Nazi -- worse yet, a _lying_ Nazi, since he has the chutzpah to
deny it.
> -- to deny that there is any link whatsoever strikes me
> as problematic.
And no one here says differently -- so what's your problem?
To make things clear, I agree there's a link; in fact, I don't
see how it could be any more obvious -- the question, again, is
what the link means. Zeleny believes the answer is self-evident:
Derrida is a crypto-fascist. But that's just a crude, baseless
slander, as I've taken the trouble to show.
> Zeleny's problem is that he cannot distinguish between throwing a
> bomb at a church and taking it apart piece by piece, lovingly, to see
> how it is made. The latter does involve, to introduce a new term,
> dismantling, and it is a destruction to the extent that any
> interference with a structure is a destruction because it doesn't leave
> its object unchanged.
Oh, this is just great -- Zeleny tries to make Derrida into
a Nazi, and pretends that a reference to Heidegger's politics can
substitute for an understanding of his philosophy, while you try
to present them as a pair of museum curators.
> The larger question, however, is whether such an action is
> destructive in the larger sense -- destructive, as has been claimed,
> to "Western Culture," "humanist education," "respect for the
> classics," etc. Those claims are silly and not worthwhile debating in
> the end, unless one is into the politics of the so-called culture
> wars.
The _debates_ have been silly, but the questions aren't.
-- moggin
Subject: Re: faster than light travel
From: mike105@ix.netcom.com (Mike Abernathy)
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 08:05:08 GMT
"Doug \"thE_bUG\" Tham" wrote:
>lbsys@aol.com wrote:
>---[GIGANTIC snip! sorry!]---
>> Ah, there was a 60 million year old sneaker
>> footprint being found at the end of the story in a layer of slate()....
>Interesting story...sorry about intruding here, but there are tons of
>REAL fossil anomalies, e.g. imprint of what looks like a sandaled
>footprint crushing a trilobite; toads, frogs, spark plugs, nails and
>even a pterosaur found trapped in unbroken coal...looks like the guy who
>made that time machine was pretty careless, huh?? :)
Say what? Have you got any sources for this? I'd be fascinated.
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 10:04:29 GMT
In article gd8f@watt.seas.Virginia.EDU (Gregory Dandulakis) writes:
>
>In article Patrick Juola wrote:
>>
>>In article mkagalen@lynx.dac.neu.edu (Michael Kagalenko) writes:
>>>
>>>Gregory Dandulakis (gd8f@watt.seas.Virginia.EDU) wrote:
>>>
>>>]It seems that you forget that science is, like biological
>>>]evolution, a field filled up with dead-end hypotheses.
>>>]These dead hypotheses are many-many more than the success-
>>>]ful ones.
>> [deletia]
>>>
>>> What a bunch of crackpot nonsense.
>>
>>Oh, I don't know. The first two sentences were coherent, correct,
>>and important.
>
>And I would add that the rest would have been equally lucid if
>you substitute the terms "data compression algorithms" with the
>terms "laws of nature in current physical theories", plus "random-
>ness in current physical theories" with "facts unexplained by the
>current physical laws".
Well, no. It wouldn't have. Making up (incorrect) terminology on
the fly does not lucidity create. All that your terminological
games really demonstrated is that you don't understand data compression
as well as you think. For one thing, there's a strong distinction in
science between cataloguing events and explaining them, one that
your "everything is compression" metaphor not only fails to capture,
but completely destroys. Your topological metaphors don't even achieve
the status of being incorrect, as your compression theory metaphor
does.
You were better off before you tried to explain. All you're
doing now is demonstrating Mr. Kagalenko's point for him.
Patrick
Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 10:21:59 GMT
In article , moggin@nando.net (moggin) writes:
... snip ...
>
>moggin@nando.net (moggin)
>
>> >> > On your account of physics, the music is no more "his work"
>> >> >than the feelings it inspires in you -- his work consists only
>> >> >of the notes on the page. Playing them is both unnecessary and
>> >> >irrelevant. In short, the hammerklavier is superfluous to the
>> >> >"Hammerklavier." (N.B.: I don't say that to make mock -- it's
>> >> >a defensible, albeit an awkward position.)
>
>Mati:
>
>> >> It is defensible. Would I have the ability of hearing the music in my
>> >> mind just by reading the notes (Some people do, so it is not
>> >> impossible) then plying it wouldn't be necessery. But, I don't have
>> >> such ability, not even the ability to play the music for myself. So,
>> >> I'm like an illiterate story lover, paying somebody to read the
>> >> stories for me. [...]
>
>moggin:
>
>> > Not quite what I meant. In order to make an analogy to your
>> >idea of physics (it seems to me), you can consider the music _only_
>> >as notes on the page. No hammerklavier for the "Hammerklavier" at
>> >all -- including the one playing in your mind. The composition is
>> >only the written notes, with no reference to the sounds they make
>> >on an instrument.
>
>Mati:
>
>> No, why? It would be like saying that the formalism of physics is
>> never to be used, only appreciated as equations on page. Did I ever
>> said anything of the sort?
>
> Constantly -- you keep playing variations on the theme, "the
>physics is the math." You shove aside all thoughts about what it
>means, ignore the models built on it, and even dismiss the events
>it describes (referring to them as mere "epiphenomena").
Did I? I wasn't even aware I know such word. Talking about a
surprise.
>That last >is the most striking, since it means you practice physics
>without any concern for _physis_.
To be exact, "it means" translates to "I think so". But, lets leave
the nitpicking alone. So, no, without a concern for _physis_ I
wouldn't be practicing physics. But, I also have concern for truth
and honesty. And honesty in science means to me "never pretend to
know more than you do". There are things we know, there are things we
guess and there are things we've no idea about. And we should
remember which is which, if we're ever to know more.
>
> It's also why you're unable to understand how action-at-a-
>distance could be an explanation: you can't grasp the question it's
>attempting to answer. For you, the math is enough -- you believe
>it's sufficient to point to the inverse square law and stop; the
>idea of explaining how gravity has its effect doesn't even seem to
>cross your mind. Since you can't see anything for the concept of
>action-at-a-distance to explain, you assume it's a description,
>and nothing more.
On the contrary. The idea of explaining is what drives me and others
in my field. That's why I'm not going to stoop to stringing a bunch
of long words together and calling it an explanation. First you've to
be honest, with yourself and others and to when you don't know
something, admit it, clearly. Then you're on your way (Sokrates was
right). It is a long way and you may not make it, but if so then
somebody else will. But if you'll just pretend that, yes, sure, here
is the explanation, then how do you think any progress will be made.
>
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: Hermeneutics and the difficulty to count to three...
From: patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 10:10:34 GMT
In article gonser@eawag.ch (-Tom-) writes:
>
>> But of course. That's exactly what I'm saying, maybe you've missed
>> it. Hypothesising is not just fine, it is necessery. But hypothesis
>> is an asked question, then you need an answer.
>
>I am aware of that and fully agree.
>
>> You can establish
>> whatever structures of thought you wish but, barring verification,
>> they are still just guesses.
>
>Yes, and all serious scientists are perfectly aware of this. But aren't
>there cases of "layers" of hypotheses built on such guesses?
Oh, sure. But they're still hypotheses.
>
>> And if it turns out that verification is
>> impossible, the structure is meaningless.
>
>Is there verification for the Big Bang?
Direct, eye-witness verification, no. Indirect verification, yes.
In the case of Mr. Meron's hypothesized substance that's experimentally
indistinguishable from a stable element, there may still be ways
to experimentally get *evidence* one way or another -- for example,
if I determine that the atomic number of his substance is 120, then
many physicists would be more likely to believe that it's unstable
than stable -- simply because we know of no stable transuranic elements.
This isn't proof, of course, but it is evidence. This is based on
reasoning from an observation (the atomic number), and a conjecture
based on a similar set of observations (the atomic numbers and
stabilities of the transuranics).
>Are there not all sorts of
>cosmological theories "out there" who's verification is impossible?
>I'm arguing that one step further about the value and importance of
>hypothesizing: There is an inherent value to hypothesizing (not only as a
>question) and even without verification, if it is well grounded in and
>consistent with the overall body of knowledge. Maybe you can just call it
>a working hypothesis, but significant research is being conducted based on
>such unverified assumptions, that are not addressing them specifically in
>the process.
But the research that is conducted tends to be aimed at finding such
indirect evidence to demonstrate/falsify these assumptions.
Patrick
Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: meron@cars3.uchicago.edu
Date: Mon, 11 Nov 1996 10:34:29 GMT
In article , moggin@nando.net (moggin) writes:
>Mati:
>
>> You seem to be running in a loop. Classical physics had no
>> explanation for the workings of gravity, only a formula.
>
> Except, that is, for action-at-a-distance. Which was, I
>agree, a piss-poor explanation, once taken out of the Hermetic
>context -- but that doesn't make it just vanish into thin air.
>
I don't much care for any Hermetic context. As far as physics is
concerned, it is description only.
>> An "action
>> at a distance" is not a physical explanation, it is just a
>> description. And an apt description, by the way. You've a force and
>> it acts from a distance. That's a statement of an observed fact. No
>> mechanism is postulated by this.
>
> Exactly -- that's what had Newton's colleagues up-in-arms --
>they insisted on a mechanistic explanation, and weren't having any
>of this spiritualistic clap-trap.
What spiritualistic clap-trap you've in mind?
> Hell, even Newton was a mechanist,
>and would have a preferred a different explanation, if possible.
>
>> It is the same as showing a remote
>> control to somebody when neither you nor the other person has any idea
>> how it works. You say "here, you point it on your TV, press here and
>> the channel changes. Press over here and the volume will change,..."
>> Nowhere does it imply any explanation of how it works, only how to use
>> it.
>
> In terms of your analogy, I ask, "How does the remote work?"
>You reply, "On the principle of action-at-distance." That offers
>an explanation (albeit an empty one) of the means by which the
>remote control is able to exert an influence on the t.v., all the
>way across the room.
That's where we differ (but you know it). I don't consider this an
expalnation. It is the same as saying "well, it works".
>
>Mati:
>
>> Look on this as follows: You've
>> a theory of motion. You know that planets follow specific
>> trajectories. Now you ask yourself "Assuming that these trajectories
>> can be accounted for by acting between the the Sun and the planets,
>> what is the form of this force". And, lo and behold you find that
>> there is only one form of force which can account for the
>> observations. So you use it. If you've an explanation for this
>> force, good, but if you don't you can still use it. I think that I
>> mentioned countless times that science is pragmatic. It was never the
>> approach that you cannot use something unless you can fully explain
>> it.
>
> Who said it was? Clearly your felt need for explanations is
>low.
Certainly. But that doesn't mean that, if I find no explanation, I'll
refrain from using it if it seems to work.
> Others feel and have felt differently. You may think that
>action-at-a-distance was unnecessary as an explanation.
No, it is not that it is unnecessery, it is just that it explains
nothing.
And who
>knows? Maybe you're right. But there it is -- an explanation --
>whether you think it's needed or not. Note, too, that your math,
>however useful, doesn't even begin to explain how the force that
>you've mananged to formalize exerts itself; which is exactly the
>explanation that action-at-a-distance was meant to provide.
>
> Why would I want to ask a question like that? It's irrelevant
>to the topic at hand, which is the role of religious mysticism in
>physics, as demonstrated by the concept of action-at-a-distance.
Nothing is demonstrated in any place except your mind. Unless you
believe that you've been given the position to decide what has been
demonstrated. If so, you're mistaken.
>
>moggin:
>
>> > Whether or not you consider it to qualify as an explanation is
>> >another question. I already noted (twice, if you count our earlier
>> >go-round) that stripped of its hermetic connotations, action-at-a-
>> >distance is an empty concept: it merely repeats the description it
>> >attempts to explain.
>
>Mati:
>
>> Precisely
>
> Then your point is precisely that it's a crappy explanation --
>not that it isn't one at all.
Thank you for trying to put words into my mouth, but I don't need it.
My point is that it is not an explanation. Newton also didn't seem to
claim that it is an explanation. So, in effect, you're saying "even
though Newton explicitly stated that he offers no explanation, I know
otherwise". I'll decline to comment on this.
Mati Meron | "When you argue with a fool,
meron@cars.uchicago.edu | chances are he is doing just the same"
Subject: Re: What is a constant? (was: Sophistry 103)
From: patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 09:51:56 GMT
In article moggin@nando.net (moggin) writes:
>moggin@nando.net (moggin):
>
>> > if a central tenet of logical positivism is in
>> >circulation, and cited with approval, then it must not be dead.
>
>patrick@gryphon.psych.ox.ac.uk (Patrick Juola):
>
>> Um... dunno 'bout this one, moggin. Ever hear of "overlap"?
>>
>> It's a central tenet of Aristotelian physics that rocks fall down.
>> This doesn't mean that Aristotelian physics is still viable in any
>> sort of "scientific" fashion.
>
>But it was certainly viable in that people
>accepted it, talked about it, and so on: it was alive. Which
>was exactly my point above. So if there are still people who
>talk about entelechy, and take it seriously, Aristotle isn't
>dead, either.
Well, I won't bother to quibble about whether or not if some few
nut-cases still believe in flat earths and logical positivism,
that means that flat earths aren't dead. But the point is that
just because some premise of l.p. has been cited doesn't mean
that the citer is a logical positivist. Theories don't come in
neat little packages where you buy one aspect, you buy it all.
Patrick
Subject: Re: Time & space, still (was: Hermeneutics ...)
From: moggin@nando.net (moggin)
Date: 11 Nov 1996 09:03:35 GMT
meron@cars3.uchicago.edu (Mati):
> >> >> But, the destabilization is not in science itself, it is in the way we
> >> >> think about science. Which, as I keep stressing, is not the same
> >> >> thing. When I listen to Bethoveen's "Hammerklavier" sonata (the third
> >> >> part, to be specific) I may appreciate the genius of the composer. At
> >> >> the same time, the feelings the music brings up in me are my own, not
> >> >> the composer's. They're related to his work, but they're not his
> >> >> work.
moggin@nando.net (moggin)
> >> > On your account of physics, the music is no more "his work"
> >> >than the feelings it inspires in you -- his work consists only
> >> >of the notes on the page. Playing them is both unnecessary and
> >> >irrelevant. In short, the hammerklavier is superfluous to the
> >> >"Hammerklavier." (N.B.: I don't say that to make mock -- it's
> >> >a defensible, albeit an awkward position.)
Mati:
> >> It is defensible. Would I have the ability of hearing the music in my
> >> mind just by reading the notes (Some people do, so it is not
> >> impossible) then plying it wouldn't be necessery. But, I don't have
> >> such ability, not even the ability to play the music for myself. So,
> >> I'm like an illiterate story lover, paying somebody to read the
> >> stories for me. [...]
moggin:
> > Not quite what I meant. In order to make an analogy to your
> >idea of physics (it seems to me), you can consider the music _only_
> >as notes on the page. No hammerklavier for the "Hammerklavier" at
> >all -- including the one playing in your mind. The composition is
> >only the written notes, with no reference to the sounds they make
> >on an instrument.
Mati:
> No, why? It would be like saying that the formalism of physics is
> never to be used, only appreciated as equations on page. Did I ever
> said anything of the sort?
Constantly -- you keep playing variations on the theme, "the
physics is the math." You shove aside all thoughts about what it
means, ignore the models built on it, and even dismiss the events
it describes (referring to them as mere "epiphenomena"). That last
is the most striking, since it means you practice physics without
any concern for _physis_. If there's been a single "application of
postmodernism" anywhere along the line, that must've been it.
It's also why you're unable to understand how action-at-a-
distance could be an explanation: you can't grasp the question it's
attempting to answer. For you, the math is enough -- you believe
it's sufficient to point to the inverse square law and stop; the
idea of explaining how gravity has its effect doesn't even seem to
cross your mind. Since you can't see anything for the concept of
action-at-a-distance to explain, you assume it's a description,
and nothing more.
> No, the equivalent for music would be to say that when listening to it
> I don't care what the composer thought about when he wrote it, I don't
> care what his beliefs were, how well did he get along with his
> contemporaries, how well did he get along with his mistress, etc. The
> music speaks for itself.
My feeling, after all this time, is that you don't much care
what _your_ beliefs are. I don't say that because separate them
from your work as a physicist, but because your acquaintance with
them seems rather slim